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INTRODUCTION
It is surprising that after more than one hundred years of
the United States Supreme Court's experience with economic
substantive due process cases, major issues concerning the liti-
gation and adjudication of such cases remain unresolved. The
nature of these issues, some of which are important for consti-
tutional adjudication generally, is well illustrated in a recent
case decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court, Workers' Com-
pensation Insurers Rating Association v. State.'
1. No. C7-82-596 (Minn. Feb. 7, 1983) (per curiam).
[Vol. 68:545
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L THE FACTS OF THE CASE
For the past ten years, the Minnesota workers' compensa-
tion system has provoked controversy and conflict involving
Minnesota employers and employees, insurance companies
writing workers' compensation insurance in the state, state ad-
ministrative agencies, and the Minnesota legislature. Unions
representing Minnesota workers have claimed that the system
does not compensate injured workers adequately or promptly.
Minnesota employers have claimed that the level of benefits
awarded injured workers results in relatively high insurance
rates, which puts them at a competitive disadvantage compared
with employers in other states and is a major factor making for
a bad business climate in Minnesota. The insurers, caught in
the middle of the controversy, take no position on what the
scope and size of workers' compensation benefits ought to be.
They are, however, concerned that insurance rates established
under law be adequate to cover the compensation awards they
must pay to injured workers, the expenses they incur in doing
so, and a reasonable return for the risks they incur in writing
workers' compensation insurance in Minnesota.
Since 1921, workers' compensation insurance rates have
been regulated in Minnesota by order of the commissioner of
insurance or that office's predecessors, the Department of Com-
merce and the Compensation Insurance Board.2 On June 1,
1981, the Minnesota legislature enacted a law, commonly re-
ferred to as chapter 346,3 which changed the compensation ben-
efits payable to injured workers and the administration and
operation of the workers' compensation system.4 For the first
2. See Act of March 15, 1921, ch. 85, § 7, 1921 Minn. Laws 132, 134; MnmN.
STAT. §§ 79.01-.63 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
3. Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611.
4. See MNN. STAT. §§ 175.001-.35, 176.001-.85 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
In 1983 the Minnesota legislature again revised the workers' compensation
system. See Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 287, 1983 Minn. Laws 1231; Act of June 7,
1983, ch. 290, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310. The important changes that chapter 290
made in the provisions of chapter 346 will be noted later but the most signifi-
cant may be mentioned here. Chapter 290 moved up the date of deregulation of
workers' compensation insurance rates from January 1, 1986, to January 1,
1984. See ch. 290, § 2, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1311 (amending MIN. STAT. § 79.071
subd. 1 (1982)). Thereafter the commissioner of insurance will have no author-
ity to impose a schedule of such rates, but has been given important duties to
monitor the ensuing rate competition. See ch. 290, § 12, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1319
(amending MINN. STAT. § 79.51 subd. 3 (1982)).
Article 2 of chapter 287, which added §§ 176A.01-.11 to the 1982 statute, cre-
ated a State Compensation Insurance Fund to compete with private insurers in
writing workers' compensation insurance in Minnesota. The management and
control of the Fund is vested in a board of directors which will appoint a man-
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time since the beginning of administrative regulation of work-
ers' compensation insurance rates in Minnesota, the legislature
itself fixed rates by mandating a reduction in the schedule of
these rates of at least 15% "as a reflection of the impact of' the
changes made by chapter 346.5
On June 5, 1981, following a lengthy, contested proceeding,
Commissioner of Insurance Michael D. Markman issued an or-
der approving an increase in workers' compensation insurance
rates of 11.8%,6 an increase the commissioner found necessary
to satisfy the statutory standards that workers' compensation
rates not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discrimina-
tory."17 On the same day, in order to effectuate the mandate of
section 142, subdivision l(b) of chapter 346, the commissioner,
ager to exercise administrative control. A total of $5,727,400 was appropriated
for fiscal years 1984 and 1985 to help start the Fund. The Fund is obligated to
repay this amount over a 10-year period, and it is not to receive any other state
appropriation at any time. It is to be treated under the law as if it were a pri-
vate insurer and taxed as if it were a private mutual insurance company.
Section 13 of article 2 of chapter 287 requires the commissioner of labor and
industry to report, no later than March 1, 1986, to the legislature and the gover-
nor on the operations of the Fund up to that date and to recommend whether
the operation of the Fund should be continued. Ch. 287, § 13, 1983 Minn. Laws
at 1239.
5. The legislative mandate was embodied in ch. 346, § 142, 1981 Minn.
Laws at 1690, which provided:
Sec. 142. RATE REDUCTION
Subdivision 1. AMOUNT.
Within 15 days olowimg the date of final enactment the commissioner
of insurance shall make a final determination as to the impact of the
provisions of this act on the schedule of rates which will be in effect on
June 2, 1981. The commissioner shall then issue an order, pursuant to
the authority granted in section 11, reducing the schedule of rates and
making other necessary changes to that schedule to reflect the actual
savings which will result from this act. The reduction shall be equal to
or greater than the sum of the following factors:
(a) a reduction of 20.9 percent as a reflection of the impact of sec-
tion 12;
(b) a reduction of 15 percent as a reflection of the impact of
changes in the benefits payable pursuant to chapter 176 and in the ad-
ministration and operation of the Minnesota workers' compensation
system provided by this act.
Subd. 2. EXCEPTION. The commissioner may reduce any of the
changes in the schedule of rates required in subdivision 1, clause (a), if
he finds that a previous rate order issued pursuant to section 79.071 has
already incorporated the required reductions.
6. This order, issued pursuant to MrNN. STAT. § 79.071 subd. 1 (1982), incor-
porated the reduction called for by § 142, subdivision 1(a) of chapter 346, which
was intended to require the commissioner to take account of the investment in-
come of the insurers.
7. MINN. STAT. § 79.071 subd. 1 (1982). The Workers' Compensation Insur-
ers Rating Association of Minnesota appealed the commissioner's order to the
Ramsey County District Court on the ground that the commissioner improp-
erly rejected a recommendation by the Office of Administrative Hearings that
the statutory standard of adequacy called for a net increase of at least 21.5%,
[Vol. 68:545
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
without any prior hearing, issued a second order that reduced
by 15% the maximum rates applicable to all workers' compen-
sation insurance policies issued or renewed on or after July 1,
1981. The second order wiped out the 11.8% increase previously
approved and effected a net reduction in rates of 5%.8
On July 29, 1981, the Workers' Compensation Insurers Rat-
ing Association of Minnesota (Rating Association), the mem-
bership of which consists of the approximately 265 insurance
companies licensed to write workers' compensation insurance
in Minnesota, and thirty of the 265 insurers9 instituted a declar-
atory judgment action in the Minnesota District Court against
the commissioner of insurance and the state of Minnesota. The
action challenged the constitutionality of section 142, subdivi-
sion 1(b) and the commissioner's order effectuating the man-
dated 15% rate reduction on the ground that the statutory
mandate and implementing administrative order violated the
insurers' due process rights under both article I, section 7 of
the Minnesota Constitution' 0 and the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution."
The plaintiffs asked the court to declare section 142, subdi-
vision 1(b) of chapter 346 and the commissioner's implement-
ing order unconstitutional. The plaintiffs further requested
that the court direct the commissioner to reinstate the sched-
ule of rates in effect prior to the 15% reduction and, after hear-
ing, reduce the rates by the amount the commissioner
not 11.8%. The district court rejected the contention of the Rating Association
and the case is now on appeal in the Minnesota Supreme Court.
8. The net reduction of 5% is arrived at by the following calculation: the
pre-5 June 1981-rate plus the 11.8% increase of that rate yields the new rate
prior to the 15% reduction. This figure minus 15% of that new rate equals
95.03% of the original rate, or a net reduction reduction of 4.97%. In short
1.118 - (1.118 x .15) = .9503 (or .0497 less than 1).
9. The Rating Association is an unincorporated association established
under the laws of Minnesota. See Mnh. STAT. §§ 79.01-.23 (1982) (amended in
part and repealed in part 1983). All insurers licensed to write workers' compen-
sation insurance in Minnesota were required to be members of the Rating As-
sociation. Id. § 79.11 repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321. The 30
named plaintiff insurance companies represented the various licensed stock
and mutual workers' compensation insurance companies domiciled in Minne-
sota and elsewhere.
10. The Minnesota Constitution guarantees that no person shall "be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." MINN. CONST. art.
I, § 7.
11. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Rating Association and the named
insurers also challenged the constitutionality of §§ 13 and 14 of Chapter 346,
dealing with the implementation of changes in the Minnesota Assigned Risk
Plan. This challenge was dismissed without prejudice by stipulation prior to
trial.
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determined would reflect the actual cost savings to the insurers
resulting from the changes made by chapter 346. Finally, if any
reductions were made, the insurers were willing to have them
made retroactive so as to apply to all policies issued or re-
newed on or after July 1, 1981, the date when the 15% rate re-
duction became effective.
In essence, the insurers contended that there was no ra-
tional relationship between the expressly stated purpose of
chapter 346-to reduce rates by the amount of the actual cost
savings to the insurers resulting from the changes made by
chapter 346-and the means chosen to effectuate that pur-
pose-the legislatively mandated 15% rate reduction. The
changes made by chapter 346, they contended, rationally justi-
fied no more than a 5% reduction in rates. The difference be-
tween this percentage and the 15% reduction mandated
amounted to fifty million dollars annually in premiums.12
The insurers also submitted that the mandated 15% rate
reduction violated the due process guarantees of the Minnesota
and United States Constitutions because the rates, after the
mandated 15% reduction became effective, deprived them as a
group, and the thirty named insurers severally, of revenues suf-
ficient to cover their expenses and yield a reasonable profit for
the risks incurred in writing workers' compensation insurance
in Minnesota.
On August 10, 1981, the plaintiffs moved for a stay of the
15% rate reduction pending the outcome of their action. The
motion was denied on September 24, 1981.13 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed that denial to the Minnesota Supreme Court, but the
court denied the motion on November 30, 1981, and plaintiffs'
appeal was dismissed without prejudice on December 4, 1981.
Trial was held beginning on January 11, 1982, and conclud-
ing on January 18, 1982. The defendants' motion for summary
judgment was denied. Their motion to dismiss, brought after
the close of plaintiffs' case-in-chief, was denied on January 18,
1982, but the court did dismiss count Ill of the complaint, which
claimed that plaintiffs' due process rights were violated be-
cause the workers' compensation insurance rates resulting
from the mandated 15% reduction deprived them of a fair and
reasonable rate of return on their investment.
12. A change of 1% in the rates is the equivalent of $5,000,000 in premiums
annually.
13. See Memorandum of Judge Joseph P. Summers (attached to Judge
Summers's order denying plaintiffs motion) reprinted infra as Appendix L
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
On March 2, 1982, the district court issued its order declar-
ing that section 142, subdivision 1(b) of chapter 346 was consti-
tutional and dismissing the plaintiffs' action.14 The order also
dismissed the Rating Association as a party to the action on the
ground that it lacked standing to seek a declaration that a law
is unconstitutional. Judgment was entered in accordance with
that order on April 1, 1982.
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's judgment to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court. After hearing oral argument, the court,
in a summary opinion dated February 7, 1983, adopted the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law of the district court and af-
firmed its order for entry of judgment.la The Rating
Association and the insurers decided not to appeal the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's judgment to the United States Supreme
Court.
II. THE STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. THE "RATIONAL BASIS" TEST
The Minnesota Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court have enunciated essentially the same test for
judging the constitutionality of economic legislation challenged
under the due process clause. In Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v.
State,16 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that "under sub-
stantive due process analysis, the means chosen by the chal-
lenged legislation . . . must bear a rational relationship to the
public purpose sought to be served.' 7 Although it reversed the
Minnesota Supreme Court on other grounds, which will be dis-
cussed later, the United States Supreme Court, in Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co. ,18 imposed the same test as had the
Minnesota Supreme Court. The standard of review used by the
Court was "the familiar 'rational basis' test"' 9--- ' whether the
legislative classification . . . is rationally related to achieve-
ment of the statutory purposes." 20 Nevertheless, as Justice
14. Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Ass'n v. State, No. 452706
(Dist. Ct. Minn. March 2, 1982) reprinted infra as Appendix 11 (Lynch, J., find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment).
15. No. C7-82-596 (Minn. Feb. 7, 1983) (per curiam).
16. 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979), rev'd sub nom Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
17. Id. at 87 n.20 (citing Federal Distillers, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 28, 46, 229
N.W.2d 144, 158 (1975)).
18. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
19. Id. at 461 (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
20. 449 U.S. at 463. The Court enunciated this standard as applicable under
1984]
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Powell stated in his dissenting opinion in Schweiker v. Wil-
son,2 1 the Supreme Court of the United States "has employed
numerous formulations for the 'rational basis' test" and
"[m] embers of the Court continue to hold divergent views on
the clarity with which a legislative purpose must ap-
pear ... and about the degree of deference afforded the legis-
lature in suiting means to ends."2 2
1. The Supreme Court Justices' "Divergent Views on the
Clarity with which a Legislative Purpose Must
Appear"
Four recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
illustrate the divergence of the Justices' views on this issue.
a. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz
Under the original Railroad Retirement Act, enacted in
1937, a person who worked for both railroad and nonrailroad
employers and qualified for railroad retirement and social se-
curity benefits could receive benefits under both systems with
an accompanying "windfall" benefit.23 The legislative history of
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, the act that restructured
the railroad retirement system, showed that the payment of
windfall benefits threatened the system with bankruptcy by the
the equal protection clause, but the standard is the same under the due pro-
cess clause. The Court observed in Clover Leaf: "From our conclusion under
equal protection... it follows afortiori that the Act does not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Id. at 470 n.12.
21. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
22. Id. at 243 n.4 (1981) (citations omitted).
23. In footnote one of the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist explained
the "windfall" benefit as follows:
Under the old Act, as under the new, an employee who worked 10
years in the railroad business qualified for railroad retirement benefits.
If the employee also worked outside the railroad industry for a suffi-
cient enough time to qualify for social security benefits, he qualified for
dual benefits. Due to the formula under which those benefits were
computed, however, persons who split their employment between rail-
road and nonrailroad employment received dual benefits in excess of
the amount they would have received had they not split their employ-
ment. For example, if 10 years of either railroad or nonrailroad em-
ployment would produce a monthly benefit of $300, an additional 10
years of the same employment at the same level of creditable compen-
sation would not double that benefit, but would increase it by some
lesser amount to say $500. If that 20 years of service had been divided
equally between railroad and nonrailroad employment, however, the
social security benefit would be $300 and the railroad retirement bene-
fit would also be $300, for a total benefit of $600. The $100 difference in
the example constitutes the "windfall" benefit.
Id. at 168-69 n.1 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 68:545
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year 1981. The 1974 Act, therefore, provided that employees
who lacked the requisite ten years of railroad employment to
qualify for railroad retirement benefits as of January 1, 1975,
would not receive any windfall benefits in the future.2 4 The
Act, however, preserved windfall benefits for (1) persons who
had retired and were receiving dual benefits as of January 1,
1975; and (2) employees who qualified for both railroad and so-
cial security benefits as of January 1, 1975, but who had not re-
tired as of that date, if they (a) performed some railroad
service in 1974, or (b) had a "current connection" 25 with the
railroad industry as of December 31, 1974, or their later retire-
ment date, or (c) had completed twenty-five years of railroad
service as of December 31, 1974.26
The 1974 Act further provided that employees who qualified
for railroad retirement benefits as of January 1, 1975, but who
"lacked a current connection with the railroad industry in 1974
and [also] lacked 25 years of railroad employment, could obtain
a lesser amount of windfall benefit if they had qualified for so-
cial security benefits as of the year (prior to 1975) they left rail-
road employment."27
Thus, an employee was eligible for the full windfall amount
if, as of the changeover date, that employee was not retired,
had eleven years of railroad employment and sufficient
nonrailroad employment to qualify for social security benefits,
and had either worked for the railroad in 1974 or had a current
connection with the railroad as of December 31, 1974, or the
later retirement date. But an employee was not eligible for the
full windfall amount if, as of the changeover date, that em-
24. In footnote three of the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist explained
how this was done:
Congress eliminated future accruals of windfall benefits by establish-
ing a two-tier system for benefits. The first tier is measured by what
the social security system would pay on the basis of combined railroad
and nonrailroad service, while the second tier is based on railroad serv-
ice alone. However, both tiers are part of the railroad retirement sys-
tern, rather than the first tier being placed directly under social
security, and the benefits actually paid by social security on the basis
of nonrailroad employment are deducted so as to eliminate the wind-
fall benefit.
Id- at 169-70 n.3.
25. The term "current connection" was defined in this context to mean
"employment in the railroad industry in 12 of the preceding 30 calendar
months." Id. at 173 n.6 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 231(o) (1976)).
26. See Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, Pub. I No. 93-445, 88 Stat. 1305-51
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976 & Supp. 1981)).




ployee was an unretired individual with twenty-four years of
railroad service and sufficient nonrailroad service to qualify for
social security benefits, unless the employee had neither
worked for the railroad in 1974 nor had a current connection
with the railroad as of December 31, 1974, or the later retire-
ment date.
An employee not eligible for the full windfall amount
would be eligible for reduced windfall benefits if that employee
had ten or more years of railroad employment as of the change-
over date and qualified for social security benefits prior to, but
not after, leaving the railroad industry.
A class action was filed in federal district court charging
that the provisions of the 1974 Act as to who would still be enti-
tled to "windfall" benefits were unconstitutional under the
equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment because it was irrational for Congress to dis-
tinguish between employees who had more than ten years but
less than twenty-five years of railroad employment simply on
the basis of whether they had a "current connection" with the
railroad industry as of January 1, 1975, or as of their later date
of retirement.2 8
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a
declaratory judgment that those provisions of the 1974 Act were
unconstitutional under the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment.2 9 The differentiation based solely on whether
an employee was active in the railroad business as of 1974 was
held not to be "rationally related" to the congressional pur-
poses of insuring the solvency of the railroad retirement sys-
tem and protecting vested benefits.30 In United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz ,31 the Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Rehnquist, reversed the judgment of the district
court and held that the challenged provisions of the 1974 Act
did not deny the plaintiff class equal protection of the law.32
Justice Brennan fied a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Marshall joined.
The majority accepted that in passing the 1974 Act Con-
gress sought "to protect the relative equities of employees and
to provide benefits to career railroad employees," 3 3 and held
28. 449 U.S. at 173-74.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 177.
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that the challenged provisions of the Act were not a "patently
arbitrary or irrational way" to achieve this objective.3 4
The classification here is not arbitrary, says appellant, because it is an
attempt to protect the relative equities of employees and to provide
benefits to career railroad employees. Congress fully protected, for ex-
ample, the expectations of those employees who had already retired
and those unretired employees who had 25 years of railroad employ-
ment. Conversely, Congress denied all windfall benefits to those em-
ployees who lacked 10 years of railroad employment. Congress
additionally provided windfall benefits, in lesser amount, to those em-
ployees with 10 years' railroad employment who had qualified for social
security benefits at the time they had left railroad employment, regard-
less of a current connection with the industry in 1974 or on their retire-
ment date.
Thus, the only eligible former railroad employees denied full wind-
fall benefits are those, like appellee, who had no statutory entitlement
to dual benefits at the time they left the railroad industry, but thereaf-
ter became eligible for dual benefits when they subsequently qualified
for social security benefits. Congress could properly conclude that per-
sons who had actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall bene-
fits while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater
equitable claim to those benefits than the members of appellee's class
who were no longer in railroad employment when they became eligible
for dual benefits. Furthermore, the "current connection" test is not a
patently arbitrary means for determining which employees are "career
railroaders," particularly since the test has been used by Congress
elsewhere as an eligibility requirement for retirement benefits. Con-
gress could assume that those who had a current connection with the
railroad industry when the Act was passed in 1974, or who returned to
the industry before their retirement, were more likely than those who
had left the industry prior to 1974 and who never returned, to be among
the class of persons who pursue careers in the railroad industry, the
class for whom the Railroad Retirement Act was designed.
3 5
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan insisted that
"equal protection scrutiny under the rational-basis test re-
quires the courts first to deduce the independent objectives of
the statute, usually from statements of purpose and other evi-
dence in the statute and legislative history, and second to ana-
lyze whether the challenged classification rationally furthers
achievement of those objectives." 3 6 The Court should not con-
sider the '"imsy or implausible justifications for the legislative
classification, proffered after the fact by Government
attorneys."37
Examining the legislative history of the 1974 Act, Justice
Brennan concluded that its purposes clearly were to place the
railroad retirement system on a sound financial basis and to
34. Id.
35. Id. at 177-78 (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 187.
37. Id. at 184.
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protect "the vested earned benefits of retirees who had already
qualified for them."38 Because the challenged provisions cre-
ated a classification "which deprives some retirees of vested
dual benefits that they had earned prior to 1974," the classifica-
tion "is not only rationally unrelated to the congressional pur-
pose; it is inimical to it."39
Justice Rehnquist replied to Justice Brennan's argument
that the Court was bound by the legislature's actual purposes
in determining the Act's constitutionality:
Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action,
our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, "constitutionally irrelevant
whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision," Flem-
ming v. Nestor, 363 U.S., at 612, because this Court has never insisted
that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. This
is particularly true where the legislature must necessarily engage in a
process of line-drawing. The "task of classifying persons for ... bene-
fits ... inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost
equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides
of the line," Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1976), and the fact the
line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for
legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.4 0
Concurring, Justice Stevens stated that he disagreed with
the Court's view that "merely a 'conceivable' or a 'plausible' ex-
planation for the unequal treatment" would justify it constitu-
tionally.41 At the same time, he disagreed with Justice
Brennan:
I do not, however, share Justice Brennan's conclusion that every
statutory classification must further ... the 'actual purpose' of the leg-
islature. Actual purpose is sometimes unknown. Moreover, undue em-
phasis on actual motivation may result in identically worded statutes
being held valid in one State and invalid in- a neighboring State. I
therefore believe that we must discover a correlation between the clas-
sification and either the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate
purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impar-
tial legislature. If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an ap-
parent aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect. If,
however, the adverse impact may reasonably be viewed as an accepta-
ble cost of achieving a larger goal, an impartial lawmaker could ration-
ally decide that that cost should be incurred.4 2
Justice Stevens viewed the actual purposes of Congress as
(1) protecting the solvency of the entire railroad retirement
system, (2) preserving benefits that had already vested, and (3)
38. Id. at 186.
39. Id. Justice Brennan also argued that the challenged provisions were
not rational even in light of the alternative purposes said to justify them by the
majority. See id. at 193-97.
40. Id. at 179.
41. Id. at 180.
42. Id. at 180-81 (citation omitted).
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increasing the level of payments to beneficiaries whose rights
were not otherwise changed.43 In light of these objectives, he
concluded that it was rational for Congress to reduce the
vested benefits of some employees in order to improve the sol-
vency of the entire program while simultaneously increasing
the benefits of others and, in deciding which vested benefits to
reduce, to favor annuitants whose railroad service was more re-
cent than that of disfavored annuitants who had an equal or
greater quantum of employment. 44
b. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,45 the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme
Court's judgment that a Minnesota law banning nonrefillable
plastic milk containers but not nonrefillable paper milk con-
tainers 6 was unconstitutional under the equal protection and
due process clauses of the federal Constitution because the law
established "a classification which is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."47 The Court also held that the chal-
lenged Act did not violate the commerce clause, an issue raised
by Clover Leaf but not passed on by the Minnesota Supreme
Court.4 8
The statute itself set out its purpose: to discourage the use
of nonreturnable, nonrefillable milk containers and encourage
the use of returnable, reusable milk containers in order to ease
solid waste disposal problems, conserve energy, and promote
resource conservation. 49 Despite the statutory statement of
43. Id. at 181.
44. Id. at 181-82.
45. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). Justice Brennan, who dissented in Fritz, wrote the
majority opinion in this case. Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opin-
ion in Fritz, did not participate in the decision in this case. Justice Stevens,
who concurred in Fritz, dissented in this case. Justice Powell, who joined the
majority in Fritz, dissented in part in this case.
46. Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 268, 1977 Minn. Laws 440 (codified at MmMN.
STAT. § 116F.21-.22 (1980)), repealed by Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 151, § 2, 1981
Minn. Laws 457, 458.
47. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1979), rev'd
sub non. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). In the
Minnesota Supreme Court, Clover Leaf did not contend that chapter 268 vio-
lated the due process clause or equal protection guarantee of the Minnesota
Constitution. See 289 N.W.2d at 81. The Minnesota Supreme Court decided the
case solely on federal constitutional grounds. See id. The plaintiffs in the Rat-
ing Association case contended that § 142 subdivision l(b) of chapter 346 vio-
lated the due process clauses of the Minnesota and federal Constitutions.
48. See 449 U.S. at 470-74.
49. Ch. 268, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws at 440.
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purpose, however, the state district court found that the "actual
basis" for the Act was "to promote the economic interests of
certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries at
the expense of the economic interests of other segments .of the
dairy industry and the plastics industry"--an illegitimate state
purpose.5 0 The Minnesota Supreme Court overruled the dis-
trict court on this point. It found that the purpose of the Act
was "to promote the state interests of encouraging the reuse
and recycling of materials and reducing the amount and type of
material entering the solid waste stream"-a legitimate state
purpose.51
In the United States Supreme Court, Clover Leaf renewed
its argument that the actual purpose of the Act was to "isolate
from interstate competition the interests of certain segments of
the local dairy and pulpwood industries." 52 The Court rejected
this argument and accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's
contrary determination, that the articulated purpose of the Act
was its actual purpose. "In equal protection analysis," Justice
Brennan wrote, "this Court will assume that the objectives ar-
ticulated by the legislature are actual purposes of the statute,
unless an examination of the circumstances forces us to con-
clude that they 'could not have been a goal of the legisla-
tion."' 5 3 The Act's legislative history, according to the Court,
supported the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion as to the
principal purposes of the Act.54
Justice Powell dissented on the ground that the Court
should not have decided the commerce clause issue but should
have remanded the case "with instructions to consider specifi-
cally whether the statute discriminated impermissibly against
interstate commerce."5 5 For this purpose, he would have re-
quired the Minnesota Supreme Court to determine whether the
statute was intended to promote its stated purpose or the "ac-
50. See 449 U.S. at 460 (citation omitted).
51. 289 N.W.2d at 82.
52. 449 U.S. at 463 n.7 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 23, Clover Leaf).
53. 449 U.S. at 463 n.7 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648
n.16 (1975)). Justice Brennan added.
The contrary evidence cited by respondents ... is easily understood,
in context, as economic defense of an Act genuinely proposed for envi-
ronmental reasons. We will not invalidate a state statute under the
Equal Protection Clause merely because some legislators sought to ob-
tain votes for the measure on the basis of its beneficial side effects on
state industry.
449 U.S. at 463 n.7.
54. 449 U.S. at 463 n.7.
55. 449 U.S. at 477.
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tual" purposes found by the district court.56 Justice Powell
agreed, however, that it "was entirely appropriate for [the Min-
nesota Supreme Court] to accept, for purposes of equal protec-
tion analysis, the purpose expressed in the statute."57 There is
no reason to suppose that Justice Powell would not have ac-
cepted "the purpose expressed in the statute" for due process
analysis as well. Commerce clause analysis, according to Jus-
tice Powell, is different: "Under the Commerce Clause, a court
is empowered to disregard a legislature's statement of purpose
if it considers it a pretext."5 8
c. Schweiker v. Wilson
The Supplementary Security Income (SSI) program, a part
of the Social Security Act, provides a subsistence allowance to
the nation's needy, aged (sixty-five or older), blind, and dis-
abled persons. Residents of public institutions are generally
excluded from eligibility for full SSI payments, but "comfort al-
lowances" of twenty-five dollars per month are provided to
otherwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions that
receive Medicaid funds for their care.59 This small stipend is
intended to enable the institutionalized needy to purchase
small comfort items not supplied by the institution.
The SSI scheme was challenged in a class action represent-
ing all residents of public mental institutions between the ages
of twenty-one and sixty-five. This group is ineligible for Medi-
caid support and so is not provided with "comfort allowances."
The federal district court held that the exclusion of this
group from "comfort allowance" payments was unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it violated the equal protection com-
ponent of the fifth amendment's due process clause because
the classification did not have a "substantial relation" to the
"primary purpose" of the legislation.60
In Schweiker v. Wilson,61 by a five-to-four vote, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court.
Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Rehnquist.
Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
56. Id. at 475.
57. Id. at 476.
58. Id. at 476 n.2.
59. Social Security Act, § 1611(e) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e) (1) (A) (1976).
60. 450 U.S. at 229-30.
61. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
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Justice Blackmun restated the rational basis test to incor-
porate his view of what legislative purpose is constitutionally
significant:
[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether the classification employed in
§ 1611(e) (1) (B) advances legislative goals in a rational fashion....
[Allthough this rational standard is "not a toothless one," Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976), it does not allow us to substitute our
personal notions of good policy for those of Congress .... As long as
the classificatory scheme chosen by Congress rationally advances a
reasonable and identifiable governmental objective, we must disregard
the existence of other methods of allocation that we, as individuals,
perhaps would have preferred. 62
Justice Blackmun found sufficient indication in the "sparse"
legislative record that "the decision to incorporate the Medicaid
eligibility standards into the SSI scheme must be considered
Congress' deliberate, considered choice."63 -Accordingly, "we
decline to regard such deliberate action as the result of inad-
vertence or ignorance."64 He proceeded:
Having found the adoption of the Medicaid standards intentional,
we deem it logical to infer from Congress' deliberate action an intent to
further the same subsidiary purpose that lies behind the Medicaid ex-
clusion, which, as no party denies, was adopted because Congress be-
lieved the States to have a "traditional" responsibility to care for those
institutionalized in public mental institutions. The Secretary, empha-
sizing the then-existing congressional desire to economize the dis-
bursement of federal funds, argues that the decision to limit
distribution of the monthly stipend to inmates of public institutions
who are receiving Medicaid funds "is rationally related to the legiti-
mate legislative desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of
individuals whose care and treatment arebeing fully provided for by
state and local government units" and "may be said to implement a
congressional policy choice to provide supplemental financial assist-
ance for only those residents of public institutions who already receive
significant federal support in the form of Medicaid coverage." Brief for
Appellant 27-28. We cannot say that the belief that the States should
continue to have the primary responsibility for making this small
"comfort money" allowance available to those residing in state-run in-
stitutions is an irrational basis for withholding from them federal gen-
eral welfare f.unds.65
Justice Blackmun then added:
This Court has granted a "strong presumption of constitutionality" to
legislation conferring monetary benefits, Mathews v. De Castro, 429
U.S. [181, 185 (1976)], because it believes that Congress should have
discretion in deciding how to expend necessarily limited resources.
Awarding this type of benefits inevitably involves the. kind of line-
drawing that will leave some comparably needy person outside the fa-
vored circle. We cannot say that it was irrational of Congress, in view
62. 450 U.S. at 234-35 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 235.
64. Id. at 236 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 236-37 (citations omitted).
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of budgetary constraints, to decide that it is the Medicaid recipients in
public institutions that are the most needy and the most deserving of
the small monthly supplement.
6 6
Justice Powell dissented strongly from the majority's approach
to the issue of legislative purpose. He wrote:
[A]n important touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is
how readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature intended to
serve .... When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears in the leg-
islative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme itself, a court has
some assurance that the legislature has made a conscious policy
choice. Our democratic system requires that legislation intended to
serve a discernible purpose receive the most respectful deference....
Yet, the question of whether a statutory classification discriminates ar-
bitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted to serve an
identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose can be suggested only
by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the constitutionality
of a statute, a reviewing court may be presented not so much with a
legislative policy choice as its absence.
In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported by the
legislative history. When no indication of legislative purpose appears
other than the current position of the Secretary, the Court should re-
quire that the classification bear a "fair and substantial relation" to the
asserted purpose. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920). This marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would
test the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal pro-
tection review as something more than "a mere tautological recognition
of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do." [United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).] 6 7
Justice Powell also expressed his dissatisfaction with some
of the views about legislative purpose expressed in prior cases:
Some of our cases suggest that the actual purpose of a statute is
irrelevant, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960), and that the
statute must be upheld "if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify" its discrimination, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961). Although these cases preserve an important caution,
they do not describe the importance of actual legislative purpose in our
analysis. We recognize that a legislative body rarely acts with a single
mind and that compromises blur purpose. Therefore, it is appropriate
to accord some deference to the executive's view of legislative intent,
as similarly we accord deference to the consistent construction of a
statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement.
E.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Ascertainment of actual
purpose to the extent feasible, however, remains an essential step in
equal protection.6 8
Applying his approach to the challenged provision, Justice
Powell concluded:
66. Id. at 238-39 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 243-45 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 244 n.6 (emphasis added).
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Neither the structure of [the provision] nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to be served
by denying appellees the small SSI allowance.... The structure of
the statute offers no guidance as to purpose because [the provision] is
drawn in reference to the policies of Medicaid rather than to the poli-
cies of SSI. By mechanically applying the criteria developed for Medi-
caid, Congress appears to have avoided considering what criteria would
be appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a person can
reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment. The importation of
eligibility criteria from one statute to another creates significant risks
that irrational distinctions will be made between equally needy
people.6
9
He rejected the government's argument that "Congress ration-
ally could make the judgment that the States should bear the
responsibility for... providing treatment and minimal care."70
Justice Powell maintained:
There is no logical link ... between these two responsibilities....
[R] esidence in a public mental institution, as opposed to residence in a
state medical hospital or a private mental hospital, bears no relation to
any policy of the SSI program.... If SSI pays a cash benefit relating
to personal needs other than maintenance and medical care, it is irrele-
vant whether the State or the Federal Government is paying for the
maintenance and medical care; the patients' need remains the same,
the likelihood that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the
same.
7 1
Justice Powell concluded "that Congress had no rational
reason for refusing to pay a comfort allowance to [the challeng-
ers], while paying it to numerous otherwise identically situated
disabled indigents."7 2 "This unexplained difference in treat-
ment must have been a legislative oversight. I therefore
dissent."7 3
d. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,74 the
Supreme Court invalidated an Iowa statute which generally
prohibited the use of sixty-five-foot double-trailer trucks within
its borders. Most truck combinations were restricted by the
statute to fifty-five feet in length, but double-trailer trucks, mo-
bile homes, trucks carrying vehicles such as tractors and other
farm equipment, and single-trailer trucks hauling livestock
could be as long as sixty feet. The statute also permitted Iowa
cities abutting the state line to adopt, by local ordinance, the
69. Id. at 245 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 246.
71. Id. at 246-47 (emphasis deleted).
72. Id. at 247.
73. Id.
74. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
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length limitations of the adjoining state. If a city exercised this
option, otherwise oversized trucks were permitted within the
city limits and in nearby commercial zones. Finally, Iowa truck
manufacturers could obtain permits to ship trucks as large as
seventy feet outside the state, and permits were also available
to move oversized mobile homes from points within Iowa or de-
liver them to Iowa residents.7 5
Iowa defended the law as a reasonable safety measure.76
But the Supreme Court held that it unconstitutionally bur-
dened interstate commerce.7 7 No majority opinion supported
the six-to-three decision. Justice Powell wrote a plurality opin-
ion, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice
Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Marshall
joined. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart.
Justice Powell accepted that the purpose of the statute was
to promote safety, as Iowa claimed, but went on to say:
But the incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or
safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack.
Regulations designed for that salutary purpose nevertheless may fur-
ther the purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so sub-
stantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.
7 8
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan disagreed with
Justice Powell's view of the purpose of the Iowa statute. He
was convinced that Iowa's actual reason for banning sixty-five-
foot doubles had nothing to do with safety: "Rather, Iowa
sought to discourage interstate truck traffic on Iowa's high-
ways."7 9 For this conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on "the
record and the legislative history of the Iowa regulation."80 The
record, according to Justice Brennan, disclosed "the obvious
fact that the safety characteristics of 65-foot doubles did not
provide the motivation for either legislators or Governor in
maintaining the regulation."8 1 Rather, the actual purpose of
75. Id. at 665-66.
76. Id. at 667.
77. Id. at 669.
78. Id. at 670.
79. Id. at 681-82 (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 683.
81. Id. at 685. The "record" relied upon by Justice Brennan included the
following facts recounted by Justice Powell
In 1974, the legislature passed a bill that would have permitted 65-
foot doubles in the State.... Governor Ray vetoed the bill. He said:
I find sympathy with those who are doing business in our state and
whose enterprises could gain from increased cargo carrying ability
by trucks. However, with this bill, the Legislature has pursued a
course that would benefit only a few Iowa-based companies while
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the Iowa legislature was "protectionist in nature" and thus "im-
permissible under the Commerce Clause."8 2
Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the plurality
opinion that highway safety was the actual purpose of the Iowa
law banning sixty-five-foot doubles. He rejected Justice Bren-
nan's view that "the Court should consider only the purpose
the Iowa legislators actually sought to achieve by the length
limit, and not the purposes advanced by Iowa's lawyers in de-
fense of the statute."8 3 He maintained that Justice Brennan's
argument "has been consistently rejected by the Court in other
contexts"84 and that Justice Brennan could "cite no authority
for the proposition that possible legislative purposes suggested
by a State's lawyers should not be considered in Commerce
Clause cases." 85 Justice Rehnquist advanced the following rea-
sons for rejecting Justice Brennan's view:
[I]t assumes that individual legislators are motivated by one discerni-
ble "actual" purpose, and ignores the fact that different legislators may
vote for a single piece of legislation for widely different reasons....
How, for example, would a court adhering to the views expressed in
the opinion concurring in the judgment approach a statute, the legisla-
tive history of which indicated that 10 votes were based on safety con-
siderations, 10 votes were based on protectionism, and the statute
passed by a vote of 40-20? What would the actual purpose of the legis-
lature have been in that case? This Court has wisely "never insisted
that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute."8 6
providing a great advantage for out-of-state trucking firms and
competitors at the expense of our Iowa citizens."
Id. at 677 (citation omitted).
Governor Ray further commented that "if we have thousands more trucks
crossing our state, there will be millions of additional miles driven in Iowa and
that does create a genuine concern for safety." Id. at 677 n.23 (citation omitted).
After the veto, the "border cities exemption" was immediately enacted and
signed by the Governor. Id. at 677.
The parochial restrictions in the mobile home provision were enacted after
Governor Ray vetoed a bill that would have permitted the interstate shipment
of all mobile homes through Iowa. Governor Ray commented, in his veto
message: 'This bill . . . would make Iowa a bridge state as these oversized
units are moved into Iowa after being manufactured in another state and sold
in a third. None of this activity would be of particular economic benefit to
Iowa." Id. at 666-67 n.7.
Justice Powell inferred from this legislative history that "the deference tra-
ditionally accorded a State's safety judgment is not warranted." Id. at 678 (cita-
tion omitted). This was "not enough" according to Justice Brennan. Id. at 685
n.5.
82. Id. at 685 (emphasis deleted).
83. Id. at 702 (emphasis in original) (citing United States Railroad Retire-
ment Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187-88 (1980) and Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, 405 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1981)).
84. 450 U.S. at 702.
85. I&
86. Id. at 702-03 (emphasis deleted) (citations omitted) (quoting United
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Justice Rehnquist agreed with the position taken by Jus-
tice Powell in Clover Leaf, that the Court's approach to the de-
termination of legislative purpose might be different in
commerce clause cases than in equal protection cases. 87 But
he did not agree with Justice Powell that the purpose ex-
pressed in a statute should control in equal protection cases.
He would only go so far.
It may be more reasonable to suppose that proffered purposes of a stat-
ute, whether advanced by a legislature or post hoc by lawyers, cloak
impermissible aims in Commerce Clause cases than in equal protec-
tion cases. Statutes generally favor one group at the expense of an-
other, and the Equal Protection Clause was not designed to proscribe
this in the way that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent lo-
cal barriers to interstate commerce. Thus even if my Brother Bren-
nan's arguments were supportable in Commerce Clause cases, that
analysis would not carry over of its own force into the realm of equal
protection generally.8 8
"But," he added, "even in the Commerce Clause area, [Justice
Brennan's] arguments are unpersuasive." 89
e. Implications of the Four Cases for the Rating Association
Case
In considering the Rating Association case, it is clear be-
yond any doubt that the actual purpose of the legislatively
mandated 15% reduction in workers' compensation insurance
rates was to reflect the cost savings to the insurers resulting
from the changes made by chapter 346. The title to chapter 346
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)). The views
expressed by Justice Rehnquist are similar to those advanced by Chief Justice
Warren in his majority opinion in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968):
Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous
matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the
Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the pur-
pose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in
this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of mis-
reading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we
are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitu-
tional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Con-
gressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of
others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is un-
wise [to void] legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to
enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or an-
other legislator made a "wiser" speech about it.
391 U.S. at 383-84 (citation omitted).
87. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 476 & n.2
(1981). For a discussion of Justice Powell's position in Clover Leaf, see supra
text accompanying notes 55-58.
88. 450 U.S. at 703 n.13.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
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declared one of its purposes to be "mandating an insurance
rate reduction by an amount reflecting cost savings due to ben-
efit and administrative changes" made by the statute.90 Section
142, subdivision 1 required the commissioner of insurance to is-
sue an order "reducing the schedule of rates ... to reflect the
actual savings which will result from" the statute.91 The com-
missioner was authorized to issue this order without following
the contested case procedures that would otherwise have been
required.92 Indeed, the statute authorized the commissioner to
issue the order without any prior hearing.93 Finally, section
142, subdivision 1 (b) required the commissioner to issue an or-
der reducing insurance rates by at least 15% "as a reflection of
the impact of changes [made by chapter 346] in the benefits
payable pursuant to chapter 176 and in the administration and
operation of the Minnesota workers' compensation system."94
I share Professor Gerald Gunther's opinion that the consti-
tutionality of legislation challenged under the equal protection
or due process clause should be judged in the light "of legisla-
tive purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not
merely in conjecture." 95 This standard does not necessarily ex-
clude purposes proffered for the first time during the course of
litigation by lawyers seeking to uphold the constitutionality of
legislation. But it would call for closer scrutiny than that im-
plicit in the views of Chief Justice Warren9 6 and Justice
Rehnquist.
It might have been argued that the constitutionality of the
mandated rate reduction did not depend solely upon whether
the reduction was rationally related to its actual purpose but
that it was constitutional if it was rationally related to another
"plausible" legislative purpose-namely, to fix workers' com-
pensation insurance rates at, but not below, the minimum rates
within the constitutional zone of reasonableness. In his memo-
randum denying the insurers' motion for a stay, Minnesota Dis-
trict Court Judge Summers made this argument, writing that
even "[a] ssuming for the purpose of argument that the legisla-
90. Ch. 346, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1611.
91. Ch. 346, § 142 subd. 1, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1690.
92. Ch. 346, § 11, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1617 (amending MAm'N. STAT. § 79.071(1980)) amended by ch. 290 § 2-3, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1311.
93. See id.
94. Ch. 346, § 142 subd. 1(b), 1981 Minn. Laws at 1690.
95. Gunther, The Supreme Cour, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 21 (1972).
96. See supra note 86; text accompanying notes 83-86.
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ture acted in error in requiring a 15% rate cut, there is no evi-
dence that any individual insurer will now be forced to do
business in Minnesota at a loss ratio which would amount to a
confiscation."9 7 But the attorney general, representing the
state of Minnesota and the commissioner of insurance, never
made this argument. Indeed, the Rating Association and the
thirty insurers tried to present data and testimony in the dis-
trict court to show that the existing rates were at levels below
the constitutional zone of reasonableness and, for this reason,
violated the due process guarantees of the Minnesota and
United States Constitutions. As we shall see, the attorney gen-
eral objected to the introduction of this evidence and the objec-
tion was sustained by the district court and the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
In any case, none of the four United States Supreme Court
cases examined required the Minnesota courts to test the valid-
ity of the mandated 15% rate reduction by its relation to any
purpose other than that expressly articulated in the language
of chapter 346. Justice Rehnquist began his opinion in Fritz by
emphasizing that the "plain language" of the 1974 Act's section
containing the challenged provisions "marks the beginning and
end of our inquiry."9 8 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Bren-
nan correctly pointed out that the "plain language" of the sec-
tion in question "can tell us only what the classification is; it
can tell us nothing about the purpose of the classification, let
alone the relationship between the classification and that pur-
pose."9 9 Fritz, then, extends only to a case in which the plain
language of the statute tells us nothing about the legislative
purpose. In such a case, the majority opinion holds that the
Court is not bound to test the rationality of the statute by the
purpose that may appear from a study of the Act's legislative
history, but may uphold the constitutionality of the statute if it
is rational in light of some other plausible purpose suggested
by the statute's defenders, or even by the Court itself. One
cannot assume that the majority in Fritz would have reached
out for some purpose other than Congress's actual purpose in
order to uphold the statute if its plain language had revealed
Congress's actual purpose. In the absence of such plain lan-
guage, the Court may not wish to be bound by legislative his-
tory. As Justice Stevens argued in his concurring opinion, the
97. See Appendix I, infra, at 668.
98. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 (1980).
99. Id. at 186-87.
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"actual purpose" of the legislature in such a case may be un-
known, even after studying the legislative history.100 Or, the
legislative history may reveal conflicting purposes.
Furthermore, the Rating Association case was clearly not
the kind of case assumed by Chief Justice Warren in United
States v. O'Brien.10 l In O'Brien, Chief Justice Warren assumed
that a statute might be held unconstitutional if tested by the
legislature's actual purpose, but then the legislature might re-
enact precisely the same statute without more ado and make
clear it was seeking to effectuate some other purpose to which
the statute had a rational relationship.102 This was Fritz and it
seems fruitless for a court to declare a statute unconstitutional
in such a case. But if the mandated 15% rate reduction had
been declared unconstitutional because it bore no reasonable
relationship to the cost savings effectuated by chapter 346, the
Minnesota legislature could not, without more ado, reenact the
same reduction by saying its purpose was to bring workers'
compensation insurance rates down to, but not below, the mini-
mum rates within the constitutional zone of reasonableness.
The Minnesota legislature would not have known whether a
15% reduction would or would not accomplish this alternative
purpose. It would have had to investigate and study the matter
afresh and only then could it have decided whether to reenact
section 142, subdivision 1 (b). It would have been sheer coinci-
dence if the legislature again came up with the 15% figure, even
assuming that some reduction in rates proved to be warranted
by the suggested alternative purpose.
Finally, Fritz, as well as the cases on which Justice Rehn-
quist primarily relied in Fritz, Dandridge v. Williams, 0 3 and
Jefferson v. Hackney,10 4 involved the allocation of benefits. The
Court is more likely to assume a more deferential stance,, and
look for any sustaining legislative purpose, in testing the ra-
tionality of governmental allocation of benefits than in testing
the rationality of governmental imposition of burdens or obliga-
100. Id. at 180.
101. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
102. See id. at 384 supra note 86. I do not think it can generally be as-
sumed, as Chief Justice Warren did in O'Brien, that if a statute otherwise valid
on its face was nullified because of its articulated purpose, it would always be
reenacted and accompanied by a "wiser" statement of purpose. Confronted
with the Supreme Court declaring a statutory provision unconstitutional be-
cause of its "actual purpose," support for the provision might erode.
103. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
104. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
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tions. The Rating Association case, of course, fell into the lat-
ter category.
Clover Leaf lo5 supports the position that the constitutional-
ity of the mandated 15% rate reduction should have been deter-
mined solely in light of its articulated actual purpose. There
were no circumstances which could have forced the courts to
conclude that the purpose expressed in section 142, subdivision
l(b) of chapter 346 could not have been its goal.
Nevertheless, the actual purpose of the Act in Clover Leaf,
as viewed by the Minnesota and United States Supreme
Courts, helped to sustain the Act's constitutionality; the alter-
native purpose suggested by Clover Leaf was an illegitimate
purpose that would have led to the Act's invalidation under the
commerce clause. We do not know for certain what the Clover
Leaf majority would have done if the situation had been re-
versed and the purpose found by the courts to be the actual
legislative purpose would have led to the Act's invalidation
while a plausible alternative purpose suggested by the Act's
proponents would have led to upholding its constitutionality.
Clover Leaf, therefore, did not settle the controversy between
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan in Fritz.
Schweiker v. Wilson1 0 6 also supports the position that the
constitutionality of the mandated 15% rate reduction should
have been determined solely in light of its articulated purpose.
Four Justices joined Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in
Schweiker, that "[a scertainment of actual purpose to the ex-
tent feasible ... remains an essential step in equal protec-
tion."107 Even according to Justice Blackmun and the majority,
the rational basis test must be applied in light of a "reasonable
and identifiable governmental objective,"l0 8 which Justice
Blackmun found in the "sparse" legislative history. 0 9 The only
"reasonable and identifiable governmental objective" in the
Rating Association case was that expressly articulated in the
text of the statute.
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,110 the Iowa
truck limits case, all the Justices applied the rational basis test
in light of the "actual purpose" of the Iowa legislature. The
four Justices in the plurality, however, disagreed with the con-
105. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
106. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
107. Id. at 244 n.6.
108. Id. at 235.
109. Id.
110. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
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curting Justices as to what was the "actual purpose."' l The
dissenting Justices tested the Iowa statute in light of the "ac-
tual purpose" assumed by the plurality, even though Justice
Rehnquist argued that the Court could consider possible legis-
lative purposes suggested by a state's lawyers, if those pur-
poses would validate the statute. This argument was not the
basis of his dissenting opinion, however. He merely contended
that even if the Court agreed with Justice Brennan that Iowa's
"actual purpose" was parochialism, it could still consider the
purpose suggested by Iowa's lawyers-safety. But he regarded
safety as the actual purpose.112
Even if we accept the arguments made by Justice Rehn-
qulst against Justice Brennan's actual purpose theory, those
reasons do not apply to the hypothetical situation assumed in
the Rating Association case for the reasons set forth in the
above discussion of Fritz, on which Justice Rehnquist relied.
As noted earlier, there can be no doubt that the actual purpose
of the Minnesota legislature in mandating the 15% rate reduc-
tion was to reflect the cost savings effected by chapter 346.
Again, it should be recalled that the attorney general suggested
no other legislative purpose by which to test the constitutional-
ity of the mandated reduction.
2. The Degree of Deference Accorded the Legislature in
Suiting Means to Ends
As Professor Gunther has written, the United States
Supreme Court in passing on the constitutionality of economic
regulation under the due process clause has engaged in "mini-
mal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.""l 3 This
"hands off" approach has been employed by the Court not only
when legislative ends have been challenged as unconstitutional
but also when the means chosen by the legislature to effectuate
a legitimate end have been challenged on the ground that they
have no "real and substantial relation" to that end.114 As a re-
sult, no statutory economic regulation has been nullified on
substantive due process grounds since 1937.115
111. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
113. Gunther, supra note 95, at 8.
114. This is the theoretically operative standard formulated by the Court in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
115. Only one statutory economic regulation has been invalidated on equal
protection grounds since 1937. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). This de-
cision was overruled in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
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The legitimacy of the end sought by chapter 346--to reduce
rates by the amount of the cost savings to the insurers result-
ing from that statute-was not disputed in the Rating Associa-
tion case. Rather, the insurers contended that the mandated
15% rate reduction had no "rational," "reasonable," or "fair" re-
lation to the actual cost savings occasioned by chapter 346 and
therefore was "arbitrary" and violative of due process."16 The
Rating Association and the insurers maintained that the mini-
mal, virtually nonexistent, review accorded the usual legislative
choice of means for economic regulation was not warranted in
testing the validity of the legislatively mandated 15% rate re-
duction. A number of reasons support this contention and indi-
cate why the Rating Association case was an unusual economic
due process case. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ply-
ler v. Doe"17 seems to say that the degree of deference with
which the Court will apply the "rationality test" in reviewing a
state legislative judgment will depend upon the particular cir-
cumstances of the case.118 The particular circumstances of the
Rating Association case did not warrant a high degree of judi-
cial deference to the legislatively mandated 15% rate reduction.
The "hands-off" policy of the United States Supreme Court
in economic due process cases is due to the Court's unwilling-
ness to "strike down... laws, regulatory of business and in-
dustrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.""19 In
seeking to invalidate the mandated 15% rate reduction, how-
116. Nothing turns, theoretically or practically, on any purported distinction
among "rational," "arbitrary," "reasonable," and "fair." The dictionary defines
"rational" as "agreeable to reason" and gives "reasonable" as a synonym. WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNATiONAL DICTIONARY 2066 (unabridged 2d ed. 1946). "Reason-
able" is defined as "just"; "fair-minded"; "equitable." Id. at 2074. "Arbitrary" is
the Latin equivalent of "unreasonable" or "irrational" and denotes an unrea-
soning decisiveness. Id. at 138.
The "numerous formulations" of the rational basis test to which Justice
Powell referred essentially impose a standard of reasonableness between
means and ends. In a recent case, for example, Justice Brennan, speaking for
the Court, stated that in applying the deferential standard of review under the
equal protection clause, the Justices "seek only the assurance that the classifi-
cation at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose."
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). In a recent case declaring § 103 of chapter
346 unconstitutional under the equal protection guarantees of the Minnesota
and United States Constitutions, the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted this
standard. See Nelson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 580, 581 (Minn. 1981). The test
under substantive due process would be the same as under equal protection.
117. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
118. See id. .see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).




ever, the insurers were not asking the courts to impose their
own views of wise economic or social policy upon the Minne-
sota legislature. Nor were the insurers seeking to deprive the
Minnesota legislature of effective means to accomplish the ob-
jective of chapter 346. The insurers requested that, upon de-
claring the mandated 15% rate reduction unconstitutional, the
Minnesota Supreme Court direct the commissioner of insur-
ance to reinstate the preexisting schedule of rates until the
commissioner held a hearing. After the hearing, the commis-
sioner could reduce the rates by an amount determined to re-
flect the actual cost savings to the insurers resulting from the
changes made by chapter 346 and could make the reduction ret-
roactive so as to apply to all policies issued or renewed on or
after July 1, 1981, the date when the mandated reduction be-
came effective.
The insurers asked the Minnesota courts to determine
whether the actual cost savings to the insurers resulting from
the changes made by chapter 346 reasonably justified a reduc-
tion of 15% in the workers' compensation insurance rates.
They argued that because the legislature's judgment that the
changes justified such a reduction was a particular, quantita-
tive-not policy-judgment, it was not entitled to the degree of
deference usually accorded by the courts to the legislature's
choice of means to effectuate its purposes. An examination of
Clover Leaf, the cases cited therein, and the other cases in
which the United States Supreme Court has deferred to legisla-
tive wisdom about economic or social policy reveals that none
involved complex, quantitative judgments by the legislature,
and especially, as in the Rating Association case, judgments
about relatively small percentage differences in rate levels that
amount to very significant sums to those affected. The five
cases cited in Clover Leaf will be examined first.
Vance v. Bradley120 upheld a federal law requiring retire-
ment at age sixty of federal employees covered by the Foreign
Service retirement system but not of civil service employees
serving overseas under similar conditions and facing compara-
ble hardships. The Court emphasized that the judgment that
the Foreign Service needed a sixty-year age limit more than
other departments of the federal government was a policy deci-
sion for Congress, not the courts, to make. 12 ' City of New Ore-
120. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
121. See id. at 102, 106-07.
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ans v. Dukes122 sustained a 1972 New Orleans ordinance
barring pushcart food vendors from the French Quarter, but ex-
empting those vendors (two in number) "who have continu-
ously operated the same business... for eight or more years
prior to January 1, 1972."123 To have invalidated the ordinance
would have thwarted the legislative policy embodied in the
grandfather clause. The Court noted that "rational distinctions
may be made with substantially less than mathematical exacti-
tude,"124 adding that 'the judiciary may not sit as a superlegis-
lature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental
rights nor proceed along suspect lines." 2 5 The phrase "sub-
stantially less than mathematical exactitude" was used by the
Court metaphorically when the issue was "the wisdom or desir-
ability of le7 islative policy," and not a complex, quantitative
judgment such as that made in mandating a 15% rate reduc-
tion. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,126 another case cited
in Clover Leaf, upheld a state law requiring employers to give
their employees four hours off from work with full pay in order
to vote. Again, invalidation of the law would have negated state
policy. In this context, the Court explained:
The judgment of the legislature that time out for voting should cost the
employee nothing may be a debatable one. It is indeed conceded by
the opposition to be such. But if our recent cases mean anything, they
leave debatable issues as respects business, economic, and social af-
fairs to legislative decision.1 2 7
Henderson Co. v. Thompson 128 sustained a Texas statute and
implementing administrative order prohibiting the use of sweet
natural gas (as opposed to sour gas, which contains hydrogen
sulphide) for the manufacture of carbon black. This was done
because both sweet and sour natural gas could be used to man-
ufacture carbon black but only sweet gas could be used for fuel
and light. United States v. Carolene Products Co.129 upheld a
federal prohibition of the interstate shipment of skimmed milk
mixed with fionmilk fats.
All the other great cases usually cited to demonstrate that
economic regulation merits "only the mildest review under the
122. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
123. Id. at 298.
124. 427 U.S. at 303.
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
127. Id. at 425.
128. 300 U.S. 258 (1937).
129. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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Fourteenth Amendment"' 30 also involved broad legislative poli-
cies and not the particular, complex, quantitative judgment
needed to fix the level of rates. Lindsley v. National Carbonic
Gas Co. 131 upheld a New York law prohibiting the owner of a
property's surface from pumping water, gas, or oil from wells
on that property penetrating the rock, but not from those that
did not, and from pumping for the purpose of collecting and
selling the gas apart from the water, but not for other purposes.
The Supreme Court sustained a New York law providing for
the administrative fixing of minimum and maximum retail
prices for milk in Nebbia v. New York,132 a state minimum
wage law for women in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,33 and
a state law limiting the fees or compensation of private employ-
ment agencies in Olsen v. Nebraska.3 4 Lincoln Federal Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron Metal Co. 135 upheld state "right to
work" laws requiring that employment decisions not be based
on union membership. Ferguson v. Skrupa136 sustained a Kan-
sas law prohibiting anyone from engaging in the business of
debt adjusting except as an incident to the lawful practice of
law. An Oklahoma law that made it unlawful for an optician to
fit or duplicate lenses without a prescription from an
opthalmologist or optometrist was upheld in Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc. ' 3 7 Finally, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. ' 3 8 sustained an
Arkansas law requiring "full crews" on railroads.
Similarly, the crucial distinction between Clover Leaf and
the Rating Association case is that invalidation of the means
employed by the Minnesota legislature in Clover Leaf would
have prevented the Minnesota legislature from effectuating a
number of important policies. It would have prevented the
Minnesota legislature from banning nonreturnable plastic milk
containers without at the same time banning nonreturnable pa-
perboard containers and thereby would have prevented the leg-
islature from experimenting with a step-by-step approach to
the solution of Minnesota's waste disposal and energy conser-
vation problems. It would have prevented the Minnesota legis-
130. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 207 (1976).
131. 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
132. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
133. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
134. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
135. 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
136. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
137. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
138. 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
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lature from banning the introduction of a new plastic
nonreturnable milk container that, once entrenched, would
have made it extremely difficult, politically, to ban all
nonreturnable milk containers. It would have prevented the
legislature from acting so as to avoid a sudden, simultaneous
ban on paperboard as well as plastic nonreturnable containers,
a ban which would have severely dislocated the existing paper-
board container and milk industries. Invalidation of the chosen
means also would have prevented the legislature from acting so
as to conserve energy by banning plastic containers, made from
nonrenewable resources (oil and gas), but not, for the time be-
ing, paperboard containers, made from a renewable resource
(pulpwood). It would have prevented the legislature from tak-
ing a first step to help ease the state's solid waste disposal
problem.
In sum, none of these economic due process cases in which
the United States Supreme Court engaged in only the mildest,
if any, review involved quantitative judgments. They involved
challenges to the validity either of legislative ends or of sub-
stantive policies inherent in the means selected to achieve
those ends. A declaration of unconstitutionality would have
frustrated legislative objectives and left "ungoverned and un-
governable conduct which many people find objectionable."' 39
Because of the nature of the insurers' request for relief, a dec-
laration of unconstitutionality in the Rating Association case
would not have had this effect. For these reasons, the insurers
maintained that the degree of deference accorded by the courts
to the legislative judgment in the usual economic due process
case was not warranted in their case.
Finally, a decision by the courts to engage in "minimal
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact"140 in response to a
challenge that the legislatively mandated 15% rate reduction
bore no reasonable relationship to the actual cost savings to
the insurers effectuated by chapter 346 would produce the
anomalous result that the courts would scrutinize rate fixing by
the more expert administrative agency more carefully than
they would rate fixing by the less expert legislature.
If interested persons petitioned the commissioner of insur-
ance to modify the existing schedule of rates in light of benefit
changes, there had to be a hearing on the petition conducted in
139. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
140. Gunther, supra note 95, at 8.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
accordance with the contested case procedures set forth in the
Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act.141 The commis-
sioner's decision had to be based on "substantial evidence"'142
and was subject to judicial review.143 Surely if the Minnesota
legislature had left it to the commissioner of insurance to de-
termine, after a contested case proceeding, the amount by
which rates should be reduced to reflect the actual cost savings
to the insurers resulting from the changes made by chapter 346
and then had passed a statute reducing rates by a greater
amount than the commissioner fixed, the courts would not have
141. See Mv'N. STAT. § 79.071 subd. 3 (1982). The contested case procedures
are found at MxNm. STAT. §§ 14.01-14.70 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
142. MN. STAT. § 79.071 subd. 4 (1982).
143. MrN. STAT. § 79.073 (1982), amended by Act of June 1, 1983, ch. 247, § 38,
1983 Minn. Laws 852, 869, repealed effective 1 January 1984 by ch. 290, § 15, 1983
Minn. Laws at 1321. Prior to deregulation, there were alternative ways in which
rates might be fixed. The commissioner of insurance was directed under Mn'N.
STAT. § 79.075 (1980), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321, to estab-
lish, by rule, a formula by which the schedule of rates could be automatically
adjusted to reflect benefit changes that had been mandated by operation of law
subsequent to the most recent change in the state-wide schedule of rates. If
such a formula was established, the contested case procedures need not have
been followed. But § 79.075 provided that at each rate hearing following an au-
tomatic adjustment, the commissioner had to review the adjustment to assure
that the schedule of rates adopted subsequent to the adjustment was not ex-
cessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. If it was found that the result-
ing rates were excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory, the
commissioner was directed to order appropriate remedial action.
Section 11 of chapter 346 added a new subdivision la to § 79.071 to provide
another alternative. In the event of changes in the workers' compensation law
justifying a reduction in the schedule of rates, or if the commissioner of insur-
ance determined that the loss experience of the insurers indicated a change in
the existing schedule of rates, the commissioner had the discretion to order a
change in the schedule of rates with or without a prior hearing. Any hearing
for this purpose was not subject to the contested case procedures otherwise re-
quired. See ch. 346, § 11, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1617 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 79.071 (1980)). But a subsequent petition for modification of the rates would
have been subject to these procedures and the propriety of the commissioner's
prior adjustment of the schedule of rates could have been raised in such a sub-
sequent proceeding.
Neither of these alternatives was ever used by the commissioner of insur-
ance, except in the Rating Association case, in which the insurance commis-
sioner, pursuant to § 11 of chapter 346, issued his order implementing the
mandated 15% rate reduction without a prior hearing.
Neither § 11 of chapter 346 (codified at Mm'N. STAT. § 79.071 subd. la (1982),
amended by ch. 290, § 3, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1311, repealed effective 1 January
1984 by id. § 15), nor MlmN. STAT. § 79.075 (1980), repealed by ch. 290, § 145, 1983
Minn. Laws at 1321, did away with the requirement that the commissioner's or-
der be based on substantial evidence or that it be subject to judicial review.
Because the legislature itself mandated the 15% rate reduction, the substantial
evidence test would not have been applicable in review of the commissioner's




showed great deference to the legislative judgment. The au-
thority of the legislature to take such action is not questioned,
but, as Professor Henry W. Bikl6 wrote in a pioneering article,
"the obvious distinction between the quasi-judicial proceedings
of [an administrative agency] and the investigations possible
before committees of [the legislature] naturally raises a pre-
sumption in favor of the correctness of the determinations of
the [agency]."144 There is no difference insofar as the degree of
deference to which the legislative judgment is entitled between
the case supposed and the Rating Association case, in which
the legislature took the matter out of the hands of the commis-
sioner of insurance and mandated a 15% rate reduction. As
Professor Paul A. Freund has said, the great deference due a
legislative judgment is justified "insofar as the legislature does
indeed indulge in a generalization when it acts; but to the ex-
tent that the legislature particularizes it approaches the judi-
cial arena" and it "should be so judged on review."' 45
B. A MORE DEMANDING TEST UNDER THE MINNESOTA
CONsTrrUION?
The insurers asked the Minnesota courts to declare the leg-
islatively-mandated 15% rate reduction invalid under the due
process clause of the Minnesota Constitution as well as under
the federal due process clause. All the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court agreed in Clover Leafn 46 that a "state
court may, of course, apply a more stringent standard of review
as a matter of state law under the State's equivalent to the
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses."' 47 There are con-
flicting statements in the cases decided by the Minnesota
Supreme Court as to whether it will apply a more stringent
standard of review under the Minnesota Constitution than
under the United States Constitution. In Thompson v. Estate of
Petroff,148 for example, the court held unconstitutional the pro-
vision of the Minnesota survival statute allowing suit against
the estate of a deceased person who committed a negligent act
but not an intentional tort, on the ground that it violated the
144. Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Con-
stitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HAuv. L. REV. 6, 27 (1924).
145. Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in SUPREME COURT
AND SUPREME LAw 47-48 (Cahn ed. 1954).
146. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
147. Id. at 461 n.6. See also id. at 477-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
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equal protection guarantee of the Minnesota Constitution.149
The court did not expressly find the provision unconstitutional
under the United States Constitution but commented that
"since we regard the rational basis test as the same under both
[the Minnesota and the United States Constitutions], we be-
lieve that the statute also could be found defective under the
federal Constitution."150 On the other hand, in Wegan v. Vil-
lage of Lexington,ll in which the court held it was a denial of
equal protection under both the federal and state constitutions
for the Minnesota Dram Shop Act to exempt sellers of 3.2 beer
from its relatively short notice-of-claim and statute of limitation
provisions, the court stated that "[a] lthough we hold the classi-
fications violate the United States and Minnesota Constitu-
tions, we also conclude that even if the classifications passed
constitutional muster under the federal constitution, they
would still be defective under our state constitution."152
The special circumstances of the Rating Association case
called for a more stringent interpretation of the due process
clause of the Minnesota Constitution than of the United States
Constitution. Unlike a decision of the United States Supreme
Court, the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court would
have had no effect beyond the boundaries of Minnesota. The
need for a uniform rule throughout the country was not present
in this case. Nor, as indicated above, would a more stringent
standard of review leading to the invalidation of the mandated
15% rate reduction have frustrated the legislative objective of
reducing rates by the amount of the actual cost savings to the
insurers resulting from chapter 346. Despite these considera-
tions, the insurers did not press the Minnesota courts to em-
ploy a stricter standard of review under the due process clause
of the Minnesota Constitution than the United States Supreme
Court has held to be proper under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The insurers feared that pressing
149. The Minnesota Constitution does not contain an equal protection
clause like that found in the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. But the Minnesota Supreme Court has fashioned an equal protection
guarantee on the basis of article I, § 2, article X, § 1, and article XII, § 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution.
150. 319 N.W.2d at 406 n.10. The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken the
same position with respect to the due process clause. See, e.g., State v. Schif-
sky, 243 Minn. 533, 69 N.W.2d 89 (1955); State v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 213
Minn. 395, 7 N.W.2d 691 (1942), affd 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
151. 309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981).
152. Id. at 281 n.14. The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken the same po-
sition in cases other than those involving economic due process or equal pro-
tection. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979).
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such a claim might be construed as an admission of the case's
weakness under federal due process-an admission the insur-
ers thought was not only unwarranted but possibly prejudicial
to their case under the Minnesota Constitution.
m. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
A. THE TRIAL OF LEGISLATIVE FACTS
1. In Applying the Rational Basis Test, Must the Courts
Consider Only the Legislative Facts before the
Legislature at the Time It Acted?
Whether the legislative means bear a fair or reasonable re-
lationship to the legislative ends is, as the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated in Clover Leaf,153 "dependent upon facts"' 54-- leg-
islative facts. In this respect, the United States Supreme Court
did not disagree with the Minnesota Supreme Court when it re-
versed the state court in Clover Leaf. Whether the mandated
15% rate reduction bore a fair or reasonable relationship to the
actual cost savings to the insurers flowing from chapter 346 also
depended upon legislative facts-the general impact that
changes made by chapter 346 would have on the amounts that
all insurers would have to pay injured workers in Minnesota
and the amount, if any, by which these changes would reduce
insurers' other costs. Resolution of the issue as to whether the
resulting rates deprived the insurers of a fair return on their in-
vestment also depended upon legislative facts-facts as to the
general impact these rates would have on the financial condi-
tion of the workers' compensation insurance industry as a
whole. The facts bore on "questions of law and policy" 5 5 and
had relevance to "the enactment of a legislative body."156
In his opinion for the majority in Clover Leaf, Justice Bren-
nan, in a passage that is far from clear, seemed to say that in
applying the rational basis test the courts must consider only
the legislative facts before the legislature at the time it acted.
Justice Brennan wrote:
Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause may introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is ir-
rational, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-154
153. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979), rev'd
sub nom. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
154. Id. at 82.
155. Mhm. R. Evm. 201 advisory committee comment.
156. FED. R. Evm. 201 advisory committee note.
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(1938), they cannot prevail so long as "it is evident from all the consid-
erations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take
judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable." Id., at 154.
Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting
the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legisla-
tion merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was
mistaken.1
5 7
In a footnote to this passage, Justice Brennan added that the
majority expressed "no view whether the District Court could
have dismissed this case on the pleadings or granted summary
judgment for the State on the basis of the legislative history,
without hearing respondents' evidence. 5 8
It is clear from these passages that Justice Brennan did not
hold that the case could have been disposed of "on the basis of
the legislative history, without hearing [Clover Leafs] evi-
dence." Furthermore, Justice Brennan did not say that the evi-
dence Clover Leaf could introduce in support of its claim, or
the evidence of which the Court might take judicial notice, was
restricted to evidence the legislature considered at the time it
acted. In saying that if there was evidence before the legisla-
ture reasonably supporting the legislation, Clover Leaf could
"not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering
evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken," 5 9 Justice
Brennan may have only intended to indicate the standard by
which the Court would evaluate any evidence introduced. As
Clover Leaf demonstrates, there is also no reason to think that
the Justice's views would be different if the constitutional issue
were one of economic due process rather than equal protection.
Carolene Products was itself a case of economic due process.
Justice Brennan returned to this issue in his concurring
opinion in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,160 in
which Iowa truck limits were invalidated under the commerce
clause:
Both the opinion of my Brother Powell and the opinion of my
Brother Rehnquist are predicated upon the supposition that the consti-
tutionality of a state regulation is determined by the factual record cre-
ated by the State's lawyers in trial court. But that supposition cannot
be correct, for it would make the constitutionality of state laws and reg-
ulations depend on the vagaries of litigation rather than on the judg-
ments made by the State's lawmakers.
In considering a Commerce Clause challenge to a state regulation,
the judicial task is to balance the burden imposed on commerce
157. 449 U.S. at 464 (citation omitted) (brackets the Court's).
158. Id. at 464 n.8 (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109-112 (1979); Bay-
side Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936)).
159. Id. at 464.
160. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
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against the local benefits sought to be achieved by the State's
lawmakers.... In determining those benefits, a court should focus ul-
timately on the regulatory purposes identified by the lawmakers and
on the evidence before or available to them that might have supported
their judgment. See generally Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
S.. Since the court must confine its analysis to the purposes the
lawmakers had for maintaining the regulation, the only relevant evi-
dence concerns whether the lawmakers could rationally have believed
that the challenged regulation would foster those purposes .... It is
not the function of the court to decide whether in fact the regulation
promotes its intended purpose, so long as an examination of the evi-
dence before or available to the lawmaker indicates that the regulation
is not wholly irrational in light of its purposes.
1 6 1
Justice Brennan emphasized that "courts are not empowered
to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers con-
cerning the utility of legislation."162
These passages indicate more clearly than those in Clover
Leaf that Justice Brennan would judge the constitutionality of
legislation on the basis of the evidence "before or available to
the lawmaker."163 Such evidence would certainly be restricted
to evidence in existence at the time the legislature acted, al-
though Justice Brennan seems to be saying it would not be re-
stricted to the evidence actually "before" the legislature but
would include evidence "available" to the legislature, even, pre-
sumably, if the "available" evidence did not actually come to its
attention.
Justice Brennan offered one principal reason against deter-
mining "the constitutionality of a state regulation .. .by the
factual record created . . . in trial court"164-namely, that it
would make constitutionality "depend on the vagaries of litiga-
tion rather than on the judgments made by the State's
lawmakers."' 65 Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans A. Linde,
in his frontal attack upon the rational basis test, advanced addi-
tional justifications for the position that legislation should be
judged by its rationality at the time enacted and not at the time
challenged.166 He argued that the premise of constitutional re-
view should be responsible lawmaking and that on this prem-
ise, "the purpose against which the rationality of the means is
161. Id. at 680-81 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 679.
163. Id. at 680.
164. Id. at 680.
165. Id.
166. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L REV. 197 (1976). Jus-
tice Linde would dispense altogether with the concept of substantive due pro-




tested must obviously be the purpose intended at the time of
enactment."' 67 As indicated above, I do not disagree with this
view, but Justice Linde goes on to maintain that it "would make
little sense to accuse past legislators of irrationality because
the facts on which they acted have subsequently changed."' 68
Furthermore, "if the reasonableness of a law on present facts is
subject to continuing review regardless of its original rational-
ity, then no decision ever settles that a law is constitutional on
this score."' 69 A law might be constitutional at one time and
place and not in another time and place. 70 In sum, the rational
basis test should call for the review of the "one-time reasona-
bleness of lawmakers" and not "the continuing reasonableness
of laws."'1 7 1
It is true, as Justice Linde maintains, that "at its best, the
legislative process is a far cry from the deliberative search for
agreed ends and the informed assessment of means." 17 2 There
is no constitutional requirement that the legislature set forth
findings of legislative fact in every piece of legislation. Nor, I
would add, is there a constitutional requirement that a legisla-
ture conduct hearings and build a record when it passes a law.
Those eventually challenging the constitutionality of legislation
may not have had the opportunity, or availed themselves of the
opportunity, to present to the legislature certain legislative
facts bearing upon the constitutionality of the legislative action.
They may not have realized how the law would affect them;
they may not have had the means or the inclination to be rep-
resented before the legislature. No constitutional doctrine re-
quires those challenging legislative action to have participated
in the legislative process as a condition of making their chal-
lenge. To deny them the opportunity to present any material
legislative facts would deny them the only effective means they
have to raise the constitutional issue.
If Justice Linde is correct in saying that the rationality of
the individual legislators who voted for the challenged legisla-
tion is at issue when the legislation is attacked on due process
grounds, then Felix Cohen would indeed have been correct
167. Id. at 216. The "premise" Justice Linde has in mind is that the consti-
tutional rule promulgated by the Court "is one with which the government
should have complied, or should know how to comply with in the future." I&
at 222.
168. Id. at 216-17.
169. Id. at 218.
170. Id. at 218-22.
171. Id. at 222.
172. Id. at 224.
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when he wrote that this constitutional standard would make
"of our courts lunacy commissions sitting in judgment upon the
mental capacity of legislators and, occasionally, of judicial
brethren."73
The reasonableness of legislation, not that of legislators, is
and ought to be the constitutional issue. The reasonableness of
the means chosen by the legislature to effectuate a legitimate
end may depend not only upon legislative facts that were
brought to the legislature's attention at the time it acted but
also upon legislative facts in existence at that time that were
not brought to its attention and legislative facts that came into
existence afterwards because of changed conditions. Legisla-
tive facts assumed by the legislature to be true may also be
shown to be false. So long as the notion of substantive due pro-
cess is not entirely abandoned, those challenging legislative ac-
tion should be able to adduce any legislative facts that support
their claim or dispute the validity of the legislative facts relied
upon by the legislature. This position could help to validate, as
well as invalidate, legislation.
To hold that only the legislative facts before the legislature
at the time it acted may be taken into consideration by a court
in determining the constitutionality of legislation would have
the strange result of barring use of the "Brandeis brief." The
legislative facts that Mr. Brandeis set forth in his famous brief
in support of Oregon's law fixing a maximum ten-hour working
day for women 7 4 and those that the social scientists submitted
to show the deleterious effects on black children of state-im-
posed school segregation,? 5 brought to the attention and con-
sideration of the courts legislative facts that were not before
the state legislatures when they acted. Indeed, in the School
Segregation Cases,7 6 the Court said, in citing the work of the
social scientists, "whatever may have been the extent of psy-
chological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this
finding [the deleterious effect of school segregation] is amply
supported by modern authority."177 In the numerous cases in
which it has taken judicial notice of legislative facts, the Court
has never limited itself to noticing only those facts that were
173. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 808, 819 (1935), quoted in Linde, supra note 166, at 208.
174. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
175. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 494 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
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before the legislature when it acted. 7 8
Furthermore, there is nothing incongruous, as Justice
Linde maintains, in the notion that legislation may have been
reasonable at the time it was enacted but became unreasonable
because circumstances changed thereafter. Moreover, legisla-
tion as applied in one context may be constitutional, but uncon-
stitutional as applied in another context. As Professor Kenneth
Karst has pointed out, "[o]ne principal justification for giving
the independent review of legislation to the judiciary lies in the
ability of a court to weigh constitutional claims on the basis of
experience which was not available when the legislature
acted."17 9 If legislation is such that its reasonableness may
vary from time to time and from place to place, its implementa-
tion should be entrusted to an administrative agency.
It must be realized, too, that it would be impossible for the
courts in most states to adopt Justice Brennan's position, be-
cause in most states no information exists as to what legislative
facts were before the legislature or available to it.180 Justice
Brennan was able to rely on the legislative history of the envi-
ronmental statute under attack in Clover Leaf only because
Minnesota began, in 1974, to make available to the public tape
recordings of the standing committee hearings and floor ses-
sions of both houses of its legislature. Lawyers then began to
purchase these tapes and make transcripts from them for use
in litigation.'18 If the Rating Association case had arisen
178. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (The Abortion Cases).
179. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV.
75, 76-77.
180. Minnesota is one of only 19 states that make available transcripts or
tapes of debates on the floors of their legislatures. Of the 19, 3 states do not
make them available on a regular basis. Thirty-two states, including Minne-
sota, make available transcripts or tapes of the testimony before legislative
committees. Of the 32, 16 do not make them available on a regular basis. Only
14 states publish the reports of their standing and special legislative committes;
9 states publish the reports of their special legislative committees only; 4 states
publish the reports of their standing legislative committees only; and 23 states
do not publish any reports of their legislative committees. Some of the states
who do publish reports of their legislative committees do so on an irregular ba-
sis.
I am indebted to David Curle, a student at the University of Minnesota Law
School, for compiling these data from M.L. FISHER, GUIDE TO STATE LEGISLA-
TrVE MATERmA.S (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1979).
181. Two copies of each tape, made by employees of the house and senate,
are deposited in the State Legislative Reference Library. See PERMANENT
RULES OF THE HOUSE 1.18, 6.6; PERmANENT RULEs OF THE SENATE 65. At the end
of each biennium, copies of the tapes are transferred to the State Historical So-
ciety, as the house rules require. Under the senate rules, the tapes may be dis-
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before 1974, it would have been impossible to recount the legis-
lative history of chapter 346.
Finally, Justice Brennan's views are not shared by a major-
ity of the present Justices and are inconsistent with an unbro-
ken line of Supreme Court decisions holding that legislative
facts not before the legislature when it acted may be brought to
the reviewing court's attention in challenge or support of the
constitutionality of the legislature's action. In one of the earli-
est cases in which the Court confronted this issue, Chastleton
Corp. v. Sinclair,18 2 rent control in the District of Columbia
was attacked for violating the due process clause of the fifth
amendment on the ground that the war-created emergency that
justified rent control in 1919 had come to an end by 1922, de-
spite a congressional declaration to the contrary. Speaking for
the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that "upon the facts that we
judicially know we should be compelled to say that the law has
posed of as the Legislative Reference Library deems appropriate. Any person
may listen to the tapes, using the facilities of the library or may purchase a
copy of a tape for a reasonable fee, PEzmANrNT RuLES OF THE HOUSE 1.18, or a
"fee adequate to cover the cost of preparing the copies," PERMANENT RULE S OF
THE SENATE 65.
The Joint Rules of the Senate and House of Representatives governing the
conduct of conference committees do not require or provide for the tape record-
ing of the conference committee hearings. According to Ms. Linda Montgom-
ery, the director of the Legislative Reference Library, tapes of these meetings
are occasionally made and copies of the tapes that are made may or may not be
sent to the Legislative Reference Library by the senate or house staff members
who prepared them.
In 1981, a bill was introduced in the Minnesota Senate which would have
declared "[t]estimony of legislators, legislative staff and other individuals in-
volved in the legislative process, written summaries and verbatim records of
legislative proceedings, whether taped or otherwise recorded and transcribed,"
to be "not relevant evidence of legislative intent or the contemporaneous his-
tory of laws" and to be "inadmissible in administrative or judicial proceedings
for the purpose of construction of laws." S.F. 70, 72d Leg., 1981 Sess. § 2, subd.
3, 1981 MNN. LEG. SENATE BTTS 149. The bill contained the following findings:
Subdivision 1. The legislature finds that legislative intent is not
accurately revealed in written summaries or personal recollections of
legislators, legislative staff or other individuals involved in the legisla-
tive process, or in verbatim records of legislative proceedings because
many legislators do not express their opinions on particular issues, be-
cause statements made are incomplete expressions of individual in-
tent, and because all research and background on the various issues
are not-comprehensively reported in legislative proceedings.
Subd. 2. The legislature further finds that testimony of legislators,
legislative staff or other individuals involved in the legislative process,
and use of verbatim records of legislative proceedings as evidence of
legislative intent would divert legislative resources away from evaluat-
ing policies and improving statutory drafting and toward wasteful crea-
tion of dubious "legislative history."
Id § 2 subds. 1-2. The bill did not pass.
182. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
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ceased to operate.' 83 Generally, he stated:
We repeat what was stated in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154, as to
the respect due to a declaration of this kind by the legislature so far as
it relates to present facts. But even as to them a Court is not at liberty
to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law de-
pends upon the truth of what is declared. .. . And still more obviously
so far as this declaration looks to the future it can be no more than
prophecy and is liable to be controlled by events. A law depending
upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to
uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts
change even though valid when passed.' 8 4
The Court reaffirmed the position it took in Chastleton in
an opinion written by Justice Brandeis in Nashville, Chattanoo-
ga & St. Louis Railway v. Walters.185 In this case, the railroad
contended that a Tennessee statute and implementing adminis-
trative order requiring the railroad to construct an underpass
to eliminate a grade crossing and bear one-half the cost thereof,
though reasonable at the time enacted, became unreasonable
because economic and transportation conditions had changed.
The Court reversed the supreme court of Tennessee for refus-
ing to consider these changes and remanded the case so that
they could be considered.
In Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin,186 the Supreme
Court reversed the decree of a three-judge district court that
granted a motion to dismiss the complaint attacking the consti-
tutionality of a provision of the New York Milk Control Law of
1933. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the taking of
evidence as to the economic conditions and trade practices un-
derlying the law.187 Nothing in the opinion indicates that the
Court assumed that only the legislative facts known to the New
York legislature at the time it acted were relevant to the four-
teenth amendment issue.
Upholding a federal prohibition of the interstate shipment
of skimmed milk mixed with nonmilk fats in United States v.
Carolene Products Co. ,188 the Court stated:
[A] statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in
judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show that
a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a rational
basis.
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose consti-
183. Id. at 549.
184. Id. at 547-48 (citations omitted).
185. 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
186. 293 U.S. 194 (1934).
187. Id. at 213.
188. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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tutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judi-
cial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial
inquiry, Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, and the
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a partic-
ular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those
facts have ceased to exist. Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.
543.189
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,190 seven Jus-
tices (the four Justices in the plurality and the three dissenting
Justices) agreed that evidence bearing on the constitutional is-
sues could be introduced at a trial and would not be restricted
to evidence before the legislature at the time it enacted the
challenged legislation. In Clover Leaf,'9 1 too, it is clear that the
United States Supreme Court, like the Minnesota Supreme
Court, did not limit its consideration to the legislative facts
before the Minnesota legislature at the time it banned
nonreturnable plastic milk containers. Despite the passages
from his opinion quoted above, Justice Brennan took into ac-
count all the evidence in the record made at the trial, including
the evidence that was not before the legislature.192
Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Insurance Co. ,193 a decision
by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, also re-
flected long-standing Supreme Court precedent. In Jordan, the
constitutionality of fire insurance rates was attacked on the
ground that they were confiscatory, 94 an issue also present in
the Rating Association case. After holding that procedural due
process required "a judicial type of hearing" 9 5 at some point in
the course of the administrative ratemaking or judicial review
thereof, the District of Columbia Circuit decided that the Con-
stitution did not require such a hearing to be "included in the
legislative or administrative process."' 9 6 But, if not included in
that process, such a hearing had to be afforded the complaining
insurance companies in "a judicial proceeding in which new ev-
idence may be supplied and full opportunity afforded for explo-
ration of the bases of the disputed order."' 97
189. Id. at 152-53.
190. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
191. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
192. See id.
193. 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
194. Id. at 291.
195. Id. at 288.
196. Id. at 289.
197. Id. (citation omitted).
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2. Did the State District Court in the Rating Association
Case Consider Only the Legislative Facts before
the Minnesota Legislature at the Time It
Acted and Ignore the Testimony and
Documentary Data Introduced at the Trial?
There is no clear answer to this question. The attorney
general did not contest the insurers' position, that facts not
before the legislature could be brought to the court's attention
in challenging the constitutionality of legislative action, but
maintained that the district court did consider the testimony
and data introduced at the trial.198
At trial, both the insurers and the attorney general submit-
ted testimony and data concerning the cost savings, if any, re-
sulting from the changes made by chapter 346 in the benefits
payable to injured workers and in the administration and oper-
ation of the workers' compensation system. The Rating Associ-
ation and insurers presented three expert witnesses-Mr.
Michael Aafedt, an experienced Minnesota workers' compensa-
tion attorney, Mr. William Curtis, a claims manager with more
than twenty years of experience in the Minnesota workers'
compensation system, and Mr. Patrick Newlin, chairperson of
the Rating Association's actuarial committee and chief workers'
compensation actuary for the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insur-
ance Company. They also called as witnesses Mr. Michael D.
Markman, then commissioner of insurance, and Mr. Craig An-
derson, an employee of the Rating Association. The attorney
general presented Mr. Clarence Atwood, an actuary from Cali-
fornia who was the state's only expert witness, Mr. Duane
Harves, chief hearing examiner of the State Office of Adminis-
trative Hearings, and Ms. Bonnie Faye Venburg, supervisor of
records and compliance in the Workers' Compensation Division
of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the state dis-
trict court,199 which adopted verbatim those proposed by the at-
torney general, consist almost entirely of statements
identifying the materials in the record dealing with the legisla-
tive history of proposed changes in the workers' compensation
system that resulted in the passage of chapter 346. The materi-
als identified include the voluminous reports of the 1977 and
1979 study commissions established by the Minnesota legisla-
ture to study the workers' compensation system, the proposed
198. Brief for Respondents at 11, Rating Ass'n.
199. See Appendix II, infra, at 669-76.
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bills, and the various memoranda and statements estimating
potential cost savings to insurers from proposed benefit and ad-
ministrative changes, only some of which found their way into
chapter 346. The reports of the two study commissions do not
contain estimates of the cost savings to the insurers that might
result from the changes in the workers' compensation system
recommended therein.20 0 Nor, as an examination of the legisla-
tive history of the mandated 15% rate reduction shows, did any
legislator refer to either of these reports during the entire
course of the discussion of the various proposals that led, even-
tually, to the enactment of chapter 346.201
Of the written materials before the legislature, all those
containing estimates of the actual cost savings that might re-
sult from proposed changes in the workers' compensation sys-
tem became part of the trial record by agreement of the
parties. 202 These estimates came from only two sources. The
first source was Mr. Craig Anderson. His estimates were cited
by others and incorporated in the legislative staffs memoranda
referred to in the district court's finding nine.203 The only other
source was Commissioner Markman, on whom the legislature
relied heavily. Commissioner Markman based his estimates on
the bill introduced on March 30, 1981, before the Labor Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Employment Committee.20 4 Commis-
sioner Markman embodied his estimates in three memoranda-
two to Senator Collin Peterson and one to Senator Wayne
Olhoft.205 There were substantial differences between the pro-
posed changes in the workers' compensation system, to which
the estimates of both Commissioner Markman and Mr. Ander-
son related, and the changes finally enacted in chapter 346.206
The district court rendered no opinion evaluating the
materials before the legislature or the testimony and docu-
ments introduced at the trial. It did not even attempt to de-
scribe the testimony and documents. Nor did the district court
attempt to explain the basis on which it determined the sound-
ness and persuasiveness, or lack thereof, of the views and data
furnished by the expert witnesses. Two of the twenty-nine
200. See Joint Stipulation of Facts at 11, Rating Ass'n.
201. See Brief for Appellants at A-15 to A-40 app, Rating Assn.
202. See Joint Stipulation of Facts 15 and 16, Rating Ass'n; Supplemental
Joint Stipulation of Facts, Rating Ass'n; Joint Exhibits 5-11, 1lA, and 11B, Rat-
ing Ass'n.
203. Appendix I, infra, at 670-72.
204. Transcript of the Trial at 16, Rating Ass'n.
205. Joint Exhibits 9, 10, and 11, Rating Assn.
206. Trial Transcript at 15-17, 42, 73, 89, 91, 93, 96, 101, Rating Ass'n.
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findings of fact by the district court-findings twenty-eight and
twenty-nine--may arguably be said to have been based on the
testimony and data introduced at the trial:
28. Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the cost savings resulting
from the aggregate of all the benefit, administrative and operational
changes in ch. 346 are less than 15%.
29. The cost savings in the Act are greater than 15% and indeed
are at least 20%.207
From all that appears in the district court's findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order for judgment, these findings may
have been based on the district court's reading of the legisla-
tive history. This possibility is strengthened by the comments
of the district court during trial; the court considered its func-
tion to be to determine whether the Minnesota legislature, in
light of only the information before it when chapter 346 was
passed, could rationally have concluded that the actual cost
savings to the insurers resulting from chapter 346 would justify
a rate reduction of at least 15%.208
Although the attorney general seemed to accept the view
that facts not before the legislature may invalidate legislative
action, he nevertheless argued that the legislative history and
the information and data before the legislature alone were suf-
ficient to compel a finding that the legislature acted ration-
ally.209 Indeed, the attorney general went so far as to say that if
"the facts before the Legislature could reasonably be conceived
to be true by it then the Legislature was acting in a rational
fashion and the law should be upheld."210 But the essential
point of the United States Supreme Court cases considered
above is that the legislative facts before the legislature are
never alone sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of legisla-
tion if subsequently at a trial legislative facts are adduced dem-
onstrating that the legislative action has no reasonable basis.
The legislative facts before the legislature cannot be viewed
separately, apart from the legislative facts adduced at the trial.
3. The Applicability of the Rules of Evidence in the Trial of
Legislative Facts
At trial, the district court applied the rules of evidence, par-
207. Appendix II, infra, at 676.
208. Trial Transcript at 12, 13, 61, 62, 67, 173, 174, 176, Rating Ass'n.
209. See Brief for Respondents at 16-28, Rating Ass'n. The attorney general
also took this position at the trial. See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 13, 14, Rating
Ass'n.
210. Brief for Respondents at 16, Rating Ass'n.
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ticularly the hearsay rule and the requirement of an eviden-
tiary foundation, to the admissibility of the legislative facts that
the parties sought to introduce as bearing upon the issue of
constitutionality.211 The Minnesota and federal rules of evi-
dence, however, were meant to apply only to adjudicative facts
and should not govern the admissibility in evidence of legisla-
tive facts.2 12 No Minnesota or federal rule of evidence deals ex-
pressly with legislative facts but both sets of rules were
intended to give the courts the widest latitude in taking judicial
notice of legislative facts. Rule 201 of the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence,213 the counterpart of rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,214 deals only with the judicial notice of adjudicative
facts. 215 The Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee
commented that it was "in agreement with the promulgators of
the federal rule of evidence [rule 201] in not limiting judicial
notice of legislative facts." 216
After quoting Professor Edmund Morgan's description of
the methodology of judicial determination of domestic law, the
United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee stated:
This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative
facts. It renders inappropriate any limitation in the form of indisputa-
bility, any formal requirements of notice other than those already in-
herent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging
briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any level. It should,
however, leave open the possibility of introducing evidence through
regular channels in appropriate situations. See Borden's Farm Prod-
ucts Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194,... (1934), where the cause was re-
manded for the taking of evidence as to the economic conditions and
trade practices underlying the New York Milk Control Law.
2 1 7
Clearly courts' access to legislative facts was not intended
to be limited in any way-certainly not by the rules of evi-
dence, which obviously do not come into play when judicial no-
tice is taken of these facts. There is no question that the
Rating Association case presented an "appropriate situation"
for the introduction of evidence as to the legislative facts
211. See Trial Transcript at 32, 39, 71-74, 77, 78, 81-83, 87, 94, 95, 114-47, 149,
150, 153, 179, 182, 196, 197, 206, 208, 213, 214, 225-27, 232-37, 252, 253, 261, 262, 274,
284, 299, 302, 306, 318, 328, 357, 377, 378, 380, 382-84, 408-10, 420, 421, 437, 444, 448,
450, 451, 469, 470, 507, 508, 601, 644, 647, 674-76, 682-85, 695-98, 711, 713, 718, Rating
Ass'n.
212. See 3 K.C. DAvis, ADmrnsTRATrvE LAw TREATISE § 16.14 (2d ed. 1980).
213. MinN. R. EvD. 201.
214. FED. R. EviD. 201.
215. See MINN. R. EvrD. 201 advisory committee comment (refers generally
to FED. R. Evrn. 201 advisory committee note).
216. MnIN. R. Evrn. 201 advisory committee comment.
217. FED. R. EvD. 201 advisory committee comment.
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"through regular channels," that is, before the trial court. In-
troducing such evidence did not convert the legislative facts
into adjudicative facts or otherwise bring the rules of evidence
into play.
It is strange that a court should apply the rules of evidence
to the admissibility of legislative facts bearing upon the consti-
tutionality of a legislatively-fixed insurance rate when the com-
missioner of insurance would not have been bound by the rules
of evidence in a contested case proceeding to fix such a rate.218
Furthermore, the hearing examiner in such a case would have
been authorized to "admit documentary and statistical evi-
dence accepted and relied upon by an expert whose field of ex-
pertise may have some relevance to workers' compensation
rate matters, without the requirement of traditional evidentiary
foundation."219
In any case, the state district court's application of the
rules of evidence to the admissibility of legislative facts did not
prevent the parties in the Rating Association case from
presenting the essentials of their cases to the tribunal. The
court did, however, exclude from the record certain written ac-
tuarial explanations of the data relied on by the insurers which
could have helped the court to understand the complex, quanti-
tative issues in the case. The insurers inserted the most impor-
tant of these explanations in the appendix to their brief to the
Minnesota Supreme Court without objection from the attorney
general or the court.22 0
4. The Standard for Review of the Legislative Facts by the
Trial Court
The United States Supreme Court overruled the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Clover Leaf22l because the state court sub-
stituted "[its] evaluation of legislative facts for that of the legis-
lature"222 in applying the federal constitutional standards of
equal protection and due process. 223 Justice Brennan acknowl-
218. See MNN. STAT. § 14.60 subd. 1 (1982).
219. Mm'N. STAT. § 79.071 subd. 3 (1982).
220. See Brief for the Appellants at 41-58 app., Rating Ass'n.
221. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
222. Id. at 470.
223. Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that so long as the Minnesota
courts had articulated the proper federal constitutional standards, which he
thought they had, see id. at 486, the United States Supreme Court lacked the
authority "to make the majestic announcement that it is not the function of a
state court to substitute its evaluation of legislative facts for that of a state leg-
islature," id at 479 (emphasis in original). Justice Stevens insisted.
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edged that Clover Leaf had
produced impressive supporting evidence at trial to prove that the
probable consequences of the ban on plastic nonreturnable milk con-
tainers will be to deplete natural resources, exacerbate solid waste dis-
posal problems, and waste energy, because consumers unable to
purchase milk in plastic containers will turn to paperboard milk car-
tons, allegedly a more environmentally harmful product.
2 2 4
Nevertheless, he went on to emphasize:
But States are not required to convince the courts of the correct-
ness of their legislative judgments. Rather, "those challenging the leg-
islative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be
conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker." Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. [93, 111 (1979)1. See also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missour4 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S.
258, 264-265 (1937).
Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause may introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is ir-
rational, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-154
(1938), they cannot prevail so long as "it is evident from all the consid-
erations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take
judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable." Id. at 154.
Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting
the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legisla-
tion merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was
[TIhe allocation of functions within the structure of a state govern-
ment [is] a matter for the State to determine. I know of nothing in the
Federal Constitution that prohibits a State from giving lawmaking
power to its courts. Nor is there anything in the Federal Constitution
that prevents a state court from reviewing factual determinations made
by a state legislature or any other state agency ... The functions that
a state court shall perform within the structure of state government are
unquestionably matters of state law ... [TIhe factual conclusions
drawn by the Minnesota courts concerning the deliberations of the
Minnesota Legislature are entitled to just as much deference as if they
had been drafted by the state legislature itself and incorporated in a
preamble to the state statute. The State of Minnesota has told us in
unambiguous language that this statute is not rationally related to any
environmental objective; it seems to me to be a matter of indifference,
for purposes of applying the federal Equal Protection Clause, whether
that message to us from the State of Minnesota is conveyed by the
State Supreme Court, or by the state legislature itself.
Id. at 479-82 (citations omitted).
Justice Brennan sharply attacked Justice Stevens's argument as "novel"
but "without merit."
[W]hen a state court reviews state legislation challenged as viola-
tive of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not free to impose greater re-
strictions as a matter of federal constitutional law than this Court has
imposed. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 719 (1975).
The standard of review under equal protection rationality analy-
sis-without regard to which branch of the state government has made
the legislative judgment-is governed by federal constitutional law,
and a state court's application of that standard is fully reviewable in
this Court ....
449 U.S. at 461-62 n.6 (citation omitted).




These passages are beset with internal contradiction. To
say that the reviewing court must determine whether the legis-
lative facts "reasonably" support the classification is to impose
a more stringent standard of review than saying that the re-
viewing court must determine whether "the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reason-
ably be conceived to be true by the governmental deci-
sionmaker." For what may reasonably be "conceived" (which,
in its dictionary sense, means "imagined," "supposed," "sus-
pected," or "fancied"2 26) to be the case may not reasonably be
the case in light of all the known facts.
It is possible to distinguish between the standard the re-
viewing court should apply in determining what the legislative
facts are and the standard it should apply in determining
whether the legislative facts, as so determined, reasonably sup-
port the legislative action. Justice Brennan could then be read
as saying that the reviewing court must accept as the legisla-
tive facts those that could "reasonably be conceived to be true
by the governmental decisionmaker" and then decide whether
these facts "reasonably" support the legislative action. But
such a distinction is unreal. If the reviewing court accepts the
legislative facts on which the legislation was based because
those facts could reasonably be imagined to be true by the gov-
ernmental decisionmaker, the accepted facts will always sup-
port the reasonableness of the legislative action. Thus, for
example, if the reviewing courts had to accept as legislative fact
that the cost savings to the insurers resulting from chapter 346
amounted to a sum justifying a 15% rate reduction merely be-
cause the Minnesota legislature could reasonably have
imagined this to be the case, then of course the mandated 15%
rate reduction was reasonably related to its articulated
purpose.
The cases Justice Brennan cited, and others decided by the
Court, do not support his conclusion that the ultimate question
of constitutionality must be determined on the basis of legisla-
tive facts that could "reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker." First, as indicated above, Jus-
tice Brennan's conclusion is based on the erroneous view that
225. 449 U.S. at 464 (citation omitted) (brackets the Court's).
226. 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY 757 (1933) ("imagined," "fancied");
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 469 (1961) ("imagined,"




only the legislative facts before the legislature at the time it ac-
ted are constitutionally significant. For example, the language
Justice Brennan quoted from Vance v. Bradley227 was not in-
tended to state the standard of judicial review when a party at-
tacking the constitutionality of legislation introduced data
rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. Instead, the
passage was merely a restatement of the presumption of con-
stitutionality attached to legislation.
In Vance v. Bradley the Court upheld a federal law that re-
quired federal employees covered by the Foreign Service re-
tirement and disability system to retire at age sixty but did not
apply the same requirement to civil service employees serving
overseas under similar conditions and facing comparable hard-
ships.228 The case had been decided in the federal district
court on cross-motions for summary judgment.229 In this con-
text, the Supreme Court used the word "conceived" in reply to
the Foreign Service employees' argument that the procedural
posture of the case and the legislative facts stated in the em-
ployees' motion for summary judgment required the govern-
ment "to have current empirical proof that health and energy
tend to decline somewhat by age 60 and ... to offer such proof
for the District Court's perusal before the statute could be sus-
tained."230 The government had no such burden, concluded the
Court, because appellees (the Foreign Service employees) had
not rebutted the presumption of constitutionality. To do so,
they were "required to demonstrate that Congress has no rea-
sonable basis for believing that conditions overseas generally
are more demanding than conditions in the United States and
that at age 60 or before many persons begin something of a de-
cline in mental and physical reliability."23 ' Reviewing the legis-
lative facts in the appellees' motion for summary judgment and
in their brief, the Court concluded that appellees had not sus-
tained this burden.232
The "reasonably can be conceived" language seems to have
been used for the first time in Borden's Farm Products Co. v.
Baldwin,233 in which the Court reversed a district court's dis-
missal of fourteenth amendment due process and equal protec-
227. 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979); supra text accompanying note 148.
228. 440 U.S. at 94-95.
229. Id. at 95.
230. 440 U.S. at 110 (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 111-12.
233. 293 U.S. 194 (1934).
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tion challenges to the New York Milk Control Law of 1933.
Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion for the Court, wrote:
Respondents invoke the presumption which attaches to the legisla-
tive action. But that is a presumption of fact, of the existence of factual
conditions supporting the legislation. As such, it is a rebuttable pre-
sumption .... It is not a conclusive presumption, or a rule of law
which makes legislative action invulnerable to constitutional assault.
Nor is such an immunity achieved by treating any fanciful conjecture
as enough to repel attack. When the classification made by the legisla-
ture is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived that would sustain it, there is a presumption of the existence of
that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must carry the
burden of showing by a resort to common knowledge or other matters
which may be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate proof, that the
action is arbitrary.2 3 4
This passage may be interpreted in two ways-either the
legislative facts that can reasonably be conceived to support
the legislative action give rise to the presumption of constitu-
tionality, or the presumption of constitutionality compels the
reviewing court to accept as legislative facts those which could
reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental deci-
sionmaker. In either case the legislative facts that give rise to
the presumption of constitutionality, or come into "being" be-
cause of the presumption, may be rebutted. Once rebutted, the
reviewing court must determine what are the legislative facts
(resolving reasonable doubts in favor of the validity of the leg-
islation) and whether the legislative facts so determined rea-
sonably support the legislative action.
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 235 is consistent with
this reading of Vance v. Bradley and Borden's Farm Products
Co. v. Baldwin. In Carolene Products, the trial court had sus-
tained a demurrer to the indictment of the company for the in-
terstate shipment of skimmed milk mixed with nonmilk fats,
holding that the Act prohibiting the shipment was unconstitu-
tional on "its face because it infringed the due process clause of
the fifth amendment and transcended Congress's power under
the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court stated that, in view of the procedural
posture of the case, it "might rest decision wholly on the pre-
sumption of constitutionality."2 6 "But affirmative evidence
also sustains the statute," the Court added, and then reviewed
this evidence.23 7 By demurring, the Carolene Products Com-
234. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
235. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
236. Id. at 148.
237. Id. at 148-50.
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pany chose not to introduce any facts to rebut the presumption
of constitutionality. Thus the following statements in Carolene
Products, cited by the Court in Clover Leaf,2 38 must be evalu-
ated in light of this procedural posture:
[A] statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in
judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show that
a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a rational
basis.
But such we think is not the purpose or construction of the statu-
tory characterization of filled milk as injurious to health and as a fraud
upon the public. There is no need to consider it here as more than a
declaration of the legislative findings deemed to support and justify the
action taken as a constitutional exertion of the legislative power, aiding
informed judicial review, as do the reports of legislative committees, by
revealing the rationale of the legislation. Even in the absence of such
aids the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a char-
acter as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational ba-
sis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators....
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose consti-
tutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judi-
cial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial
inquiry, Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, and the
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a partic-
ular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those
facts have ceased to exist. Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.
543.... But by their very nature such inquiries, where the legislative
judgment is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether
any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed
affords support for it. Here the demurrer challenges the validity of the
statute on its face and it is evident from all the considerations
presented to Congress, and those of which we may take judicial notice,
that the question is at least debatable whether commerce in filled milk
should be left unregulated, or in some measure restricted, or wholly
prohibited. As that decision was for Congress, neither the finding of a
court arrived at by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can
be substituted for it. 2 3 9
The Court's statement that it was required to sustain con-
gressional judgment so long as "the question is at least debata-
ble whether commerce in filled milk should be left unregulated,
or in some measure restricted, or wholly prohibited," obviously
refers to the situation in that case, in which a demurrer chal-
lenged the validity of the statute on its face and no facts were
introduced by the challengers to rebut the presumption of con-
stitutionality. The Court based its conclusion on the legislative
facts it found in examining the legislative history of the chal-
238. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).
239. 304 U.S. at 152-54 (citations omitted).
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lenged Act and on the legislative facts of which it took judicial
notice. In any case, there is no real difference between asking
the reviewing court on the basis of all the evidence before it to
determine whether it is reasonable to assume the truth of the
legislative facts supporting the validity of the legislative action,
and asking the court to determine whether the truth of the leg-
islative facts is "at least debatable." Yet both these standards
are quite different from asking the reviewing court whether it is
reasonable to conceive or imagine legislative facts that might
support the challenged legislation. They are also different from
the standard rejected by the Court in Carolene Products,
namely that the reviewing court should independently deter-
mine, after weighing all the evidence, what are the legislative
facts. This latter difference may be what Justice Brennan re-
ferred to in Clover Leaf when he said that legislative action
may not be invalidated by a showing that the legislature was
"mistaken," but only by a showing that the legislative facts did
not "reasonably" support the legislative action.2 40
In Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,241 which upheld the
Missouri law requiring employers to give employees time off
with pay to vote, no legislative facts were in dispute. Invalida-
tion of the law would have negated state policy. In this context,
unrelated to the ascertainment of legislative facts, the Court
explained:
The judgment of the legislature that time out for voting should cost the
employee nothing may be a debatable one. It is indeed conceded by
the opposition to be such. But if our recent cases mean anything, they
leave debatable issues as respects business, economic and social affairs
to legislative decision.2 4 2
Finally, Henderson Co. v. Thompson 243 is also consistent
with the suggested interpretation of the other cases cited by
Justice Brennan in Clover Leaf. In Henderson Co., the Court
sustained a Texas statute and implementing administrative or-
der prohibiting the use of sweet natural gas for the manufac-
ture of carbon black. 244 In upholding the Texas policy, the
Court concluded that the distinction between sweet and sour
gas "has ample support in the evidence"245 and "[n]o facts
have been found, or established by the evidence, which would
240. 449 U.S. at 464.
241. 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
242. Id. at 425.
243. 300 U.S. 258 (1937).
244. For a discussion of Henderson Co., see supra text accompanying note
128.
245. Id. at 265.
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justify us in pronouncing the action of the Legislature
arbitrary."246
Indeed, if one examines how Justice Brennan dealt with
the legislative facts involved in Clover Leaf, it becomes appar-
ent that he did ask whether, despite the data introduced at the
trial, it was reasonable to accept the legislative facts justifying
the differentiation between nonreturnable plastic and
nonreturnable paperboard milk containers. Justice Brennan
held that the trial court in Clover Leaf patently violated the
principles governing rationality analysis under the federal
equal protection clause because it took the position that as
fact-finder it was obliged to weigh and evaluate the evidence
and resolve the sharp conflict between the parties over the leg-
islative facts.247 According to Justice Brennan the Minnesota
Supreme Court committed the same error when it also con-
cluded that the statute was unconstitutional,248 and explained
that "[b]ased upon the relevant findings of fact by the trial
court, supported by the record, and upon our own independent
review of documentary sources, we believe the evidence con-
clusively demonstrates that the discrimination against plastic
nonrefillables is not rationally related to the Act's
objectives." 249
Thus Justice Brennan assumed that the Minnesota courts
had concluded that the Minnesota legislature was simply "mis-
taken" as to the legislative facts and that the courts had not
confined their inquiry to whether it could reasonably be con-
cluded that the legislative facts adduced in support of the clas-
sification were true.250 In determining that it could reasonably
be concluded that these supporting legislative facts were true,
the United States Supreme Court conducted "its own de novo
review of [the] state legislative record in search of a rational
246. Id. at 264.
247. 449 U.S. at 464. A fuller quotation from the trial court's memorandum is
set forth in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion. See id. at 481 n.6.
248. See 449 U.S. at 464-65.
249. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1979), rev'd
sub nom Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
250. Justice Brennan's assumption may be unwarranted because the Min-
nesota Supreme Court concluded that "the evidence conclusively demonstrates
that the discrimination against plastic nonrefillables is not rationally related to
the Act's objectives." Id. This conclusion reasonably carries the implication
that the Minnesota Supreme Court also concluded that the legislative facts ad-
duced in support of the classification could not rationally be assumed to be
true. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated it was following the principles gov-





Taking into account all the evidence in the record, includ-
ing the evidence introduced at the trial, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that "the Minnesota Legislature could rationally have
decided that its ban on plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might
foster greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives," 252
one of the statute's objectives. For this conclusion, he relied on
statements by two state senators who supported the statute.
Both senators argued that once a new plastic nonreturnable
milk container was introduced, the legislature would find the
container very difficult to ban. Justice Brennan also relied on
evidence that the plastic jug was the most popular, and the gal-
lon paperboard carton the most cumbersome and least well-re-
garded, package in the industry, and the inference therefrom
that the ban on plastic nonreturnables would buy time while
environmentally preferable alternatives were developed and
promoted by an industry that would not wish to retain the pa-
perboard carton indefinitely.253 Justice Brennan then added:
This Court has made clear that a legislature need not "strike at all evils
at the same time or in the same way,". . . and that a legislature "may
implement [its] program step by step, . . .adopting regulations that
only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimi-
nation of the evil to future regulations."254
It was also reasonable for the Minnesota legislature, as
many legislators explained, to ban the plastic nonreturnables
before they became entrenched, in order to prevent the loss, in
the event of a later ban, of the larger amounts of capital that
would be invested in the plastic container industry in the in-
terim.255 It was reasonable, too, to permit the use of paper-
board containers in the short run in order to prevent the severe
economic dislocation in the milk industry that would have re-
sulted from a simultaneous ban on both plastic and paperboard
nonreturnable milk containers because few milk dairies were
yet able to package their products in refillable bottles or plastic
pouches.256
The Minnesota Supreme Court had concluded that the
251. 449 U.S. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 466 (emphasis in original).
253. Id. at 485-66.
254. Id. at 466 (citations omitted) (quoting Semler v. Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935) and City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)) (brackets the Court's).
255. See 449 U.S. at 467.
256. See id. This justification, advanced by the State, was not directly ad-
dressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id.
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"production of plastic nonrefillables requires less energy than
production of paper containers"2 5 7 and, therefore, the ban on
plastic nonrefillables would not achieve another of the Act's
objectives-to conserve energy.2- 8 Relying on statements made
during the floor debate on the Act and a reliable empirical
study cited during the legislative debate, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that it was "at least debatable" whether the contrary
was true because plastic milk jugs are made from plastic resin,
an oil and natural gas derivative, whereas paperboard milk car-
tons are primarily comprised of pulpwood, a renewable.
resource.259
The Minnesota Supreme Court had also determined that
plastic milk jugs occupy less space in landfills and present
fewer solid waste disposal problems than do paperboard con-
tainers and, therefore, the ban on plastic nonrefillables was not
a rational means to achieve the last of the Act's major objec-
tives-to ease the state's solid waste disposal problem.260 Rely-
ing on statements made during the floor debate and on the
same empirical study, which reported that plastic milk jugs oc-
cupy a greater volume in landfills than other nonreturnable
milk containers, Justice Brennan rejected the Minnesota
Supreme Court's conclusion because the truth of its contradic-
tory was "at least debatable."26 1
In sum, Clover Leaf seems to say that if it is at least debat-
able-that is, if there is a reasonable difference of opinion-as
to the legislative facts on which the constitutionality of legisla-
tive action depends, the reviewing court must accept the ver-
sion of the facts that would sustain the constitutionality of the
legislation and not reject that version simply because the court
is persuaded that the legislature was mistaken as to the facts.
On the basis of the facts so accepted, the reviewing courts must
then determine whether the statutory means are rationally re-
lated to the statutory objectives. Yet, as we shall see in the
next section, the United States Supreme Court has taken judi-
cial notice of constitutionally significant legislative facts with-
out inquiring whether there was a reasonable difference of
opinion about them and whether it was at least debatable that
their contradictories might be true.
It is impossible to know what standard the state district
257. 289 N.W.2d at 85 (citation omitted).
258. Id
259. 449 U.S. at 468-69.
260. 289 N.W.2d at 8244.
261. 449 U.S. at 469-70.
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court used in the Rating Association case in reviewing the leg-
islative facts as to the cost savings to the insurers resulting
from the changes made by chapter 346. All we know is that the
district court accepted the attorney general's proposed findings
that the insurers "failed to prove that the cost savings resulting
from the aggregate of all the benefit, administrative and opera-
tional changes in ch. 346 are less than 15%"262 and that these
cost savings "are greater than 15% and indeed are at least
20% .263 These findings read as if they are the result of the dis-
trict court's independent evaluation of the legislative facts. The
district court also found, as proposed by the attorney general,
that "the Legislature had before it sufficient information and
data... as to clearly preclude a finding that the Legislature ac-
ted arbitrarily, capriciously or irrationally in mandating a 15%
rate reduction." 26 4
B. DOES THE "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" TEST APPLY TO THE
REVIEW BY THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE FACTS FOUND BY THE DISTRICT
COURT?
Rule 52.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that "findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."265 The
attorney general argued that this test applied because there
was conflicting expert testimony about the cost impact of vari-
ous changes made by chapter 346.266 The Rating Association
and insurers responded with three arguments. The Rating As-
sociation maintained that the district court's ultimate conclu-
sions regarding legislative facts were clearly erroneous under
traditional standards; 26 7 that, under accepted doctrine, the
clearly erroneous test should not apply in this case; and, more
important, that rule 52.01 applies only to findings of adjudica-
262. Appendix II, infra, at 676 (Finding of Fact No. 28).
263. Id. (Finding of Fact No. 29).
264. Id. at 675-76 (Finding of Fact No. 27).
265. MINN. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
266. Brief for Respondents at 10-12, Rating Ass'n.
267. For an example of the application of such traditional standards, see In
re Trust Known as Great Northern Iron Ore Properties, 308 Minn. 221, 225, 243
N.W.2d 302, 305, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976) ("the trial court's findings may
be held clearly erroneous, notwithstanding evidence to support such findings, if




tive facts and not to findings of legislative facts. The second
and third arguments will be discussed here.
The insurers argued that the conflicting expert testimony
about the cost impact of chapter 346 did not require the appli-
cation of the clearly erroneous standard because that conflict
did not center on the "credibility of the witnesses" within the
meaning of rule 52.01. The credibility of the witnesses in the
Rating Association case did not turn on conflicting eyewitness
reports or evaluations of the witnesses' demeanors or conduct.
Instead it turned on the pertinence and applicability of the data
bases and the assumptions, methodologies, analyses, and rea-
soning used by the expert witnesses to reach their respective
conclusions about the impact of chapter 346 on insurers' costs.
Credibility in this sense is discernible to anyone who analyzes
the record. The Minnesota Supreme Court was as competent
as the district court to resolve these conflicts and to reach ulti-
mate conclusions about the reasonableness of the legislative
determination that these changes would have sufficient cost im-
pact to justify the mandated 15% rate reduction. Under estab-
lished precedent, the Minnesota Supreme Court need not have
deferred to the district court's assessments. 268
The insurers' third argument, that rule 52.01 of the Minne-
sota Rules of Civil Procedure, like its counterpart, rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,269 applies only to findings
of adjudicative facts and not to the legislative facts that were
embodied in the district court's findings twenty-eight and
twenty-nine,2 70 requires a more detailed analysis.
The principal reason for the clearly erroneous rule in the
review of a trial court's findings of adjudicative facts does not
apply to legislative facts. Unlike the determination of disputed
adjudicative facts-that is, facts involving "who did what,
where, when, how, and with what motive or intent"2 7 1 --the de-
termination of disputed legislative facts, as explained above,
268. See id. There is also authority for the proposition that an appellate
court must engage in more careful scrutiny of a trial court's findings of fact
when, as in the Rating Association case, the trial court adopted verbatim the
prevailing party's proposed findings of fact. See Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622,
626 (9th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-43 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 694 (1942); Murphy v. Murphy, 269 Minn. 393, 404-06,
131 N.W.2d 220, 227-28 (1964). The insurers did not present this argument to the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
269. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a).
270. Findings of Fact Nos. 28 and 29 are reprinted in Appendix U, infra, at
676.
271. 3 K.C. DAvis, supra note 212, § 15.4, at 147.
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does not "depend peculiarly upon the credit given to witnesses
by those who see and hear them."272 Furthermore, the advi-
sory committee note on the federal rules explains that rule
52(a) "accords with the decisions on the scope of the review in
modern federal equity practice."273 Each of the federal cases
cited in support of this statement involved adjudicative facts.274
The note then points out that in Minnesota, among other states,
"the review of findings of fact in all non-jury cases ... is assim-
ilated to the equity review. '275 The case cited in support of this
proposition also involved adjudicative facts.27 6
That the 'Tmdings of fact" governed by rule 52.01 refer to
findings of adjudicative, not legislative, facts is further demon-
strated by the impact of rule 201 of the Minnesota Rules of Evi-
dence and its counterpart, rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.277 Both rules deal only with the judicial notice of ad-
judicative facts and were not intended to limit the judicial no-
tice of legislative facts. In the cases cited in the Minnesota
Supreme Court Advisory Committee's comment on rule 201 of
the Minnesota Rules of Evidence,278 the Minnesota Supreme
Court took judicial notice of extrarecord legislative facts that
were the products of the court's own research and understand-
ing.27 9 Furthermore, there is general agreement that the
United States Supreme Court "commonly takes judicial notice
of disputable and even disputed legislative facts." 280 In numer-
ous cases, the Court has relied heavily on extrarecord legisla-
272. Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 341 (1949) ("Findings
as to the design, motive and intent with which men act depend peculiarly upon
the credit given to witnesses by those who see and hear them.").
273. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) advisory committee note.
274. See Warren v. Keep, 155 U.S. 265 (1894); Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U.S. 132
(1892); Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136
(1888); Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 204 F.
166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 624 (1913). These cases were cited in FED.
R. CIrv. P. 52(a) advisory committee note.
275. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee note.
276. See State Bank of Gibbon v. Walter, 167 Minn. 37, 208 N.W. 423 (1926),
cited in FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee note.
277. MINN. R. EviD. 201; FED. R. EviD. 201.
278. MwNN. R. Evm. 201 advisory committee comment.
279. See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372-73, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419-20
(1969); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500
(1967); Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 574-75,
102 N.W.2d 528, 536-37 (1960). These cases were cited in MINN. . EvID. 201 advi-
sory committee comment.
280. 3 K.C. DAvIs, supra note 212, § 15.11, at 185. See also, Bikln, supra note
144, at 12-19; Karst, supra note 179, at 77 (1960); Miller & Barron, The Supreme
Cour4 The Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. RE V. 1187, 1237 (1975).
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ive facts, only some of which were produced by the parties in
their briefs and the rest by the Justices' own research.281 In-
deed, in many cases the United States Supreme Court has
taken judicial notice of legislative facts rejected by the federal
district courts, without even mentioning the clearly erroneous
rule.8 2
The practice of the United States and Minnesota Supreme
Courts of taking judicial notice of legislative facts in the per-
formance of their appellate functions is inconsistent with the
notion that the appellate courts must accept the trial court's
findings of legislative facts unless "clearly erroneous." This
practice is also inconsistent with the notion that, in the exer-
cise of constitutional review, the courts must assume the truth
of the legislative facts on which constitutionality depends if
reasonable people may differ about their truth or, as Justice
Brennan said in Clover Leaf, their truth vel non is "at least de-
batable."283 In all the cases cited, the Minnesota Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court determined the
legislative facts for themselves.
No authoritative pronouncement from either the Minnesota
or the United States Supreme Court has decided the applicabil-
ity of the clearly erroneous rule to legislative facts. In two re-
cent cases, the United States Supreme Court has had occasion
to consider the applicability of rule 52(a). In Pullman-Standard
v. Swint,284 the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in
a case involving an alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that the court of appeals
281. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979); Ballew v. Geor-
gia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196-97 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-62 (1973); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-52 (1972);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-54 (1966).
282. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 98-102 (1979), rev'g 436 F. Supp.
134 (D.D.C. 1977); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
75-77 (1978), rev'g Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 138-40 (1976), rev'g 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975) and 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D.
Va. 1974); United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 5-6
(1970), revg 308 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1970); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 190-95 (1963), revg 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962) and 191 F.
Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), discussed in 3 K.C. DAvIS, supra note 212, § 15.11, at
186; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-95 (1954) (The School Segregation
Cases), revVg Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952), Davis v. County
School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.
Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
283. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (quot-
ing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938))
284. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
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erred because it did not apply the "clearly erroneous" test
when it rejected the federal district court's finding that Pull-
man-Standard and the Union, in agreeing to a particular senior-
ity system, had not intended to discriminate against black
employees of Pullman-Standard.285 The issue of the parties'
motive or intent is, of course, a typical issue of adjudicative
fact. Regarding rule 52(a), the Court stated:
Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to ex-
clude certain categories of factual findings from the obligation of a
court of appeals to accept a district court's findings unless clearly erro-
neous. It does not divide facts into categories; in particular, it does not
divide findings of fact into those that deal with "ultimate" and those
that deal with "subsidiary" facts.
2 8 6
The court of appeals in Pullman-Standard had made an in-
dependent determination of the "ultimate" adjudicative fact-
that the disproportionately adverse impact of the seniority sys-
tem on black employees reflected an intent to discriminate on
the basis of race.2 87 It had applied the "clearly erroneous" test
to the trial court's findings of "subsidiary" facts, from which the
inference of discriminatory intent was drawn. But some of
these subsidiary facts were adjudicative facts and others were
legislative facts. For example, the trial court found that linking
seniority to "departmental age" was typical of seniority ar-
rangements generally and of agreements in the railroad equip-
ment manufacturing industry in particular. The court of
appeals did not disagree with this finding of legislative fact.2 88
The trial court also found that the arrangement of departments
at the Pullman-Standard plant was rationally related to the na-
ture of the work there and consistent with practices generally
followed in unionized plants throughout the country.2 89 The
court of appeals did not disagree with the trial court about
what these general practices were-legislative facts.2 90 But it
rejected the trial court's findings that the structure of depart-
ments at Pullman-Standard's plant was rational and in line
with general industry practice and, therefore, did not reflect a
discriminatory intent2 91 -- all adjudicative facts.
Therefore, when the Supreme Court stated that rule 52(a)
285. Id. at 275-76.
286. Id. at 287.
287. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 533 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456
U.S. 273 (1982).
288. See 624 F.2d at 531.
289. See 456 U.S. at 280.
290. See 624 F.2d at 530-31.
291. See id. at 533.
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"does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain cate-
gories of factual findings" from its ambit,2 92 it did not have in
mind the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts.
It was referring to the distinction between "subsidiary" adjudi-
cative facts and "ultimate" adjudicative facts.
In Rogers v. Lodge,293 the Supreme Court relied on Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint in holding that the "clearly erroneous"
standard applied to a finding of the federal district court of an
adjudicative fact-that the at-large system of voting for mem-
bers of the Board of Commissioners in Burke County, Georgia,
was being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the
voting strength of the black population.29 4 For this reason, the
at-large system was held to violate the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendment rights of the black citizens.2 95 The Court also held
that rule 52(a) applied to the trial court's subsidiary findings of
fact, which may fairly be described as involving issues of legis-
lative, as well as adjudicative, fact.296
Neither in Pullman-Standard v. Swint nor in Rogers v.
Lodge does it appear that a party argued that rule 52(a) does
not apply to the trial court's "subsidiary" findings of legislative
facts. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, unlike the Rating Associ-
ation case, the "ultimate" facts as well as the "subsidiary"
facts about which the trial court and the court of appeals dif-
fered were adjudicative facts, to which the Supreme Court held
rule 52(a) applicable. In Rogers v. Lodge, too, unlike the Rating
Association case, the "ultimate fact" was an adjudicative fact
but the subsidiary facts underlying the ultimate fact were
mainly legislative facts.
The Supreme Court in Rogers v. Lodge advanced two addi-
tional reasons for upholding-the trial court's findings of fact.
The first was the "two-court rule"-the "Court of Appeals did
not hold any of the District Court's findings of fact to be clearly
erroneous, and this Court has frequently noted its reluctance to
disturb findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts."297
The Court also stated that it was not inclined to overturn the
trial court's factual findings in a voting rights case such as Rog-
ers v. Lodge because they represented "'a blend of history and
292. 456 U.S. at 287.
293. 458 U.S. 613, reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 198 (1982).
294. See id. at 622-23.
295. See id. at 616.
296. See id. at 623-24.
297. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623. As Clover Leaf demonstrates, this rule does not
apply to the review of state court judgments.
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intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the ...
County multimember district in the light of past and present
reality, political and otherwise.' ",298
In other words, there were special reasons why the federal
district court was best able to appraise the subsidiary "legisla-
tive" facts in the voting rights case. Other special reasons may
impel an appellate court to give weight to a trial court's deter-
mination of legislative facts. The trial court is able to question
expert witnesses so as to be sure it understands what they are
saying and has time to study and inquire about written data
submitted to it. In short, the trial process may enable the trial
court to obtain a deeper understanding of the legislative facts
than an appellate court that is dependent upon a written record
and the briefs of counsel. But none of these special reasons
was present in the Rating Association case, where the trial
court's ultimate conclusions of legislative fact were unaccompa-
nied by any findings with respect to the cost savings to the in-
surers resulting from any of the specific changes made by
chapter 346, by any evaluation of the testimony or documentary
evidence presented at the trial, or by any opinion indicating in-
dependent reflection.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the
clearly erroneous test in a situation that casts the Rating Asso-
ciation case into interesting perspective. In Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc. ,299 the Fifth Circuit upheld a federal district
court's determination of the legislative facts underlying its con-
clusion that an intercity bus company that had a policy of re-
fusing to consider persons between the ages of forty and sixty-
five for initial employment as bus drivers did not violate the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act because the age limit
imposed was a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the safe operation of its business. Again, the issue
as to whether rule 52(a) applied to legislative facts was appar-
ently not raised; the cases cited by the court in elaborating the
clearly erroneous standard involved only adjudicative facts.30 0
But the application of the clearly erroneous rule to the trial
court's determination of the legislative facts was contrary to
what the Supreme Court did in a similar case three years later.
In Vance v. Bradley,30 1 which involved an issue of legislative
298. Id. at 622 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-770 (1973)).
299. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
300. See id. at 233.
301. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
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fact similar to that in Tamiami-whether a sixty-year age limit
for Foreign Service officers is justified-the Supreme Court
took judicial notice of legislative facts that were contrary to the
findings of the federal district court without mentioning rule
52(a).
Judge Brown, who wrote the court's opinion in Tamiami,
also wrote an additional, specially concurring opinion that is
significant for the Rating Association case. Speaking only for
himself, Judge Brown said: "Though a court, with its adversary
procedure, is not necessarily precluded from resolving issues of
legislative fact... it is generally thought their determination is
particularly appropriate to the administrative process, where
staffs of specialists and great storehouses of information are
available."302 He further noted that
[t]he determination of a factor as decisive as the age of employment
having such universal application an administrative agency with its
broader power of inquiry should be in a better position to evaluate the
various factors pro and con than a court on the limited record-no mat-
ter how long the trial-that traditional adversary rules of evidence
bring about.
In deciding such a serious problem the trier ought not to be left, as
was the Judge below, in the predicament of trying to choose the view,
pro and con, of the incumbent Deputy Director of the Bureau of Motor
Carrier Safety who, as a witness, supported the government's position
but who was opposed by equally explicit contrary testimony from his
immediate predecessor who likewise appeared as an expert witness
but on behalf of the carriers. 3 0 3
Judge Brown thought the "ideal resolution" of the case
would have been for the court to seek further information and
guidance by asking the federal Department of Transportation
to investigate, hear, and decide initially the issue of legislative
fact.304 The relief the insurers requested in the Rating Associa-
tion case resembled the "ideal resolution" proposed by Judge
Brown in Tamiami, which Professor Davis thinks should "be-
come the foundation for future law."305 To obtain this relief,
the insurers did not ask the Minnesota Supreme Court to de-
termine, independently, precisely what percentage reduction in
insurance rates was warranted by the actual cost savings to the
insurers resulting from chapter 346. They asked the court to
render the decision it would have reached if it were the first tri-
bunal to evaluate the legislative facts. In other words, they
302. Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 245.
303. Id. at 243, 246.
304. Id. at 239.
305. 3 K.C. DAvis, supra note 212, § 16.14, at 270.
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asked the court to determine independently whether it could
reasonably be concluded that the cost savings justified the
mandated 15% rate reduction and not to decide merely whether
it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that the
Minnesota legislature did not act "arbitrarily, capriciously or ir-
rationally in mandating a 15% rate reduction."306 Neither the
United States nor the Minnesota Supreme Court has so re-
stricted itself when taking judicial notice of legislative facts. To
discharge their ultimate responsibility of implementing consti-
tutional guarantees, courts must exercise an independent judg-
ment, at least to the extent urged by the insurers, about the
legislative facts on which the constitutional validity of chal-
lenged legislative action depends.307
The Minnesota attorney general argued strongly that the
clearly erroneous rule applied in the Rating Association case,
but did not discuss the insurers' contention that rule 52.01 does
not apply to a trial court's findings of legislative facts. 308 Be-
cause the Minnesota Supreme Court disposed of the case sum-
marily, we do not know what it thought of this contention.
306. See Appendix 11, infra, at 676 (Finding of Fact No. 27).
307. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court
stated: 'This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional
principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain
that those principles have been constitutionally applied.... We must 'make
an independent examination of the whole record. . . ."' Id. at 285 (quoting Ed-
wards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)). In a footnote, the Court fur-
ther noted that it also must "review the finding of facts .... where a
conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled
as to make it necessary." Id. at 285 n.26 (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380,
385-86 (1927)). The facts in Sullivan were adjudicative; the Court's responsibil-
ity to examine the evidence independently is even clearer when legislative
facts are at issue.
Furthermore, with respect to the determination of legislative facts, there
should be no difference between economic and non-economic due process
cases, although the degree of deference to legislative policy may differ in the
two categories of cases.
308. Brief for Respondents at 9-16, Rating Ass'n. The attorney general ar-
gued that "we need not reach the interesting legal question of whether the
clearly erroneous standard does not apply in a case where the facts are solely
'legislative' as opposed to 'adjudicative."' Id. at 11. The attorney general ar-
rived at this position on the basis of a misunderstanding of the concept of legis-
lative facts. The attorney general assumed that legislative facts are only those
facts that the legislature considered in the course of enacting chapter 346. Id.
at 10-12. But obviously, the testimony and data presented to the district court
by the expert witnesses also related to legislative facts. These facts went to the
underpinnings of the legislatively mandated 15% rate reduction. The insurers'
contention that rule 52.01 does not apply to a trial court's conclusions about leg-
islative facts was not at all "premised," as the attorney general maintained,
"upon the implausible proposition that the Trial Court did not consider the tes-
timony of the expert witnesses at trial." Id. at 11. These two contentions had
nothing to do with each other.
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C. WERE THE MINNESOTA COURTS WARRANTED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE ACTUAL COST SAVINGS TO THE INSURERS
RESULTING FROM THE CHANGES MADE BY
CHAPTER 346 REASONABLY JUSTIFIED A RATE
REDUCTION OF AT LEAST FIFTEEN PERCENT?
Chapter 346 contained 146 sections. After a brief review of
the legislative history of the 15% reduction, each of the sections
that the state claimed might result in cost savings to the insur-
ers will be described. The sections dealing with the administra-
tion and operation of the workers' compensation system will be
considered first, followed by the sections dealing with the
changes in the benefits payable to injured workers.
1. Legislative History of the Mandated Fifteen Percent Rate
Reduction
Twenty-five of the twenty-nine findings of fact by the trial
court in the Rating Association case related to the legislative
history of the various proposals to change Minnesota's worker's
compensation system. They were intended to support the
court's finding twenty-six that "[p]laintiffs' claims that the Leg-
islature lacked a rational basis for mandating this [15%] reduc-
tion are unsubstantiated."309 Yet, the legislative history of the
mandated reduction shows that the legislature gave it only su-
perficial consideration.310
A mandated rate reduction of 15% was proposed for the
first time in the conference committee, which had the task of
reconciling different house and senate bills. To reflect the cost
savings to the insurers expected to accrue from the proposed
benefit changes, the house bill mandated a rate reduction of 8%
and the senate bill, 10%.31I To reflect the cost savings expected
from the proposed administrative and operational changes, the
house bill mandated an additional reduction of 2%, and the
senate bill, 10%.312 In addition, the house bill directed the com-
missioner of insurance to reduce rates by another 2%, on Octo-
ber 1 of 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985, to reflect the full impact of the
changes. The commissioner was authorized to vary this per-
centage, however, if the cost savings to the insurers proved to
309. See Appendix II, infra, at 675.
310. The legislative history is set forth in full in the Brief for Appellants at
A-15 to A-40, Rating Ass'n.
311. See H.F. 682, 72d Leg., 1st Sess., 1981 J. Minn. House 2040; S.F. 359, 72d
Leg., 1st Sess., 1981 J. Minn. Senate 955.
312. See sources cited supra note 311.
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be more or less than was anticipated. Thus, the senate bill
would have mandated an immediate 20% reduction in rates as
compared to the 10% reduction mandated by the house bill.
Any further rate reduction under the house bill would have
been problematic. On the other hand, the 20% reduction under
the senate bill was to have been for one year only. The confer-
ence committee's and the legislature's decisions to mandate an
immediate and continuing 15% rate reduction rejected the ap-
proaches of both the senate and house bills.
The only, and very brief, legislative committee discussion
of the basis for the mandated 15% rate reduction occurred dur-
ing the May 15, 1981, meeting of the conference committee.
Senator Peterson asked Insurance Commissioner Markman
whether a mandated reduction of 15% was not "open to some
debate." Commissioner Markman replied that it was and that
15% represented his "best estimate," that he could be right or
wrong, and that the rate reduction justified by proposed benefit
changes "could as well be 2% ... as it could be 14 [%]."3 13
There was no discussion of the mandated 15% rate reduc-
tion on the floor of the senate and only the briefest discussion
on the floor of the house. Representative Stadum argued that,
based on Commissioner Markman's estimates, only an 11% re-
duction in rates was justified. Representative Simoneau re-
plied that he believed "everything that is in the bill amounts to
an immediate fifteen percent discount."314
2. The Changes in the Administration and Operation of the
Workers' Compensation System
a. Commencement of Payment of Compensation and
Penalizing Failure to Make Timely Payments of
Benefits
Section 96 of chapter 346 required the insurer to commence
payment of compensation within fourteen days of the notice to,
or knowledge by, the employer of a compensable injury.315
Only if the employer determined that the worker's disability
was not the result of a compensable injury could payment of
compensation be discontinued. Within thirty days after the
first payment was due, the employer could apply to the com-
313. See Brief for Appellants at A-38, Rating Ass'n.
314. Id. at A-39 to A-40.
315. Ch. 346, § 96, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1672 (amending MN. STAT. § 176.221




missioner of labor and industry 31 6 for a thirty day extension
within which to determine whether the injury was compensa-
ble. Even if the employer decided to discontinue payments,
those already made could be recovered only if the commis-
sioner found that the employee's claim of work-related disabil-
ity had not been made in good faith. Under prior law, the
insurer was required to commence payment of compensation
within thirty days of notice to, or knowledge by, the employer
of a compensable injury, unless within that time the employer
or insurer filed with the commissioner of labor and industry a
denial of liability or a request for an extension of time within
which to determine liability.3 1 7 Section 96 further provided that
the employer or insurer who failed to begin compensation, to
file a denial of liability within the prescribed time, or to request
an extension of time within which to determine liability had to
pay a penalty to the Special Compensation Fund amounting to
100% of the delayed payments.3 1 8
Section 97 provided that if the employer was guilty of inex-
cusable delay in making payments, the delayed payments to
the worker were to be increased by 10%.319 If any sum ordered
to be paid by the Department of Labor and Industry was not
paid when due and the order was not appealed, the sum bore
12% interest until paid.32 0 Under prior law, any payment not
made when due bore 8% interest until paid.32 '
Furthermore, section 98 added the provision that if an in-
surer repeatedly failed to pay benefits within three days of the
due dates, the commissioner of labor and industry would order
the insurer to explain the failure in person.32 2 If prompt pay-
ments were not made thereafter, the commissioner of labor and
industry was directed to refer the insurer to the commissioner
of insurance for disciplinary action.
316. The commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry adminis-
ters the workers' compensation system. MmN. STAT. § 175.17 (1982).
317. MnNN. STAT. § 176.221 subd. 1 (1980), amended by ch. 346, § 96, 1981
Minn. Laws at 1672.
318. Ch. 346, § 96, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1672 (amending MIN. STAT. § 176.221
subd. 5 (1980)).
319. Ch. 346, § 97, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1674 (amending MAaN. STAT. § 176.225
(1980)).
320. Id.
321. MINN. STAT. § 176.225 subd. 5 (1980), amended by ch. 346, § 97, 1981
Minn. Laws at 1674.




b. Administrative Procedures with Respect to the Initial
Determination of a Compensation Claim
1. Settlement agreements
Sections 134 and 135323 clarified the prior law; settlement
agreements between an injured worker or the worker's depen-
dent and the employer or insurer must be approved by the au-
thority with jurisdiction over the matter at the time of the
settlement.324 To be, approved, the settlement agreement must
have been found to be reasonable, fair, and in conformity with
the workers' compensation law. A settlement agreement was
conclusively presumed to meet these criteria if the parties were
represented by attorneys. 325 Consistent with the law prior to
chapter 346, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals
could set aside an award made upon a settlement.326
To encourage settlements, section 72 required that judg-
ment be entered on a settlement agreed to by the parties up to
one day before a matter was to be heard.327 If one party re-
jected a reasonable offer of settlement made by the other party,
evidence of the offer was not admissible except in a proceeding
to determine attorney's fees. If a rejected offer of an employer
or insurer was more favorable than the judgment finally ob-
tained by the worker, the employer was not liable for any part
of the worker's attorney's fees. If a rejected offer of an em-
ployee was at least as favorable as the judgment finally ob-
tained by the worker, the employer or insurer would be
required to pay 25% of the attorney's fee in excess of two hun-
dred fifty dollars. Under prior law, an employer who unsuc-
cessfully contested liability was not obligated to pay any such
323. Ch. 346, §§ 134-135, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1687 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 176.521 subds. 1-2 (1980)).
324. MINr. STAT. § 176.521 subd. 2 (1982 & Supp. 1983). The authority may be
either the Workers' Compensation Division, a compensation judge, the Work-
ers' Compensation Court of Appeals, or a district court. Id.
325. Id. Subdivision 2 withdraws the conclusive presumption when the set-
tlement concerns an employee's right to medical compensation or rehabilita-
tion, in which case the settlement must be approved by the Workers'
Compensation Division, a compensation judge, or the Workers' Compensation
Court of Appeals. Id.
326. Id. § 176.521 subd. 3. That section authorizes the Workers' Compensa-
tion Court of Appeals to set aside an award made upon a settlement only upon
filing of a petition by any party to the settlement and after a hearing on the pe-
tition. The court of appeals must refer such petitions to the chief hearing ex-
aminer for assignment to a compensation judge for hearing.





2. Burden of proof
Section 55 specifically stated that the burden was on the in-
jured worker or dependent to prove that the injury or death of
the worker arose out of and in the course of employment. 29
The employer bore the burden of proving that the employer
was not liable because either the injury was self-inflicted or the
worker's intoxication was the proximate cause of the injury.
Section 56 provided that all disputed issues of fact in claims for
compensation must be decided by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 30 It then defined such evidence as "evidence produced
in substantiation of a fact which, when weighed against the evi-
dence opposing the fact, has more convincing force and greater
probability of truth."331 It also stated that questions of law aris-
ing under the workers' compensation law "shall be determined
in accordance with the rules of construction generally applied
to all other civil matters."33 2 The legislative history reveals that
the legislative committees linked sections 55 and 56 with sec-
tion 136, which deleted the phrase that section 176.531 of the
Minnesota law was to be "liberally construed" to insure the
prompt payment of compensation by public employers. 333
3. The medical panel in permanent partial disability cases
Section 89 provided that the administrator of the Workers'
Compensation Court of Appeals should choose three Minne-
sota counties, including at least one rural county, for a pilot
medical panel project to continue until January 1, 1983.334 In
1983 the administrator was to report on its operation and make
recommendations as to its future. The project required the ad-
ministrator to compile and maintain a list of names of physi-
cians, podiatrists, and chiropractors qualified to determine the
extent of permanent partial disability. From that list, the em-
328. See MINN. STAT. § 176.081 (1980).
329. Ch. 346, § 55, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1644 (amending MIN. STAT. § 176.021
subd. 1 (1980)). See also ch. 290, § 32, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1329 (amending Mm-N.
STAT. § 176.021 subd. la (1982)).




333. Ch. 346, § 136, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1687 (amending MINN. STAT. § 176.531
subd. 3 (1980)). See also Brief for Appellants at A-20 to A-21, Rating Ass'n.
334. Ch. 346, § 89, 1981 Mim. Laws at 1665 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.152
(1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 173, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1404).
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ployer.and the injured worker were to select a medical panel to
report on the extent of the disability when that was an issue.
The report of the panel would be binding on the compensation
judge and subject to very limited review by the Workers' Com-
pensation Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The panel members' fees were to be paid either by the em-
ployer or, if the worker proceeded in bad faith, by the worker.
c. Transfer of Workers' Compensation Judges to the Office of
Administrative Hearings
The workers' compensation judges were transferred to the
Office of Administrative Hearings and made independent of the
Workers' Compensation Division of the Department of Labor
and Industry, effective July 1, 1981.335 The three settlement
judges remained in the division. Hearing reporters and support
staff for the compensation judges also were transferred to the
Office of Administrative Hearings.
Chapter 346 provided that the compensation judges would
perform the functions of a hearing examiner in workers' com-
pensation matters. No other hearing examiner could be as-
signed to these matters. The compensation judges were
required to be "learned in the law," to have "demonstrated
knowledge of workers' compensation laws," and to be "free of
any political or economic association that would impair their
ability to function officially in a fair and objective manner."336
Workers' Compensation Division attorneys who represent em-
ployees in workers' compensation proceedings were prohibited
from being hired or appointed as compensation judges for a pe-
riod of two years following termination of service with the
Division.337
335. See ch. 346, §§ 2-6, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1613-15 (amending Mum. STAT.
§ 15.052 subds. 1-5 (1980)); ch. 346, § 103, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1676 (codified at
Mm. STAT. § 176.262 (1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 173, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1404);
ch. 346, § 141, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1689 (providing for certain transition problems
with regard to the transfer of the compensation judges and their salaries). Fur-
ther amendments in 1983 altered the procedures before workers' compensation
judges and changed the judges' decision-making process. See ch. 290, §§ 142-49,
1983 Minn. Laws at 1387-90 (amending Mun. STAT. §§ 176.281, .285, .312, .321
subd. 1, .331, .341, .361, .371 (1982)).
336. Ch. 346, § 2, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1613 (amending lum. STAT. § 15.052
subd. 1 (1980)).
337. Ch. 346, § 103, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1676 (codified at Mn. STAT. § 176.262
(1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 173, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1404).
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d. Separation of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals
from the Department of Labor and Industry and
Modification of the Court's Powers
The existing Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals was
reconstituted as an independent agency in the executive
branch, with its judges subject to the limitations of article VI,
section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution, to the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Judicial Standards, and to the constraints
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.338 The judges of the existing
court were to be judges of the reconstituted court until their
terms expired. New judges would be appointed for staggered,
six-year terms by the governor, with the advice and consent of
the senate. Together with the other officers and employees of
the court of appeals, the judges were forbidden, under penalty
of removal, to induce other officers or employees of the state to
adopt their political views, favor any political person or candi-
date for office, or contribute funds for campaigns or other polit-
ical purposes. 39
Unless an appeal was taken to a district court, chapter 346
provided that the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals
was the exclusive agency to hear appeals by workers, employ-
ers, and insurers from decisions of the commissioner of labor
and industry, the Workers' Compensation Division, or a com-
pensation judge.34o The court of appeals also could review
cases transferred to it by the district court. In all such cases,
the statute provided that the court of appeals "shall be the sole,
exclusive, and final authority for the hearing and determination
of all questions of law and fact arising under the workers' com-
pensation laws of the state," subject only to appeal to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court.341
The court of appeals was not permitted to hear the case de
novo. It could, however, examine the record made before the
compensation judge, disregard that judge's findings of fact, and
substitute its own findings of fact. It also could remand the
case for a de novo hearing before a compensation judge. -2 The
338. Ch. 346, § 42, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1638 (codified at MIN. STAT. § 175A.01
(1982)).
339. Ch. 346, § 44, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1639 (codified at MmAi. STAT. § 175A.03
(1982)).
340. Ch. 346, § 42, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1638 (codified at MENN. STAT. § 175A.01
(1982)).
341. Id. See also ch. 346, § 51, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1641 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 175A.01 (1982)).




chief judge of the court also could refer any question of fact to
the chief hearing examiner for assignment to a compensation
judge. The chief judge could request that the compensation
judge hear the evidence and either report the evidence to the
court of appeals or make findings of fact and report them to the
court of appeals.3 43
e. Increased Prefunded Limit for Purposes of the Workers'
Compensation Reinsurance Association
Under the prior law as well as the current law, the Reinsur-
ance Association assumes 100% of the liability of its member
insurers for compensation payments above the retention limits
explained below. 344 All insurers licensed to write workers'
compensation insurance in Minnesota must be members of the
Association.34 5 The Association charges its members premiums
to cover its liabilities and expenses; the premiums are assessed
according to a specified formula and include two different por-
tions-the "prefunded limit" portion and the "pay as you go"
portion.3m
Under prior law, the Reinsurance Association was required
to charge its member insurers premiums that would be suffi-
cient to cover (1) expected liabilities for compensation pay-
ments, which ranged between a $100,000 or $300,000 lower limit,
for which the member insurer elected to retain liability, and a
$500,000 higher limit-the "prefunded limit" portion; (2) actual
payments for claims in excess of $500,000--the "pay as you go"
portion; and (3) incurred or estimated operating and adminis-
trative expenses.34 7 The Reinsurance Association, in turn, was
empowered to reinsure all or any portion of its liabilities, in-
cluding its potential liability in excess of the prefunded limit.
Sections 19 and 20 of chapter 346 raised the prefunded limit
to $2,500,000.m This limit was subject to upward adjustment, as
343. Ch. 346, § 115, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1680 (amending MINN. STAT. § 176.381
(1980)). See also ch. 290, §§ 150-152, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1390-92 (amending
MwNN. STAT. § 176.421 subds. 3, 4, 6 (1982)) (changing procedures and powers of
Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals).
344. Ch. 346, § 19, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1622 (amending MiNN. STAT. § 79.35
(1980)).
345. Ch. 290, § 7, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1314 (amending MINN. STAT. § 79.34
subd. 1 (1982)).
346. Ch. 346, § 19, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1622 (amending MN. STAT. § 79.35
(1980)).
347. MINN. STAT. § 79.35 (1980), amended by ch. 346, § 19, 1981 Minn. Laws at
1622.




were the retention limits, on January 1, 1983, and each Janu-
ary 1 thereafter by the percentage increase in the statewide av-
erage weekly wage.34 9 The increase in the prefunded limit was
also made retroactive to October 1, 1979, and the Reinsurance
Association was authorized to adjust its members' premiums to
take account of the retroactive change. 350
f. The Assigned Risk Plan
Responsibility for the Assigned Risk Plan was transferred
from the Rating Association to the commissioner of insurance
who was authorized to issue rules to implement it.351 The com-
missioner was to fix the initial premiums for insuring risks that
were rejected by the insurers in the normal course of business
but determined by the commissioner to be "in good faith enti-
tled to coverage."35 2 After the rejected employer paid the pre-
mium, the commissioner assigned the risk to one or more
qualified members of the Rating Association or qualified group
self-insurance administrators. The commissioner would then
enter into a contract with the assignee to issue a policy, or a
group self-insurance administration contract, covering the com-
pensation liability of the assigned risk. Unlike the situation
under prior law, assignees would compete for the business.
All members of the Rating Association were reinsurers
among themselves of the compensation liability assumed for
assigned risks. Moreover, each qualified group self-insurance
administrator was made a member of the Reinsurance Associa-
tion, and the Assigned Risk Plan itself was treated as a group
self-insurer member electing the higher retention of liability
limit.3 53
Section 14 created an Assigned Risk Plan Review Board
with five members.a 4 The commissioner of insurance was one
of the five and appointed the other four, two members of the
Reinsurance Association and two employers insured under the
Assigned Risk Plan. An assessment of 0.25% was levied on pol-
icies issued under the Plan to pay for the review board. The
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Ch. 346, §§ 13-15, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1617-19 (amending Mim. STAT.
§ 79.25.26 (1980)).
352. Ch. 346, § 13, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1617 (amending MA-NN. STAT. § 79.25
(1980)).
353. Id.




Assigned Risk Plan was not to be effective until January 1,
1982, and was to expire on July 1, 1983, and be superseded by a
new and a different plan.355
3. The Impact of the Changes in the Administration and
Operation of the Workers' Compensation System
The table below sets forth the quantitative differences be-
tween the state and the insurers with respect to the rate impact
of the changes made by chapter 346 in the administration and
operation of the workers' compensation system.
TABLE 1
Rate Changes Justified
Changes Made By By Resulting Changes









Assigned Risk Plan -0.8 0.0 to -1.0
All other changes -8.4 0.0
Total -8.5 +0.7 to -0.3
a. Impact of Increasing the Prefunded Limit for Purposes of
the Workers' Compensation Reinsurance
Association
The state and the insurers agreed that the increase in the
prefunded limit would increase costs to the insurers by an
amount sufficient to justify a rate increase of 0.7%.
b. Impact of the Assigned Risk Plan
The state's expert witness testified that the Assigned Risk
Plan would justify a rate reduction of 0.8%.356 Using the latest
financial data, which the state's expert did not do, the insurers'
355. Ch. 346, § 146, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1693. The superceding plan was set
out in chapter 346, § 34, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1634 (codified at MIN. STAT. § 79.63
(1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 173, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1404). See also ch. 290,
§§ 5-6, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1311-13 (changing the Assigned Risk Plan and its
administration).
356. Trial Transcript at 612, Rating Ass'n.
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expert estimated the justified rate reduction at 1.0%.357 But
chapter 346 fixed January 1, 1982, as the effective date of the
Assigned Risk Plan, and the Plan did not go completely into ef-
fect until March 1982 at the earliest-eight months after the
mandated 15% rate reduction became effective-and it expired
on July 1, 1983. In light of these facts, it was arbitrary to justify
any part of the continuing 15% rate reduction on the basis of
the Plan. Nevertheless, in arriving at the conclusion that no
reasonable estimate of the aggregate of the cost savings to the
insurers resulting from all the changes made by chapter 346
justified a rate reduction of more than 5%, the insurers ac-
cepted the 0.8% estimate of the state's expert.
c. Impact of all Other Changes in the Administration and
Operation of the Workers' Compensation System
With respect to the other changes outlined above, the state
and the insurers also agreed that the settlement agreement
provision and the use of medical panels in the pilot project in
three counties would not result in any cost savings to the insur-
ers justifying any part of the mandated rate reduction.
The other changes that the state claimed justified an 8.4%
rate reduction concerned other aspects of the administrative
and judicial handling of workers' compensation claims-sub-
jects with which the Minnesota Supreme Court is very familiar.
No estimate was ever presented to the legislature or the district
court of the cost savings reasonably attributable to each of
these changes taken separately. Instead, Insurance Commis-
sioner Markman estimated that the cost savings to the insurers
from all these changes would justify a rate reduction of 2% a
year for five years, 10% at the end of five years.3 58 The state's
expert witness did not independently assess the impact of
these changes but simply accepted Commissioner Markman's
estimate as correct and "applied commonly accepted discount-
ing methodology" to arrive at his 8.4% estimate.35 9 Each of
these changes taken alone was, as the district court acknowl-
edged, "unpriceable." 60 Taken together, they were also un-
priceable. The insurers maintained that it was arbitrary for the
legislature to quantify the unquantifiable and that there was no
357. Id. at 461, 464.
358. See id. at 46-47; Joint Exhibits at 9, 11, Rating Ass'n.
359. Brief for Respondents at 49, Rating Ass'n.
360. See Appendix II, infra, at 670.
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reasonable basis on which any of these changes could justify
any rate reduction.
1. Impact of the fourteen-day payment requirement
The legislative history of chapter 346 reveals the legislature
assumed that if injured workers were paid compensation
within fourteen days, they would be less disposed to litigate
and more likely to go back to work sooner, thereby effecting
cost savings to the insurers justifying some rate reduction.36'
Commissioner Markman agreed that the prompt payment re-
quirement would affect only the 'relatively small number" of
disputed claims, ensuring that these claims "will be paid
sooner, as opposed to later. '3 62 On the basis of all the testi-
mony at the trial, it appeared that 90% of all workers' compen-
sation claims are undisputed and about 83% of these claims
were being paid by a typical insurer within the fourteen days
even before chapter 346 was enacted 3 63
Furthermore, even in the small percentage of cases in
which it was assumed that insurers who had not previously
done so would now be compelled to commence payments
within fourteen days or be penalized, the Workers' Compensa-
tion Court of Appeals, in effect, read the penalties out of the
statute. In Wagner v. Farmers Union Central Exchange,364 the
court held that the changes made by section 96 of chapter 346
relieved the employer and its insurer of the penalties provided
by that section until thirty days after the date on which the
first payment was due, or forty-four days, not, as the state
claimed, fourteen days after notice to or knowledge by the em-
ployer of a compensable injury. In Zimprich v. Hiniker Com-
pany,3 65 the court held that the penalty provisions of section 97
as applied by the Workers' Compensation Division violated the
procedural due process rights of employers and insurers under
both the Minnesota and United States Constitutions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Wagner, rejected the in-
terpretations of both the state and the Workers' Compensation
Court of Appeals, holding that when no denial of liability or re-
quest for an extension of time has been filed by the employer,
361. Trial Transcript at 48-49, Rating Ass'n.
362. Id. at 55.
363. Id. at 281-83.
364. 34 W.C.D. 564 (Workers' Comp. Ct. App. 1982), affid as modified, 329
N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1983).
365. 34 W.C.D. 620 (Workers' Comp. Ct. App. 1982). This decision was not
appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
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the 100% penalty for the benefit of the Special Compensation
Fund may be imposed if payments are not commenced within
thirty days, not fourteen days or forty-four days, of notice to or
knowledge by the employer of a compensable injury. 66 Thus,
the supreme court destroyed the state's attempted use of the
fourteen-day payment requirement as a justification, in part,
for the mandated rate reduction in the Rating Association case.
Indeed the changes made by chapter 346 in this respect may
well increase costs to the insurers because they are required to
make nonrecoverable payments in cases in which no liability is
ultimately found but in which the worker's claim is made in
good faith.367
2. Impact of the burden of proof and preponderance of
evidence provisions
The legislative history reveals that the legislative commit-
tees assumed that sections 55, 56, and 136, taken together,
would significantly increase the injured worker's burden of
proof and thereby decrease the number and amount of com-
366. Wagner v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 329 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1983).
The court reached this conclusion by reading the statute to make compensation
"due" prior to the date on which payment must commence. It termed the
state's 14-day contention "illogical." Id. at 805. The court affirmed the decision
of the court of appeals because the insurer paid on the 29th of the 30 days.
Chapter 290, § 129, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1379 (amending MINN. STAT. § 176.221
(1982)) changed the law as interpreted by the state supreme court. It provided
that the payment of temporary total compensation must begin within 14 days of
notice to or knowledge by the employer of a compensable injury. Having begun
payment, the employer may file a notice of denial of liability within 30 days of
notice to or knowledge by the employer of the injury and thereupon may termi-
nate payment of compensation. The commissioner of labor and industry is de-
prived of the authority to grant employers any extension of time within which
to determine their liability. If, however, the employer does not begin the pay-
ment of temporary total compensation within 14 days of notice to or knowledge
by the employer of the injury and fails to file a denial of liability within that
period, the 100% penalty in favor of the Special Compensation Fund will be im-
posed.
The amendment to § 176.221 also authorizes a compensation judge, as well
as the commissioner of labor and industry, (1) to find whether the employee's
claim of work-related disability was made in good faith, upon which depends
the employer's recovery of compensation payments made until the employer
denied liability and terminated payments, and (2) to assess penalties for the
delay of payments. Id
367. The decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Wagner and the
Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals in Zimprich reveal the strange result
that would be reached if only the legislative facts before the legislature at the
time it acted could be considered in the course of constitutional review when
the premises underlying these facts subsequently disappear as a result of au-
thoritative statutory interpretation or constitutional review. See also infra
notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
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pensation awards, with resulting cost savings to the insurers
which would justify a rate reduction.368 The state sought to
buttress this assumption by also relying on section 52 of chap-
ter 346 which provided: "It is the intent of the legislature that
chapter 176 be interpreted so as to assure the quick and effi-
cient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured
workers at a reasonable cost to the employers .... -369 Be-
cause sections 55 and 56 simply codified pre-existing, judicially-
imposed standards for the interpretation of the workers' com-
pensation law3 70 and changed nothing, it was arbitrary for the
legislature to assume they would produce cost savings to the
insurers.
Nor was it reasonable to attribute any cost saving to the in-
surers on the basis of section 136. The admonition in section
176.531 prior to amendment 371 that it be "liberally construed"
was intended to assure only that public employers make
prompt payment of compensation to injured public employees.
But practically all public employers in Minnesota are self-in-
sured. Thus, the elimination by section 136 of the "liberally
construed"3 72 language could hardly result in cost savings to in-
surers of private employers. Furthermore, sections 136 and 52
were hardly sufficient, by themselves, to induce the Minnesota
Supreme Court to abandon its often-stated principle that hu-
manitarian and remedial legislation must be liberally con-
strued. The workers' compensation law was the major piece of
remedial social legislation enacted in the early twentieth cen-
tury. Ever since 1923, when the court decided Kaletha v. Hall
Mercentile Co.,373 it has been consistent judicial policy to con-
strue the worker's compensation law liberally so as to resolve
doubts in favor of the injured worker.3 74 Certainly nothing in
chapter 346 required a change in this judicial policy and there
was no reason to think that anything in chapter 346 would in-
duce the court to make such an about-face. Ultimately, of
course, it would have been for the court to say. But it was un-
368. See Brief for Appellants at A-20 to A-21, Rating Ass'n.
369. Ch. 346, § 52, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1641 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.001
(1982)).
370. See, e.g., Brown v. Madden Bros., Inc., 33 W.C.D. 15 (Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. 1980).
371. MINN. STAT. § 176.531 (1980), amended by ch. 346, § 136, 1981 Minn. Laws
at 1687.
372. See ch. 346, § 136, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1687 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 176.531 (1980)) (eliminating "liberally construed").
373. 157 Minn. 290, 196 N.W. 261 (1923).
374. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 119-20, 257 N.W.2d
679, 684 (1977); Wangen v. City of Fountain, 255 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1977).
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reasonable for legislation to posit an immediate and continuing
15% rate reduction, in part, on unlikely suppositions as to what
the court might do in future cases that would not be decided
until years after the mandated reduction became effective.375
3. Impact of the transfer of workers' compensation judges to
the Office of Administrative Hearings, the separation of the
Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals from the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry, and the modification of the
court's powers
The physical transfer of the workers' compensation judges
to the Office of Administrative Hearings was not accomplished
until December 1981. Even after December 1981, however, the
changes were superficial only. The individuals serving as com-
pensation judges were the same after as before the transfer.
New rules were adopted for the conduct of workers' compensa-
tion hearings that did not differ materially from the rules that
antedated chapter 346. Mr. Duane Harves, the chief hearing ex-
aminer and head of the Office of Administrative Hearings, testi-
fied that he had instituted a number of administrative changes
that were not required by chapter 346 and could have been in-
375. See supra note 367. The 1983 Minnesota legislature may have obviated
the necessity for any resolution of this issue by the Minnesota Supreme Court
and thereby acknowledged the strength of the insurers' arguments in the Rat-
ing Association case. A 1983 amendment to § 176.001 provided:
It is the specific intent of the legislature that workers' compensa-
tion cases shall be decided on their merits and that the common law
rule of "liberal construction" based on the supposed "remedial" basis
of workers' compensation legislation shall not apply in such cases. The
workers' compensation system in Minnesota is based on a mutual re-
nunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and em-
ployees alike. Employees' rights to sue for damages over and above
medical and health care benefits and wage loss benefits are to a certain
degree limited by the provisions of this chapter, and employers' rights
to raise common law defenses such as lack of negligence, contributory
negligence on the part of the employee, and others, are curtailed as
well. Accordingly, the legislature hereby declares that the workers'
compensation laws are not remedial in any sense and are not to be
given a broad liberal construction in favor of the claimant or employee
on the one hand, nor are the rights and'interests of the employer to be
favored over those of the employee on the other hand.
Ch. 290, § 25, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1324 (amending Mm. STAT. § 176.001 (1982)).
The legislature also amended § 176.021 to provide:
All disputed issues of fact arising under chapter 176 shall be deter-
mined by a preponderance of the evidence, and in accordance with the
principles laid down in section 176.001....
Questions of law arising under chapter 176 shall be determined on
an even-handed basis in accordance with the principles laid down in
section 176.001.




stituted even before the transfer of the compensation judges to
his office.376 The mail and filing systems in workers' compensa-
tion matters were reorganized to minimize the loss of mail and
files that occurred under the prior system. 3 77 The practice of is-
suing pre-hearing orders was instituted.3 7 8 Transcript prepara-
tion was speeded up.3 7 9 Funding for the training of
compensation judges was provided.3 8o Mr. Harves offered no
testimony on whether these changes would result in any cost
savings to the insurers.
Except to make the court of appeals an independent
agency separate from the Department of Labor and Industry
and to deprive it of the power to grant a de novo hearing, chap-
ter 346 simply recodified existing law concerning the court and
its procedures. Even before chapter 346, the court of appeals
occupied a separate building, apart from the one that housed
the Workers' Compensation Division of the Department of La-
bor and Industry. Although the court of appeals may not grant
a de novo hearing, it may call for another hearing before a com-
pensation judge either on the whole case or on particular ques-
tions of fact. Even if it does not take such action but renders
its decision on the record made before a compensation judge,
the court of appeals is not limited to an appellate function but
must exercise an independent judgment on the facts and the
law.38 1
The insurers' expert witness testified that depriving the
court of appeals of the authority to grant de novo hearings
could increase the insurers' litigation costs because the court of
appeals must now remand cases to compensation judges for de
novo hearings whenever it is dissatisfied with the state of the
record, instead of having the record supplemented before it.
This will necessitate additional court appearances and addi-
tional costs to the insurers.382
The legislative history also reveals that the legislative com-
mittees believed that transferring the compensation judges,
making Workers' Compensation Division attorneys who repre-
sented injured workers ineligible to serve as compensation
376. Trial Transcript at 704, Rating Ass'n.
377. Id. at 684, 685, 691, 698, 699.
378. Id. at 698.
379. Id. at 699.
380. Id. at 690, 702.
381. See supra notes 340-43 and accompanying text.
382. Trial Transcript at 241, Rating Ass'n. The state offered no testimony




judges for two years following termination of their employrent
by the Division,383 and "reconstituting" the Workers Compen-
sation Court of Appeals as a separate agency would eliminate
an inherent bias of the prior system in favor of injured workers
and thereby result in cost savings to the insurers.3 84 The trial
court's finding twenty-one also refers to evidence before the
1977 study commission that
the workers' compensation court system was partial to injured work-
ers, ....that many of the workers' compensation judges were for-
merly civil service attorneys whose function is to represent plaintiffs,
that workers' compensation court of appeals judges are often former
workers' compensation judges, that all have come up through the sys-
tem together at the Department of Labor and Industry, and [that] all
office together at the State Department of Labor and Industry.
3 8 5
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected one of these key
legislative assumptions as a "very crude generalization" and
held the two-year ban on Workers' Compensation Division at-
torneys to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.386
"It is singularly unpersuasive, and potentially quite destructive
of the integrity of the judiciary," said the court, "to distinguish
among potential candidates for judicial appointment on the ba-
sis of source of salary without considering the individual candi-
date."387 It is equally crude and without any foundation to
assume that lower compensation awards will be made to in-
jured workers simply because the workers' compensation
judges have been transferred to the Office of Administrative
Hearings and the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals has
been legally separated from the Department of Labor and In-
dustry. There is no reason whatsoever to suppose that these
judges, under the ultimate supervision of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, would do anything differently in the future
than they did in the past-which was to do justice under the
law.
The changes discussed above may reduce the cost to the
state of administering the workers' compensation system, but
383. See ch. 346, § 103, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1676 (codified at MIN. STAT.
§ 176.262 (1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 173, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1404).
384. Brief for Appellants at A-15, Rating Ass'n.
385. See Appendix II, infra, at 675.
386. Nelson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1981).
387. Id. at 582. The dissenting justices did not disagree with this conclusion
of the majority, but would have upheld § 103 of chapter 346 because it might be
said to serve a different and legitimate legislative purpose-to broaden the
backgrounds of compensation judges. Id. at 583-84 (dissenting opinion). Nelson
v. Peterson also demonstrates the strange result that would be reached if only
the legislative facts before the legislature at the time it acted could be consid-
ered in the course of constitutional review. See supra note 367.
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the mandated 15% reduction in workers' compensation insur-
ance rates was intended to reflect the cost savings to the insur-
ers. No evidence was presented to the legislature or at the trial
that any cost savings to the insurers would result from these
administrative and operational changes. It was irrational sim-
ply to assume that they would.388
4. Conclusion
The district court's findings nine, eleven, and fourteen
through twenty-two 389 all sought to buttress the conclusion that
the legislature acted reasonably in mandating the 15% rate re-
duction by referring to various "unpriceable" changes in the
law. The district court made no effort to itemize these changes,
but it referred, presumably, to certain of the administrative and
operational changes discussed above. The insurers submitted
that these changes would not reasonably justify any reduction
388. The state sought to attribute some savings in insurers' costs to chapter
346, § 59, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1646 (codified at MNm. STAT. § 176.021 subd. 8
(1982)), which permitted benefits to be calculated to the nearest dollar, and to
the computerization of the records and information system of the Department
of Labor and Industry. See ch. 346, § 144 subd. 7, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1692 (ap-
propriating $450,000 for 1982 and $100,000 for 1983 to enable the Department to
computerize its records). A minority proposal in the 1977 Study Commission
report would have allowed rounding off payments, prohibited under the law
prior to chapter 346, because it "could save a significant amount of administra-
tive expense to insurers and thus reduce employers' workers' compensation
premiums." Brief for Respondents at 55, Rating Ass'n.
It is difficult to know on what basis the 1977 Study Commission minority
came to its conclusion. The insurers would have to calculate benefits to at least
two decimal points in order to determine whether to round up or down. Under
§ 59, the computers must be instructed to take the additional step of rounding.
The advances in computer technology since 1977 may account for the differ-
ences between the Study Commission minority report and the testimony of the
insurers' expert that no cost saving would result from rounding off payments.
In light of that technology, it is impossible to assume that § 59 would have had
any cost saving effect.
A 1983 amendment to § 176.132 added subdivision 5 requiring payments of
supplementary benefits to "be rounded up to the nearest dollar." Ch. 290, § 104,
1983 Minn. Laws at 1370 (codified at MNx. STAT. § 176.132 subd. 5 (Supp. 1983))
(emphasis supplied). To this extent, future costs to insurers will increase.
The significant fact about the program to computerize the records and in-
formation system of the Department of Labor and Industry is that it was not to
be in operation until the fall of 1983 at the earliest. Even when the computer-
ization becomes operational, it may reduce the administrative costs of the De-
partment, but it is wholly speculative whether it will reduce insurers' costs to
any extent. Certainly it was arbitrary for the legislature to mandate an imme-
diate and continuing rate reduction of 15% on the basis, in part, of a computer-
ization program that would not be in operation until at least two years after the
reduction became effective and then would have a wholly speculative impact
on insurers' costs. See supra note 367.




Although it was undoubtedly reasonable for the legislature
to enact these changes, it was not reasonable for the legislature
to render a quantitative judgment and mandate an immediate
and continuing 15% rate reduction on the basis of "unprice-
able" changes in the law involving dubious assumptions about
the future behavior of injured workers, administrators in the
Department of Labor and Industry, workers' compensation
judges, judges of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals,
and judges of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Acceptance of
the insurers' position on the effect of the administrative and op-
erational changes would have required the court to hold the
mandated 15% rate reduction unconstitutional. As we shall
see, the benefit changes alone, as the state agreed, would not
have justified a 15% rate reduction.
4. The Changes in the Benefits Payable to Injured Workers
a. Delay of Lump Sum Payments for Permanent Partial
Disabilities until the Injured Employee Returns to
Work
Under prior law, the insurer was required to make a lump
sum payment for permanent partial disability only if payments
for temporary total disability ceased and the employee re-
turned to work within four weeks from the date of injury.391 If
the employee did not return to work within that time, the in-
surer was required to pay 25% of the amount due for the per-
manent partial disability after four weeks from the date of
injury, and again after eight weeks, after twelve weeks, and af-
ter sixteen weeks.392
Chapter 346 required the insurer to make payments for
permanent partial disability in a lump sum only if and when
the injured worker returned to work.393 If the employee did not
390. To take the position unfavorable to that of the insurers, the rate in-
crease of 0.7%, justified by the increase in the prefunded limit for purposes of
the Reinsurance Association, was balanced by the rate decrease, justified by
the changes in the Assigned Risk Plan. For the reasons indicated above, the
insurers did not think that any continuing rate decrease was justified by the
Assigned Risk Plan which expired July 1, 1983.
391. Mimn. STAT. § 176.021 (1980). Temporary total disability payments in
this context refers to the weekly compensation for the loss of wages ("healing
period" benefits).
392. Id.
393. Ch. 346, § 57, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1644 (amending MmN. STAT. § 176.021
subd. 3 (1980); ch. 346, § 58, 1981 Miinn. Laws at 1646 (codified at MANN. STAT.
§ 176.021 subd. 3a (1982)). The 1983 legislature made significant changes in the
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return to work, and temporary total disability payments ceased,
payments for permanent partial disability had to be made at
the same intervals as temporary total payments were made,
that is, weekly. As soon as an employee returned to work, the
employer was to make a lump sum payment to the employee of
any balance due for the permanent partial disability. The in-
surer also had to make lump sum payments for permanent par-
tial disability if the employee was unable to return to work for
specified reasons. Thus chapter 346 did not decrease the total
amount of compensation for permanent partial disability to
which an injured worker was entitled. It merely delayed any
lump sum payment of the amount due, with certain exceptions,
until the injured employee returned to work.
b. Limitations on Death Benefits
Under prior law, if the deceased employee left a dependent
surviving spouse and no dependent child (that is, no child
under eighteen or, if a student, under twenty-five), the spouse
was entitled to receive 50% of the employee's daily wage at the
time of the injury, adjusted annually for inflation, so long as the
spouse lived and remained unmarried. If the deceased em-
ployee left a dependent surviving spouse and one dependent
child, the payment increased to 60%. If the deceased employee
left a dependent surviving spouse and two or more dependent
children, the percentage increased to 662%%.394
Section 78 of chapter 346 provided that if a deceased em-
ployee left a dependent surviving spouse and no dependent
child, the spouse had the option of receiving 50% of the em-
ployee's daily wage at the time of the injury for a period of ten
years, subject to adjustment for inflation, or a lump sum pay-
ment equal to ten years of compensation at 50% of the em-
ployee's daily wage at the time of the injury, without
adjustment for inflation.395 If the surviving spouse did not ac-
cept a lump sum settlement and later remarried, the spouse
was entitled to receive the lesser of either the remaining
weekly benefits, including adjustment for inflation, or a lump
payment of compensation for physical impairments, but retained the principle
of withholding lump sum payments until the injured employee returns to work.
Ch. 290, §§ 33, 44-68, 71-82, 86, 102, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1329, 1339-49, 1349-55, 1358,
1368 (codified in scattered sections of MINN. STAT. § 176 (Supp. 1983)).
394. See MIN. STAT. § 176.111 subds. 6-8, 10 (1980).
395. Ch. 346, § 78, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1658 (amending MiNN. STAT. § 176.111
subd. 6 (1980)). See also ch. 290, § 87, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1360 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 176.111 subd. 6 (1982)).
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sum equal to two years of compensation without adjustment
for inflation.396
Sections 79 and 80 provided that if the deceased employee
left a dependent spouse with one or more dependent children,
the spouse with one dependent child was entitled to be paid
60%, and with two or more dependent children 66%9, of the
employee's daily wage at the time of the injury until the young-
est child was no longer dependent.397 At that time, the spouse
had the same options as a spouse with no dependent children,
except that the payments would be equal to 16%7 less, if the
spouse had one dependent child, or 25% less, if the spouse had
two or more dependent children, than the last weekly benefit
payment made while the last surviving child was still a
dependent. 98
If a surviving spouse with one or more dependent children
remarried, the spouse would be entitled to receive compensa-
tion for the benefit of the dependent child or children until the
youngest child was no longer dependent. In addition, the mar-
rying spouse would be entitled to be paid in a lump sum two
full years of weekly benefits equal to the difference between
the weekly benefits payable if the spouse had not remarried
and the amounts payable to the dependent child or children.399
Section 81 provided that the limitation placed by section 83
on the combined total of weekly social security survivor bene-
fits and workers' compensation death benefits should not apply
to reduce the lump sum or weekly death benefits to which a de-
pendent surviving spouse with dependent children was enti-
tled.40 0 Section 82 provided that a portion of the death benefits
payable to a surviving spouse with dependent children could be
allocated to a guardian of the children.40 ' In that case, the limi-
tation placed by section 83 on the combined total of weekly gov-
ernment survivor benefits and workers' compensation death
benefits would apply in determining the amount allocated to
396. See sources cited supra note 395.
397. Ch. 346, §§ 79-80, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1658-59 (amending MNN. STAT.
§ 176.111 subds. 7-8 (1980)). See also ch. 290, §§ 88-89, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1361
(amending MiNN. STAT. § 176.111 subds. 7-8 (1982)).
398. See sources cited supra note 397.
399. Id.
400. Ch. 346, § 81, 1981 Vinn. Laws at 1659 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.111
subd. 8a (1982)). See also ch. 346, § 83, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1660 (amending
MniNN. STAT. § 176.111 subd. 21 (1980)).





c. Rehabilitation Services for a Dependent Surviving Spouse
Section 76 entitled a dependent surviving spouse who is in
need of rehabilitation assistance to become self-supporting to
assistance through the Rehabilitation Service Section of the
Workers' Compensation Division of the Department of Labor
and Industry.403
d. Limitation on Combined Total of Weekly Government
Survivor Benefits and Workers' Compensation
Death Benefits
Section 83 reaffirmed that the sum of weekly social security
survivor benefits and workers' compensation death benefits
payable to a dependent surviving spouse and all dependent
children could not exceed 100% of the weekly wage earned by
the deceased employee at the time of the injury.404 It expressly
stated that in applying this limitation, a surviving spouse's in-
surance benefits under social security are to be regarded as
government survivor benefits.405 These provisions were in-
tended to reinstate the policy in effect prior to the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision in Redland v. Nelson's Quality Eggs,
Inc. ,406 which eliminated the social security offset against bene-
fits payable under the workers' compensation law to certain
surviving spouses and dependents.
e. Limitations on Medical and Hospital Fees
Section 87 directed the commissioner of insurance, instead
of the commissioner of labor and industry, to establish proce-
dures for determining whether or not the charge for a health
service was excessive.40 7 It further directed that such proce-
402. Id. See also ch. 290, § 90, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1362 (codified at MIm.
STAT. § 176.111 subd. 9a (Supp. 1983)).
403. Ch. 346, § 76, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1657 (codified at Alm. STAT. § 176.102
subd. la (1980)).
404. Ch. 346, § 83, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1660 (amending Alum. STAT. § 176.111
subd. 21 (1980)). See also supra notes 399-401 and accompanying text.
405. Ch. 346, § 83, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1660.
406. 291 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1980).
407. Ch. 346, § 87, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1664 (amending Mm. STAT. § 176.136
(1980). The 1983 amendments substituted the Medical Services Review Board
for the compensation judges in the review of medical fees. Ch. 290, § 108, 1983
Minn. Laws at 1371 (amending MN. STAT. § 176.136 (1982)). The Medical Serv-
ices Review Board was created by chapter 290, § 84, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1356
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.103 (Supp. 1983)). Its function is to monitor




limit the charges allowable for medical, chiropractic, podiatric, surgical,
hospital and other health care provider treatment or services... to the
75th percentile of usual and customary fees or charges based upon bill-
ings for each class of health care provider during all of the calendar
year preceding the year in which the determination is made of the
amount to be paid the health care provider for the billing.40 8
The procedures were also designed to encourage health care
providers to develop and deliver services to rehabilitate injured
workers. Hospital charges continued to be governed by ex-
isting fee regulations, subject to modification by the commis-
sioner of insurance if necessary to prevent excessive charges
and assure quality hospital care. Elaborating on prior law, sec-
tion 87 also provided that if the commissioner of insurance, a
compensation judge, the Workers' Compensation Court of Ap-
peals, or a district court determined that the charge for a health
or medical service was excessive, no payment in excess of the
reasonable charge for that service would be made. Moreover,
the provider could not attempt to collect any amount in excess
of the reasonable charge from the injured worker, any other in-
surer, or the government.40 9
408. Ch. 346, § 87, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1664 (amending MINN. LAWs § 176.136
(1980)).
409. Id. The 1983 amendments also returned the powers of the commis-
sioner of insurance over medical and hospital fees to the commissioner of labor
and industry. Ch. 290, § 108, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1371 (amending MN. STAT.
§ 176.136 (1980)). Furthermore, the amendments gave the commissioner of la-
bor and industry express authority to adopt, amend, or repeal:
(c) rules... establishing standards and procedures for determin-
ing whether or not charges for health services or rehabilitation services
. are excessive. In this regard, the standards and procedures shall
be structured to determine what is necessary to encourage providers of
health services and rehabilitation services to develop and deliver serv-
ices for the rehabilitation of injured employees.
The procedures shall include standards for evaluating hospital
care, other health care and rehabilitation services to insure that quality
hospital, other health care, and rehabilitation is available and is pro-
vided to injured employees;
(d) in consultation with the medical services review board and the
rehabilitation review panel, rules establishing standards and proce-
dures for determining whether a provider of health care services and
rehabilitation services... is performing procedures or providing serv-
ices at a level or with a frequency that is excessive, based upon ac-
cepted medical standards for quality health care and accepted
rehabilitation standards.
If it is determined by the commissioner that the level, frequency or
cost of a procedure or service of a provider is excessive according to
the standards established by the rules, the provider shall not be paid
for the excessive procedure, service, or cost by an insurer, self-insurer,
or a group self-insurer. In addition, the provider shall not be reim-
bursed or attempt to collect reimbursement for the excessive proce-
dure, service or cost from any other source, including the employee,
1984]
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f. Adjustment of Benefits for Inflation
Under prior law, on October 1 of each year the amount of
benefits due the employee or any dependents was adjusted up-
ward for inflation at a rate determined by a percentage geared
to the increase in the statewide average weekly wage, but not
exceeding 6% a year.41 0 Under section 137, for injuries occur-
ring prior to October 1, 1981, this inflation adjustment was to be
made on October 1, 1981, and thereafter on the anniversary
date of the employee's injury.41 ' For all new injuries-those oc-
curring on or after October 1, 1981-the initial adjustment was
to be deferred until the first anniversary of the date of the
injury.
5. Impact of the Changes in the Benefits Payable to Injured
Workers
The table below sets forth the quantitative differences be-
tween the state and the insurers with respect to the rate impact
of the changes made by chapter 346 in the benefits payable to
injured workers, in the administration and operation of the sys-
tem, and of all changes combined.
another insurer, the special compensation fund, or any government
program.
Ch. 290, § 165, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1395 (codified at MiNN. STAT. § 176.83 (Supp.
1983)).
The Rehabilitation Review Panel predated chapter 346. The Panel's mem-
bership was enlarged and appointment of its members was transferred to the
commmissioner of labor and industry from the governor by the 1983 amend-
ments. Ch. 290, § 71, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1349 (amending MINN. STAT. § 176.102
subd. 3 (1982)). In addition to its consultative duties under § 176.83(d), the
Panel is required to hear appeals regarding eligibility for rehabilitation benefits
and any other rehabilitation issue that the commissioner of labor and industry
has determined. Id
410. Mmm. STAT. § 176.645 (1980).
411. Ch. 346, § 137, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1687 (amending AIN. STAT. § 176.645(1980)).
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TABLE 2
Rate Changes Justified
Changes Made By By Resulting Changes




















returned to work -6.4 -3.1
Limitations on medical
and hospital fees -2.2 0.0
Adjustment of benefits
for inflation -1.5 0.0
subtotal -12.1 -4.9
Rate impact of changes
in the administration
and operation of the
workers'
compensation
system -8.5 +0.7 to -0.3
Total Rate impact
of all changes -20.6 -4.2 to -5.2
a. Impact of the Provision for Rehabilitation Services for a
Dependent Surviving Spouse
The state and the insurers agreed that the new provision
for rehabilitation services would not reduce insurers' costs and
so would not justify any rate reduction. Indeed, insurers will
have to pay the additional costs of these rehabilitation services.
The insurers offered no estimates of the impact of these cost in-
creases on rates.
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b. Impact of the Limitation on Combined Total of Weekly
Government Survivor Benefits and Workers'
Compensation Death Benefits
The state and the insurers also agreed that the limitation
on the combined total of these benefits would not reduce in-
surer's costs and so would not justify any rate reduction. The
impact of Redland v. Nelson's Quality Eggs, Inc. 4 1 2 had never
been taken into account in fixing rates. That decision increased
insurers' costs and justified an increase in insurance rates, but
rates had never been increased to reflect these increased costs.
By eliminating the effect of the Redland decision, chapter 346
obviated the necessity for a rate increase but did not justify a
rate decrease.
c. Impact of the Limitations on Death Benefits
To arrive at the estimate that the limitations on death ben-
efits would justify a rate reduction of 1.8%, the insurers' expert
used a standard actuarial method employed by the National
Council on Compensation Insurance. 413 The state's expert
used the same method but added 0.2% to the resulting 1.8%
figure4 14 on the assumption that practically all surviving
spouses would elect the lump sum option provided in the new
law.4 15
In general, the state argued that resolution of the disputed
legislative facts in the Rating Association case involved a
choice between "conflicting judgments and opinions on some
highly subjective issues," 41 6 and so it was reasonable to accept
the judgments and opinions of the state's expert. But as the
difference regarding the impact of the limitations on death ben-
efits as well as the differences with respect to the impact of the
other benefit changes that will be discussed below reveal, more
was at issue than a mere difference of judgment or opinion.
The insurers questioned the validity of the data presented, the
412. 291 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1980). See also supra note 406 and accompany-
ing text.
413. See Brief for Appellants at A-54 to A-57, Rating Ass'n. The National
Council on Compensation Insurance is a national clearinghouse of workers'
compensation data financed by the insurance industry.
414. The difference between 1.8% and 2.0% would seem to be so small as to
make either estimate reasonable. But, as will be indicated, this was not the
case. A difference of 0.2% in the rates amounts to $1,000,000 in premiums
annually.
415. Brief for Respondents at 42, Rating Ass'n.
416. Id. at 12.
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assumptions made, and the methodology and reasoning used to
support the state's expert's conclusions.
A rhetorical question in the state's brief was the only justi-
fication advanced for the assumption of the state's expert that
practically all eligible survivors would elect the lump sum ben-
efit option. It asked:-
Why should a widow take her benefits as an annuity with 6 percent es-
calation per year and risk losing benefits because of death or remar-
riage, when she could take it all now as a lump sum and invest it in a
savings account at greater than 6 percent or, indeed, invest it at even
higher rates in investments such as tax free municipal bonds?
4 1 7
But the inference sought to be drawn from the question as-
sumed that interest rates would remain high. Furthermore, if
the assumption of the state's expert was correct, the insurers
would lose a significant amount of investment income by hav-
ing to pay out lump sums. The state's expert did, not offset any
part of this resulting increase in insurers' costs against the cost
savings estimated to flow from the limitations on the death
benefits.
In any case, the actuarial analysis of the insurers' expert
answered this rhetorical question and showed the unreasona-
bleness of the assumption of the state's expert. The analysis
accounted for the financial benefits that would accrue to surviv-
ing spouses in varying situations by electing to take lump sum
payments. It assumed that those surviving spouses who would
benefit by taking lump sum payments would do so; the others
would not. The analysis also accounted for the surviving
spouse's risk of death and dimunition of benefits upon
remarriage.
In human terms, the state's assumption that practically all
surviving spouses would opt for lump sums is patently unreal-
istic. In some cases, a surviving spouse may wish the protec-
tion of an annuity against real or imagined pressures from
children, other relatives, significant others, or creditors. Other
surviving spouses may simply prefer not to take lump sums re-
quiring financial management. If some people did not fall into
these categories, the commonly sold retirement annuities
would disappear. It is interesting that the 1983 legislature de-
prived surviving spouses of the option of taking a lump sum
settlement-the option the state thought was so desirable. Sur-
viving spouses are now required to accept weekly benefits for a
period of ten years, subject to adjustment for inflation.4 18
417. Id. at 42.
418. Ch. 290, §§ 87-89, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1360-61 (amending MINN. STAT.
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Again, as we saw in connection with the analysis of the im-
pact of the administrative and operational changes, and shall
see in connection with the other benefit changes, an immediate
and continuing 15% rate reduction was mandated on the basis
of the most dubious predictions of future human behavior. For
these reasons, it was not reasonable to assume that the limita-
tions on death benefits would result in cost savings to the in-
surers justifying a rate reduction in excess of 1.8%.
d. Impact of the Delay of Lump Sum Payments for Permanent
Partial Disabilities until the Injured Employee
Returns to Work
Under both chapter 346 and prior law, permanent partial
benefits
are benefits not linked directly to wage loss consequences of an injury
and are, in fact, payable pursuant to a statutory schedule .... For ex-
ample, [chapter 3461 provides that for the loss of a little finger the em-
ployee should receive an amount equivalent to 66 2/3 percent of his
daily wage at the time of injury for 20 weeks.4 19
Professor Arthur Larson, the foremost national authority on
workers' compensation, attributed the relatively high workers'
compensation rates in Minnesota to the legislature's 1974 aban-
donment of the "wage-loss approach" in favor of "paying for
physical impairment as such.., to what is probably the far-
thest extent of any state so far."420
Chapter 346 left the "physical-impairment approach" intact.
Recall that chapter 346 did not decrease the total amount of
compensation for permanent partial disability to which an in-
jured worker would be entitled.421 Furthermore, the total
amount of permanent partial disability benefits included not
only compensation for the permanent partial disability, but
also healing period, vocational rehabilitation, and medical ben-
efits.4 2 2 Chapter 346 delayed only the lump sum payment of the
§ 176.111 subds. 6-8 (1982)). The "remarriage penalty" has been eliminated and
the surviving spouse who remarries continues to receive the benefits to which
the spouse would otherwise be entitled. Ch. 290, § 90, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1362
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.111 subd. 9a (Supp. 1983)).
419. Brief for Respondents at 37 n.24, Rating Ass'n.
420. Larson, The Wage-Loss Principle in Workers' Compensation; 6 WM.
MrrCHELL L. REV. 501, 502-03, 522-24, 532 (1980). Professor Larson also points
out that the evaluation of physical disability is the principal cause of workers'
compensation litigation. Id. at 532.
421. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 391-93 and accompanying text. Rehabilitation pay-
ments are provided for in MiNN. STAT. § 176.102 (1982 & Supp. 1983) and medical
payments in MiNN. STAT. § 176.135 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
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disability component of the total benefits until the injured em-
ployee returned to work. It did not change the timing of other
component payments. From the legislative history it may be
deduced that the legislature hoped the delay of lump sum pay-
ments would give injured employees a financial incentive to re-
turn to work earlier than they would have under the prior law
and would thereby reduce the total amount of healing period,
vocational rehabilitation, and medical benefits. If this hope ma-
terialized the resulting cost savings to the insurers would jus-
tify a rate reduction. The state acknowledged, however, that
"there is little empirical data on the most critical component of
the estimate [of cost savings resulting from the impact of the
delay in lump sum payments], the component which measures
the extent to which the amendment actually will change
human behavior and reduce malingering."423 Nevertheless, the
state concluded that the court should accept its expert's esti-
mate that the resulting cost savings would justify a 6.4% rate
reduction and reject the 3.1% estimate of the insurers' expert
because the state's expert, allegedly, had "by far the broader
and more diversified professional experience. '4 24 But resolu-
tion of the difference between the two experts did not depend
on their relative professional experience but, again, on the in-
herent plausibility and validity of the data they presented, the
assumptions they made, and the methodology and reasoning
they used to arrive at their conclusions-matters that a review-
ing court was competent to evaluate without passing on the op-
posing experts' relative qualifications and experience.
In arriving at his estimate that the provisions for the delay
in lump sum payments for physical impairments would reason-
ably justify a rate reduction of no more than 3.1%, the insurers'
expert made assumptions that would maximize the cost sav-
ings to the insurers resulting from having to pay a lesser
amount of healing period, vocational rehabilitation, and medi-
cal benefits. Thus the insurers' expert assumed that under the
prior law one-third of the workers suffering physical impair-
ments were "malingerers," workers who were physically capa-
ble of returning to work but had not done so in order to
continue to receive these weekly benefits, knowing they would
nevertheless get the total payments due them within sixteen
weeks of the dates of the injuries. He also assumed that under
423. Brief for Respondents at 38-39, Rating Ass'n.
424. Id. at 41. The state's California expert admitted that he had no experi-
ence with, or knowledge of, the behavior of Minnesota workers. Trial Tran-
script at 649-650, Rating Ass'n.
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chapter 346 the "malingerers" would return to work one-third
sooner than they would have under the prior law in order to re-
ceive lump sum payments for their physical impairments. On
the basis of these assumptions he calculated the cost savings to
the insurers that would result from having to pay lesser
amounts of healing period benefits. Since the best judgment of
the insurers' expert was that the number of "malingerers" did
not exceed 15 to 20% of those drawing permanent partial disa-
bility benefits under the prior law,42 5 the 3.1% reduction esti-
mate was probably overstated.
Because vocational rehabilitation and medical benefits are
unrelated to the length of time the injured employee remains
out of work, it could not be assumed that the impact of chapter
346 on these benefits would be the same as on healing period
benefits. Thus, to estimate the maximum impact of chapter 346,
the insurers' expert assumed that the resulting savings in the
costs of vocational rehabilitation and medical benefits would be
one-half the savings in healing period benefits. 426
In arriving at the conclusion that the provision for the de-
lay in lump sum payments for physical impairments would jus-
tify a rate reduction of 6.4%, the state's expert estimated that
the total amount of healing period and rehabilitation benefits
would be reduced by one-third, and the total amount of medical
425. Trial Transcript at 441, 452, Rating Ass'n.
426. Id. at 442. The insurers' expert maximized the cost savings to insurers
in other ways as well. If payments of the lump sums due for physical impair-
ments were delayed for longer periods of time under chapter 346 than under
the prior law, the investment income the insurers earned on the delayed pay-
ments would increase. This increase is equivalent to a cost savings, or de-
crease in the cost of benefits, to the insurers. The insurers' expert assumed
that whereas under the prior law the insurers would pay out the total amount
of the physical disability component over the allowed 16 week period, under
chapter 346 the insurers would pay out these benefits over the average duration
of the particular type of injury (136 weeks for major permanent partial disabili-
ties; 31 weeks for minor permanent partial disabilities), with the first payment
not being made until the end of the average healing period for that particular
type of injury (31 weeks for major permanent partial disabilities; 9 weeks for
minor permanent partial disabilities). See Brief for Appellants at A-46 to A-50,
Rating Ass'n. This maximized the delay in the lump sum payments for the dis-
ability component of the permanent partial disability benefits that could occur
under chapter 346 and, consequently, also maximized the decrease in the cost
to the insurers of these benefit payments. The state's expert assumed no such
decrease in insurers' costs.
The insurers' expert then added the savings to the insurers resulting from
this assumed delay in the payments of the lump sums to the savings in the
costs of healing period, vocational rehabilitation, and medical benefits to arrive
at his estimate of the total cost savings, on the basis of which he justified a
maximum 3.1% reduction in rates. See id. at A-41 to A-50.
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benefits by one-fifth.427 The estimates of the California expert
assumed an extent of malingering on the part of Minnesota
workers under the prior law that was completely unreasonable
and can only be described as in the realm of fantasy. In effect,
the state's expert was saying that either (1) one of every three
injured workers eligible for permanent partial disability bene-
fits was a malingerer under the prior law and would be induced
by chapter 346 to return to work immediately after receiving
the injury and so would receive no healing period, vocational
rehabilitation, or medical benefits; or (2) every single injured
worker eligible for permanent partial disability benefits was a
malingerer under the prior law and would now have his or her
healing period, vocational rehabilitation, and medical benefits
cut by approximately one-third. In fact, at least 60% of all in-
jured workers eligible for permanent partial disability benefits
suffer the dismemberment or loss of use of an arm, leg, hand,
foot, or eye.428 Such severe injuries will hardly enable one-
third of the workers suffering them to return to work immedi-
ately or all the workers suffering them to return to work one-
third earlier than they would have under the prior law, even if
they are very anxious to obtain lump sum payments.429
Here again, an immediate and continuing rate reduction
was mandated, in part, on the basis of dubious assumptions
about the impact of delaying the lump sum portion of the per-
manent partial disability benefits on the behavior of injured
workers. The purported justification for attributing 6.4% of the
15% mandated rate reduction to the delaying provision was an-
other example of an attempt to quantify the unquantifiable in
an arbitrary fashion.
e. Impact of the Limitations on Medical and Hospital Fees
The state conceded that the limitations on doctors' and
hospital fees sought to be imposed by chapter 346 were not in
effect at the time the case was argued before the Minnesota
Supreme Court in January 1983. Nor were any efforts under-
way or even contemplated by the commissioner of insurance to
limit these fees in the near future, and the state cited no such
effort. These facts alone established the arbitrary nature of the
427. Trial Transcript at 613, Rating Ass'n.
428. Brief for Appellants at A-45, A-47, Rating Ass'n.
429. Furthermore, in arriving at his estimate, the state's expert, unlike the
insurers' expert, did not use the most recent data available. See Trial Tran-
script at 718, Rating Ass'n; Brief for Respondents at 40, Rating Ass'n; Reply
Brief for Appellants at 17-18, Rating Ass'n.
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legislative action mandating an immediate and continuing 15%
rate reduction on the basis, in part, of the constraints on medi-
cal and hospital fees contemplated by chapter 346.
Though the state did not dispute the insurers' general con-
tention that legislative facts coming into existence after the leg-
islature acted could be taken into consideration in reviewing
the constitutionality of the legislative action, in this specific
context the state argued that "it is difficult to see how the in-
ability, whether because of budgetary problems or otherwise, of
administrative officials to carry out the legislative directive
could result in a determination that the Legislature was irra-
tional."430 But it was unreasonable for the legislature to as-
sume that the complex administrative program it asked the
commissioner of insurance to institute to limit doctors' and
hospital fees would be implemented by July 1, 1981, when the
mandated 15% rate reduction became effective. In any case, as
the state seemed generally to agree, the question of constitu-
tionality is always whether the legislation is reasonable and not
whether the legislators were rational. As indicated above,431
the United States Supreme Court has long held that the legisla-
tive facts before the legislature do not alone demonstrate the
reasonableness of the legislative action if, subsequently, legis-
lative facts are adduced showing that the legislation has no rea-
sonable basis.432
The differences between the experts, therefore, involved
estimates of what might happen if medical and hospital fees
were ever actually constrained.4 33 It is now apparent that med-
430. Brief for Respondents at 44, Rating Ass'n.
431. See supra notes 182-97 and accompanying text.
432. See supra note 367.
433. The insurers' expert estimated that the cost savings resulting from the
eventual limitations on medical and hospital fees might justify rate reductions
of at most 0.4% and 0.9% respectively. Trial Transcript at 420, 538, Rating Ass'n;
Brief for Appellants at A-51 to A-53, Rating Ass'n. The state's expert estimated
that these eventualities would justify a rate reduction of 2.2%. Trial Transcript
at 617, 619, 621, 622, Rating Ass'n.
To determine the actual distribution of doctors' fees above the 75th percen-
tile in 1981, the insurers' expert relied on data reported by the insurers as to
the actual doctors' fees they paid on actual workers' compensation claims in
Minnesota. He relied on 1978 data supplied by the National Council on Com-
pensation Insurance to determine the percentage of total worker's compensa-
tion costs accounted for by total medical costs. The state's expert relied on
1980 public welfare data unrelated to actual workers' compensation claims to-
determine the distribution of doctors' fees above the 75th percentile in 1981 and
on 1975, not 1978, data supplied by the National Council on Compensation In-
surance to determine the percentage of total worker's compensation costs ac-
counted for by total medical costs. See Brief for Appellants at 46-47, Rating
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ical and hospital fee constraints will not be imposed prior to
the deregulation of workers' compensation insurance rates.
There was never a reasonable basis for mandating the 15% rate
reduction, in part, on the cost savings to insurers assumed to
result from these constraints.
f. Impact of the Adjustment of Benefits for Inflation
The difference between the state and the insurers regard-
ing the savings in insurers' costs that could reasonably be at-
tributed to chapter 346's change in the adjustment of benefits
for inflation resulted from the attorney general's rejection of
the Department of Labor and Industry interpretation of section
137 of chapter 346. Section 137 provided in pertinent part:
Subdivision 1. Amount. For injuries occurring after October 1,
1975 for which benefits are payable . . ., the total benefits due the em-
ployee or any dependents shall be adjusted in accordance with this
section. On October 1, 1981, and thereafter on the anniversary of the
date of the employee's injury the total benefits due shall be adjusted
by multiplying the total benefits due prior to each adjustment by a
[percentage geared to the increase in the statewide average weekly
wage]. No adjustment... shall exceed six percent a year.
Subd. 2. Time of First Adjustment. For injuries occurring on or
after October 1, 1981, the initial adjustment made pursuant to subdivi-
sion 1 shall be deferred until the first anniversary of the date of the
injury.4 3 4
Section 137 differentiated between workers injured prior to
October 1, 1981, and those injured thereafter.435 For injuries
occurring on or after October 1, 1981, it was undisputed that
the cost savings to the insurers would result from the deferral
of the first inflation adjustment until one year after the date of
injury. But any such cost savings would be more than offset by
the provision regarding injuries occurring prior to October 1,
1981. For these injuries, the Department of Labor and Industry
required the insurers to make the first inflation adjustment af-
ter passage of chapter 346 on October 1, 1981, and subsequent
Ass'n; Brief for Respondents at 42-44, Rating Ass'n; Reply Brief for Appellants
at 21, Rating Assn.
The procedures for the limitation of medical and hospital fees have become
more complicated with the return of the power to fix them to the commissioner
of labor and industry and the required consultations with both the Medical
Services Review Board and the Rehabilitation Review Panel. See supra note
406. As of the date of this writing (September 6, 1983) the limitations on medi-
cal and hospital fees envisaged by chapter 346 have not yet been put into effect.
434. Ch. 346, § 137, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1687 (amending MINN. STAT. § 176.645
(1980)).
435. See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
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adjustments on the anniversary date of the injury.43 6
The attorney general disagreed with this interpretation of
section 137. Yet, the interpretation not only is required by the
language of section 137, but also is eminently reasonable. It is
not inconsistent, as the attorney general claimed,43 7 with the
provision in section 137 that no adjustment for inflation "shall
exceed six percent a year." An example will make this clear.
A worker injured on April 1, 1979, would have received in-
flation adjustments under the prior law on October 1, 1979, and
October 1, 1980. Under the Department's interpretation of sec-
tion 137, this worker should have received inflation adjustments
on October 1, 1981, on April 1, 1982, and on April 1 of each year
thereafter. The first two adjustments after passage of chapter
346 do not amount to more than 6% "a year," either in calendar
year 1981 or calendar year 1982. Nor do they amount to a
"double payment," as the attorney general claimed, in the
twelve-month period from October 1, 1981, to October 1, 1982.438
Since April 1 was the average anniversary date for injuries that
occurred prior to chapter 346, all workers injured prior to Octo-
ber 1, 1981, would have received their inflation adjustment for
1982 six months earlier, on the average, than under the prior
law. The acceleration of the inflation adjustment for 1982 de-
prived the insurers of the monetary benefit of holding on to the
adjustment amounts for as long as was possible under the prior
law. Since there obviously were many more injured workers
receiving benefits as of October 1, 1981, than workers injured
during the policy year after October 1, 1981, the acceleration of
the inflation adjustment for 1982 required by chapter 346 re-
sulted in a net decrease in the monetary benefit of holding on
436. Id.
437. Brief for Respondents at 32-37, Rating Ass'n.
438. Id. The attorney general argued that "a year" should be construed to
mean any 12-month period, not a calendar year, despite the fact that Mn.
STAT. § 645.44 (1982) states that a "year" shall be taken to mean a calendar year
unless otherwise defined by statute and the "six percent a year" limitation has
always been interpreted under the prior law as limiting the inflation adjust-
ment to six percent in each calendar year. See Brief for Respondents at 32-37,
Rating Ass'n.
The attorney general argued, further, that his interpretation was required
by the canon of construction that "when, in the same law, several clauses are
irreconcilable, the clause last in order of date or position shall prevail," MINN.
STAT. § 645.26 (1982). See Brief for Respondents at 36, Rating Ass'n. Even if the
clause in § 176.645, subdivision 1, containing the "six percent a year" limitation
is assumed to be irreconcilable with the acceleration required by subdivison 1,
the canon does not settle the matter because the latter requirement is "last in
order of date" but the limitation is "last in order of ... position."
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to the adjustment amounts.43 9 For this reason, section 137 in-
creased insurers' costs.
Furthermore, the interpretation of the Department of La-
bor and Industry was not,. as the attorney general charged, "a
construction that is in clear conflict with the intention of the
law."4 40 It is true, of course, that the legislature intended chap-
ter 346 to lower workers' compensation costs. But the legisla-
ture intended to enact only a one-year deferral of the inflation
adjustment; a proposed two-year deferral was rejected.44 1 If
the attorney general's interpretation of section 137 had been
adopted, the intent of the legislature would have been defeated.
Using the prior example again, a worker injured on April 1,
1979, would have received inflation adjustments under the prior
law on October 1, 1979, nd October 1, 1980. According to the
attorney general, the injured worker should have received an
inflation adjustment on October 1, 1981, and then would have
waited until April 1, 1983-a period of eighteen months-to re-
ceive the next inflation adjustment. A worker injured on Sep-
tember 1, 1979, would have received inflation adjustments
under the prior law on October 1, 1979, and October 1, 1980.
According to the attorney general, the injured worker should
have received an inflation adjustment on October 1, 1981, and
then waited until September 1, 1983-a period of twenty-three
months-to receive the next inflation adjustment. The legisla-
ture that enacted chapter 346 never intended section 137 to
have such harsh consequences for a great many injured
workers.
So the intent of the legislature may not be fully realized no
matter which of the alternative interpretations of section 137 is
ultimately adopted by the courts-if and when the issue is
presented to them. In the meantime, it is the Department of
Labor and Industry, not the attorney general or the insurance
commissioner, that is entrusted with administering the work-
ers' compensation law. Unless and until its interpretation is re-
versed by the courts, the Department speaks authoritatively for
the state in this matter. Thus we have yet another instance in
439. Because the adjustment of benefits for inflation began on October 1,
1975, there were six years of claimants (October 1, 1975, to September 30, 1981)
who, on the average, had the adjustment of their benefits for inflation in 1982
come sooner under § 137 than it would have under the prior law. But there was
only one year of claimants who had the adjustment of their benefits for infla-
tion in 1982 come later under chapter 346 than it would have under the prior
law. See Brief for Appellants at A-58, Rating Ass'n.
440. Brief for Respondents at 36, Rating Ass'n.
441. Brief for Appellants at 48, Rating Ass'n.
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which the immediate and continuing 15% rate reduction was
sought to be justified, in part, on the basis of a statutory provi-
sion which was interpreted by an agency of the state so as to
increase insurers' costs, and the ultimate impact of which
would not be determined unless and until it was litigated and
decided by the Minnesota courts years after the rate reduction
became effective. It cannot be said that section 137 reasonably
justified any part of the mandated rate reduction.
IV. THE INSURERS' CLAIM THAT THE RATES IN
EFFECT AFTER THE LEGISLATIVELY MANDATED
FIFTEEN PERCENT RATE REDUCTION VIOLATED
THEIR DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BECAUSE THEY
DEPRIVED THEM OF REVENUES SUFFICIENT TO
COVER THEIR EXPENSES AND YIELD A REASON-
ABLE PROFIT
In approving the 11.8% rate increase in the April 21, 1981,
order, which became effective June 5, 1981, the commissioner
of insurance found that a return of 18%, including investment
income, was reasonable and neither excessive nor inadequate,
within the meaning of section 79.071 of the Minnesota Stat-
utes.442 On the basis of the assumptions, methodology, and
analysis used by the commissioner to arrive at this conclusion,
the insurers sought to present the most recent data available to
the district court, indicating that all the insurers writing work-
ers' compensation insurance in Minnesota, taken together,
were earning a rate of return, including investment income, of
11.7% before taxes and that each of thirty insurers named as
plaintiffs was earning a return of even less than 11.7%. More-
over, the 11.7% return was calculated on the assumption that
the actual cost savings to the insurers resulting from the
changes made by chapter 346 justified a 15% reduction in rates.
Accepting the insurers' contention that the changes made by
chapter 346 justified no more than a 5% reduction in rates, the
resulting rate of return would have been approximately 9%-
half the return the commissioner found adequate.
The insurers sought to introduce these data to demonstrate
that (1) the mandated 15% rate reduction could not be vali-
dated on the ground that it was rationally related to a purpose
other than that articulated in chapter 346, that is, to fix workers'
compensation rates at, but not below, the minimum rates




within the constitutional zone of reasonableness; 443 (2) the leg-
islature was arbitrary in mandating a 15% rate reduction when
the insurers were already earning less than a reasonable rate
of return; and (3) the insurers were not earning "extra" profits
that would mitigate unduly optimistic estimates or approxima-
tions of the actual cost savings to the insurers resulting from
the changes made by chapter 346 and so require the reasona-
bleness of the mandated 15% reduction to be judged in light of
the impact of error on the insurance industry's rate of return.
The district court sustained the state's objection to the of-
fered data and testimony444 and, upon reconsideration, affirmed
its ruling.445 It gave the following two reasons for its ruling-
Firstly, this argument [that chapter 346, section 142 is unconstitutional
because the reduction of rates ordered by the legislature is confisca-
tory] is inapplicable to insurance companies. The utilities cases which
have been cited are based upon reasons which have no application to
insurance companies, and secondly, even if... the theory contained in
the utility cases had application to insurance companies, the plaintiff
insurers have failed to meet their burden of proof, that Section 142 is
unconstitutional in establishing rates which, as to them, are confisca-
tory. The Constitution does not require that rates be fixed at a level
which will guarantee a profit to all insurers, so that confiscation claim,
as well as the confiscation grounds is dismissed ... *446
The first reason given by the district court for excluding the
offered data and testimony paralleled the views of state District
Court Judge Summers. In his memorandum denying the insur-
ers' motion for a stay, Judge Summers had written:
The court is not persuaded that an insurer would be in a position
to claim a violation of the Constitution even if it could not profitably do
business here at the legislatively mandated rate. Unlike railroads,
trucking companies, and utilities, which have extensive capital invest-
ments, geographically limited operating rights, and mandates to pro-
vide services in Minnesota, plaintiffs [insurers] are free to do business
or not to do business here as they choose. This being so, it is arguable
that the Legislature has as much right to fix maximum compensation
insurance rates as it does to set the usury rate, leaving market forces to
determine who will do business and who will not.4 4 7
The state accepted Judge Summers's argument and contended
the insurers were claiming that the mandated 15% rate reduc-
443. It should be noted that Judge Summers, in his memorandum denying
the insurers' motion for a stay, said that "[a]ssuming for the purposes of argu-
ment that the Legislature acted in error in requiring a 15% rate cut, there is no
evidence that any individual insurer will now be forced to do business in Min-
nesota at a loss ratio which would amount to a confiscation." See Appendix I,
infra, at 668.
444. Trial Transcript at 559, Rating Assn.
445. Id. at 571.
446. Id. at 571-72.
447. See Appendix I, infra, at 668.
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tion "took their property without compensation resulting in a
confiscation.""48 This interpretation of the insurers' claim,
which was also implied in Judge Summers's argument, is
clearly erroneous.
The due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment
includes two separate guarantees that limit state action: (1)
the guarantee that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law;" and (2) the in-
corporated fifth amendment due process guarantee that private
property shall not "be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation."" 9 The insurers did not contend that the existing
rates effected a "taking" of their property within the meaning
of the just compensation clause. Rather, they contended that
they were deprived of their property without due process of
law because the existing rates did not allow a reasonable rate
of return for risks incurred in writing workers' compensation
insurance in Minnesota.
Similarly, in making their claim under the Minnesota Con-
stitution, the insurers did not invoke article I, section 13, which
guarantees that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken ... for
public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or se-
cured."45 0 . They relied instead on article I, section 7, which
guarantees that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law."45 '
The distinction between the taking and due process claims
reveals the misunderstanding of the Minnesota courts in the
Rating Association case. The United States Supreme Court
has long rejected the first reason given by the district court for
excluding the data and testimony offered by the insurers in
support of their due process claim. Although the insurers are
unlike public utilities, and are legally free, in Judge Summers's
words, "to do business or not to do business [in Minnesota] as
they choose," this status does not disentitle them from claiming
that a particular state regulation of their business-rate fixing
in the Rating Association case-violates the due process
guarantees.
Before Nebbia v. New York452 was decided, the United
States Supreme Court took the position that "a state legislature
448. Brief for Respondents at 60-62, Rating Ass'n.
449. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
450. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
451. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
452. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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is without constitutional power to fix prices at which commodi-
ties may be sold, services rendered, or property used, unless
the business or property involved is 'affected with a public in-
terest.' "4 53 Thus, in Adams v. Tanner45 a state law prohibiting
employment agencies from collecting fees from workers was in-
validated, in Tyson Brother v. Banton455 state regulation of the
resale price of theatre tickets was invalidated; in Ribnik v. Mc-
Bride4 56 state regulation of employment agency fees was invali-
dated; and in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann45 7 a state law
requiring a license from a state commission to enter into the
business of manufacturing ice was invalidated. None of the
businesses involved in these cases was a public utility or re-
garded as "affected with a public interest."
Even during this period in our history, the Supreme Court,
in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis,458 upheld the con-
stitutionality of state regulation of insurance rates and rejected
the contention that such regulation deprived insurance compa-
nies of their liberty (freedom of contract) and property without
due process of law. It did so on the ground that the insurance
industry was "affected with a public interest" because it was of
"public consequence" and affected the "community at large."45 9
The Court dismissed the insurance companies' argument that
the state had no constitutional power to regulate their rates
and charges because the public had no right to demand and re-
ceive service from them.46 0 This view of the insurance industry
as one "affected with a public interest" was reaffirmed by the
Court in O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co.46 1
Nebbia v. New York held that states had the constitutional
power to regulate industries that were not like public utili-
ties. 462 'The phrase 'affected with a public interest,"' wrote
Justice Roberts for the Court, "can, in the nature of things,
mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is
453. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (invalidating state
regulation of gasoline prices) (quoting Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S.
522, 527 (1923)).
454. 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
455. 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
456. 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
457. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
458. 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
459. Id. at 413.
460. Id. at 405.
461. 282 U.S. 251, 257 (1931).
462. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
subject to control for the public good. '463 The Court then ex-
amined the adequacy of the reasons advanced by New York for
regulating minimum and maximum retail prices for milk- It did
not hold that Nebbia, the proprietor of a small grocery store in
Rochester, New York, who was convicted for selling milk at less
than the fixed minimum price, was not entitled to make and be
heard on his constitutional claim because he was not like a
public utility and was under no legal obligation to sell milk to
the public but was free to do business or not to do business in
New York as he chose. Nebbia was heard on the merits of his
constitutional claim that the state had no power to regulate his
transaction. The New York law was sustained because it satis-
fied the following standard enunciated by the Court: "the guar-
anty of due process.., demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means se-
lected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained."4 64
In no subsequent case, including those overruling the pre-
Nebbia decisions referred to above, has the Court rejected a
due process claim on the grounds enunciated by Judge Sum-
mers and the district court and accepted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in the Rating Association case.46 5 These cases
demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court will hear on
the merits the claims of industries not like public utilities, in-
cluding the insurance industry, that particular state regula-
tions, including rate or price fixing regulations, violate
constitutional due process guarantees, even if no "taking" in-
voking the just compensation clause is charged. The unreason-
able state action violating due process in rate cases is often
described as "confiscatory," but the issue remains one of due
process.
Thus, for example, in Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Insur-
ance Co. ,466 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit explicitly recognized the right of insurance companies
463. Id. at 531.
464. Id.
465. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 384 (1955) (upholding
regulation of the fitting and advertising of eyeglasses); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941) (overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928)); United
States v. Carolene Prods., Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a federal prohibi-
tion of the interstate shipment of skimmed milk mixed with nonmilk fats);
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state mini-
mum wage law for women challenged by a company owning and operating a
hotel).
466. 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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to contest the constitutionality of insurance rates fixed by the
superintendent of insurance. The appellate court stated that
"[t] he power to regulate insurance rates is a police power. Un-
doubtedly the constitutional limitations of due process of law,
both procedural and substantive, apply. '467 The procedural due
process "which must be accorded in enforcement of a reduction
in rates," held the court, "includes a judicial type of hearing
before a capable tribunal."468 The substantive limitations of
due process require "that there be enough revenue for operat-
ing expenses, capital costs, and sufficient return to the equity
owner to assure financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to
maintain its credit and to attract capital."46 9
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has reached
the same conclusion as the District of Columbia Circuit in a sit-
uation analogous to the Rating Association case. In Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance,470 the
Massachusetts legislature instituted no-fault automobile insur-
ance and simultaneously mandated a 15% reduction in automo-
bile insurance rates. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held the law unconstitutional for the following reasons:
The Commonwealth's admitted power to regulate the insurance busi-
ness and the rates which are charged for insurance does not permit it
to limit the conduct of such business to those companies which submit
to whatever rates the Commonwealth may fix, even if they be confisca-
tory. The writing of insurance is a lawful business and the Common-
wealth may not impose unconstitutional conditions upon the exercise
of the right to engage therein. While it is not constitutionally required
to fix rates which will guarantee a profit to all insurers, it may not con-
stitutionally fix rates which are so low that if the insurers engage in
business they may do so only at a loss. The insurers are not required
to either submit to confiscatory rates or go out of business. They have
a right to rates which are not confiscatory, or which satisfy any higher
applicable statutory standards; and to a judicial review on the constitu-
tional or statutory adequacy of such rates.4 7 1
It is precisely the substantive limitations of due process deline-
467. Id. at 293.
468. Id. at 288.
469. Id. at 289. Both the superintendent of insurance and the insurance
companies agreed that "the issue of confiscation" was not before the reviewing
court because the district court had set aside the superintendent's order "for
failure to comply with the basic requirement of a fair and full hearing" and it
was this action that was being appealed. Id. at 291 n.38. The court of appeals,
holding that the requisite "fair and full hearing" could take place in the review-
ing court, remanded to enable the district court to determine "the issue of con-
fiscation" and "the other phases of the issue of substantive validity of the
Superintendent's order." Id. at 291.
470. 358 Mass. 272, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970).
471. Id. at 281, 263 N.E.2d at 703 (citations omitted).
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ated by the District of Columbia Circuit and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court that the insurers in the Rating Associ-
ation case claimed were exceeded by the Minnesota legislature
in mandating the 15% rate reduction. The data and testimony
offered by them and excluded by the district court supported
this argument.
The second reason offered by the district court for dis-
missing the insurers' claim that the existing rates failed to
yield a fair rate of return is perplexing. The insurers agreed
that the due process clause does not guarantee a profit to each
and every insurer. For this reason, they sought to introduce
data and testimony showing that the existing rates did not al-
low the Minnesota workers' compensation insurance industry
as a whole to earn a fair rate of return for the risks incurred in
writing the insurance. The district court excluded the data and
testimony. By ruling that the insurers "failed to meet their
burden of proof" that the mandated 15% reduction resulted in
rates "which, as to them, are confiscatory," the district court
implied that the due process clause guaranteed a fair rate of re-
turn to each insurer but that the insurers did not offer proof of
the impact of the existing rates on each of the thirty insurance
companies named as plaintiffs. But this was not the case. The
insurers also sought to present data and testimony dealing with
the impact of the existing rates on each of these companies,47 2
but the district court excluded these data and testimony as
well.
Relying on Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde,47 3 the state ar-
gued that the district court properly excluded the insurers' of-
fer of testimony and data to show that the existing rates
deprived all the insurers writing workers' compensation insur-
ance in Minnesota, taken together, of a reasonable rate of re-
turn.474 Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde had raised the issue, as
the court of appeals in Jordan succintly put it, whether the
constitutional guarantee of due process "applies to the compa-
nies severally, as their individual figures may indicate, or
whether it applies to the group as a whole upon a reasonable
appraisal of the experience of all the companies."47 5 Although
it did not decide that issue, the court of appeals expressed the
opinion that the latter alternative is the most reasonable inter-
472. See supra text accompanying note 443.
473. 275 U.S. 440 (1928).
474. Brief for Respondents at 62 n.30, Rating Ass'n.
475. Jordan, 169 F.2d at 293.
[Vol. 68:545
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
pretation of the due process requirement and the one that will
best effectuate the public interest.47 6
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde is not without ambiguity, as
the court of appeals also pointed out in Jordan.4 7 On the one
hand, the Supreme Court said: "Rates sufficient to yield ade-
quate returns to some may be confiscatory when applied to the
business of others."47 8 This implies that the constitutional
guarantee of due process applies to the insurance companies
severally. The Court added that a company that might have a
constitutional claim that rates are confiscatorily low when ap-
plied to its business has no constitutional right to prevent these
rates from being imposed as maximum rates on other compa-
nies for which such rates are sufficient to yield adequate re-
turns because the "Fourteenth Amendment does not protect
against competition."47 9 But immediately thereafter, the Court
said
Moreover, "aggregate collections" sufficient to yield a reasonable profit
for all do not necessarily give to each just compensation for the con-
tracts of insurance written by it. It has never been and cannot reason-
ably be held that state-made rates violate the Fourteenth Amendment
merely because the aggregate collections are not sufficient to yield a
reasonable profit or just compensation to all companies that happen to
be engaged in the affected business. 4 8 0
This implies that state-made rates need not yield a reasonable
profit to every company in the affected business and contra-
dicts previous statements by the Court that the constitutional
guarantee of due process applies to the companies severally.4 8 1
The court of appeals in Jordan concluded that Aetna Insur-
ance Co. v. Hyde "appears to hold that the rates fixed by gen-
eral order may be generally valid but invalid as to those
companies which can show such rates to be confiscatory as to
them. 4 8 2 But the court of appeals was "not sure that that is
the correct rule here."48 3 It explained that if "constitutional va-
lidity is to be determined by consideration of the several com-
panies separately, the only valid uniform rate would be that
fixed by the experience of the company with the highest ex-
476. Id. at 292-93.
477. Id. at 310.
478. Aetna, 275 U.S. at 447.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Clearly, the Court assumed as a matter of course that either the insur-
ance industry as a whole or an individual insurance company could attack
state-fixed insurance rates on due process grounds.




penses."48 4 "Such," the court said, "surely is not the require-
ment of due process."4 8 5 Furthermore, this alternative, which
results in the highest possible rates, would be contrary to the
public interest. The only alternative, said the court, would be
to abandon the effort to fix a uniform rate in favor of "a series
of rates for the same risk, which in ultimate precision could be
a separate rate for each company." 486 The court then
concluded:
The practical effect of a series of rates would necessarily be the estab-
lishment of the lowest responsible rate as the uniform rate, and the
resulting financial squeeze would tend to a monopoly in a few compa-
nies. On the other hand, if constitutional validity can be tested by a
reasonable figure fixed by the general experience of all, the public in-
terest in reasonable rates, the public interest against monopoly, the
companies' interest in reasonable return, and the incentive toward
good management by the companies would all be well-served.
4 8 7
The court of appeals also referred to the practical difficul-
ties of fixing separate maximum rates for individual compa-
nies.48 8 This kind of difficulty has led, more recently, to the
Federal Power Commission's abandonment of the individual
company cost-of-service method for regulating the rates of in-
dependent producers of natural gas in favor of imposing a sin-
gle group of maximum rates on all the producers of natural gas
in an area.48 9
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde was decided in 1928. Since
that time experience in price and rate regulation has accumu-
lated in the railroad, trucking, air carrier, natural gas, and in-
surance industries. General price and rent control during
World War 11 added to this experience. In all these areas, rates
applicable to a number of sellers of a commodity or providers
of a service were based upon "a reasonable appraisal of the ex-
perience of all the companes."490 In the Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases,49 1 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional au-




488. Id. at 292.
489. See The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
490. Jordan, 169 F.2d at 293. See also The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
390 U.S. 747 (1968); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516-19 (1944); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 660 (1944); Leventhal, The Role of the Price Lawyers, in
OFFICE OF PRICE ADMIN., PUB. No. 11, PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: LEGAL
PHASES 77-87 (1947) [hereinafter cited as PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL]; Na-
thanson, The Emergency Court of Appeals, in PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL,
supra, at 5-26.
491. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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thority of the Federal Power Commission to impose a single
group of maximum rates on all the producers of natural gas in
an area, without even mentioning Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde.
The Court said:
This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislatures and admin-
istrative agencies may calculate rates for a regulated class without first
evaluating the separate financial position of each member of the class;
it has been thought to be sufficient if the agency has before it represen-
tative evidence, ample in quantity to measure with appropriate preci-
sion the financial and other requirements of the pertinent parties.
No constitutional objection arises from the imposition of maximum
prices merely because "high cost operators may be more seriously af-
fected ... than others" .... 492
The Court also said that "maximum rates must be calculated
for a regulated class in conformity with the pertinent constitu-
tional limitations." 49 3 Accordingly, "any rate selected by the
Commission from the broad zone of reasonableness permitted
by the [Natural Gas] Act cannot properly be attacked as confis-
catory."49 4 It held that rates determined in conformity with the
Act, and intended to "'balanc [ e . ..the investor and the con-
sumer interests,' are constitutionally permissible."495 The
Court made clear, however, that it was not suggesting "that
maximum rates computed for a group or geographical area can
never be confiscatory."4 96
Because section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act then prohib-
ited any natural gas company from abandoning its facilities, or
any service it was rendering by means of such facilities, with-
out commission permission, it was argued that "the members
of the regulated class must, under the Constitution, be prof-
fered opportunities either to withdraw from the regulated activ-
ity or to seek special relief from the group rates." 497 The Court
did not dispose of this argument, stating: "We need not deter-
mine whether this is in every situation constitutionally impera-
tive, for such arrangements have here been provided by the
Commission, and we cannot now hold them inadequate."4 98
The whole tenor of its opinion indicates that the Supreme
Court would see no constitutional objection if group rates im-
posed losses on individual companies, such as insurance com-
492. 390 U.S. at 769 (citations omitted) (quoting Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.s. 503 (1944)).
493. Id.
494. Id. at 770.






panies, that are under no legal obligation to continue to provide
services.
Furthermore, in Bowles v. Willingham,499 a case on which
Permian Basin relied, the Supreme Court held that, because
the World War II Emergency Price Control Act provided that
no person was required "to sell any commodity or to offer any
accommodations for rent," there was no constitutional objec-
tion to the statutory standard that maximum rents be "gener-
ally fair and equitable," even though they "may be most unfair
and inequitable as applied to a particular landlord." 00 It "has
never been thought," said the Court, "that price-fixing, other-
wise valid, was improper because it was on a class rather than
an individual basis."01
The Minnesota law, taking the same approach, prohibited
(until January 1, 1984) any insurer from writing workers' com-
pensation insurance at rates that exceeded the maximum rates
set forth in the schedule of rates adopted by the commissioner
of insurance for all the insurance companies writing such in-
surance.5 02 The schedule of rates was not to "be excessive, in-
adequate, or unfairly discriminatory." 03 Obviously the
Minnesota legislature, like other legislatures and administra-
tive agencies, had concluded that such a group standard of
ratemaking would best promote the public interest. But fixing
rates on this basis did not protect any insurance company from
competition, as the state charged.5 0 4 The insurance commis-
sioner adopted only a schedule of maximum rates; any insurer
was legally free to compete by charging lower rates.
If adopted, the position taken by the attorney general in
the Rating Association case on the issue raised in Aetna and
long since decided by the United States Supreme Court would
have necessitated the conclusion that the provisions in the
Minnesota law for fixing group rates for workers' compensation
insurance were unconstitutional. In any case, since the insur-
ers in the Rating Association case also offered to prove that
each of the individual insurers named as plaintiffs was unable
to earn a fair rate of return, the district court and Minnesota
Supreme Court erred under whichever of the alternative stan-
499. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
500. Id. at 516-19.
501. Id. at 518.
502. MiNN. STAT. §§ 79.21, 79.071 (1980).
503. MiNN. STAT. § 79.071 (1980), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at
1321.
504. Brief for Respondents at 47, Rating Ass'n.
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dards of constitutional rates would have ultimately been held
to be proper by the courts.
V. THE ADEQUACY OF POSSIBLE ADMINISTRATIVE
RELIEF FOR THE INSURERS
The state asserted that if the insurers were prejudiced by
any aspect of chapter 346, they should have sought adjustments
of the rates by the commissioner of insurance.50 5 Since the at-
torney general never contended that the Rating Association
case should be dismissed because of the insurers' failure to ex-
haust their administrative remedies, it is difficult to know what
point the attorney general was trying to make. In any event,
the insurance commissioner could not grant the insurers the
relief they were seeking.
The only authority for the insurance commissioner to re-
consider the 15% rate reduction was that set forth in section 11
of chapter 346, which provided:
If ... the commissioner determines that the loss experience of Minne-
sota workers' compensation insurers indicates a change in the existing
schedule of rates, the commissioner may, in his discretion, order a
change in the schedule of rates or order a hearing to determine
whether and by what percentage the schedule of rates should be
changed.5 0 6
"Loss experience" refers to the dollars in benefits that insurers
actually have paid or are obligated to pay. Loss experience for
all policies written in the period January 1 through Decem-
ber 31, 1981, and expiring December 31, 1982-the first policy
year containing any loss experience under chapter 346-would
not begin to be reported until 1984. The loss experience under
chapter 346 would not be completely known for an additional
five to six years. This delay is inherent in the workers' com-
pensation system because losses under policies written in any
calendar year continue to be incurred by the insurance compa-
nies for years thereafter. Furthermore, such losses do not be-
gin to be reported until at least eighteen months after the last
policies were written. It will be years before the insurers or the
commissioner can assemble sufficient data to ascertain how
much of the loss experience was due to chapter 346 and how
much to other factors.
Even if the commissioner could have distinguished the fac-
tors responsible for the loss experience and increased rates be-
505. Id. at 73-75.
506. Ch. 346, § 11, 1981 Minn. Laws at 1617 (codified at MiNN. STAT. § 79.071
subd. la (1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321).
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cause the assumptions made by chapter 346 did not materialize,
the increased rates would have applied only "to new and-re-
newal policies issued after the effective date" of the commis-
sioner's final order increasing the rates.5 07 By that time, July 1,
1986--the date set by chapter 346 for the deregulation of work-
ers' compensation insurance rates-would have arrived and the
insurance commissioner would have been completely out of the
picture. By moving up the deregulation date to January 1,
1984,508 and prohibiting the insurance commissioner from ap-
proving any proposed increase in rates after May 1, 1983,509 the
1983 legislature made it impossible for any state agency to right
even a part of the wrong inflicted upon the insurers by the
mandated 15% rate reduction. Only the courts could grant the
insurers the relief that would have enabled them to recover the
past losses suffered because of the mandated reduction. With-
out the courts' intervention, the mandated reduction was a
"permanent" reduction, at least from July 1, 1981, when it be-
came effective, until January 1, 1984, the date of deregulation.
VI. THE RATING ASSOCIATION'S STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
MANDATED FIFTEEN PERCENT RATE
REDUCTION
Judge Summers was the first to imply that there might be
some question about the Rating Association's standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the mandated 15% rate reduction.
In denying the insurers' motion for a stay, he wrote that the
Rating Association was "merely a rating bureau composed of
insurers" and "cannot suffer harm whether the order goes into
effect or not."5 10 The district court dismissed the Rating Asso-
ciation as a party from the case because it had "insufficient
statutory authority to act as a party in a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration that a law is unconstitutional."5 1 '
With all due respect, the views of Judge Summers and the dis-
trict court are inconsistent with the principles of standing
enunciated by the United States and Minnesota Supreme
Courts.
507. MINN. STAT. § 79.076, subd. 1 (1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn.
Laws at 1321.
508. Ch. 290, § 2, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1311 (amending Mmi'N. STAT. § 79.071,
subd. 1 (1982)).
509. Id.
510. See Appendix I, infra, at 667.
511. See Appendix II, infra, at 676.
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The Rating Association is an association of all Minnesota
workers' compensation insurers doing business in Minnesota.
Created in 1921 as part of the adoption of the new compulsory
workers' compensation insurance system,5 12 the association
owns or rents the property and offices in which it conducts its
business. It contracts with employers, suppliers, member in-
surers, and even the state to buy and sell goods and services. It
is a legal entity separate and apart from its members, with gen-
eral authority to sue or be sued in its own name.5 13
The statutes required the Rating Association to undertake
certain actions in connection with the operation of the workers'
compensation system but did not circumscribe its day-to-day
operations or the scope of the additional services it might per-
form for its members.514 These matters were dealt with in its
articles of association and bylaws, which the statutes author-
ized the Rating Association to adopt and which had to be ap-
proved by the commissioner of insurance.515 The articles of
association and bylaws of the Rating Association authorized
the association to take such action "as may be required" to pro-
512. Act of March 15, 1921, ch. 85, § 2, 1921 Minn. Laws at 132-33 (current ver-
sion at MnN. STAT. § 79.34 (1982)).
513. MINN. STAT. § 540.151 (1982).
514. MNN. STAT. §§ 79.01-.32 (1982). In addition to its participation in rate
proceedings, which will be discussed in the text, the Rating Association was
also authorized to conduct a survey of all insurance risks, MMNN. STAT. § 79.08
(1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321; to adopt, subject to
administrative approval, a manual governing all operations of the workers'
compensation system, MNN. STAT. § 79.076 (1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983
Minn. Laws at 1321, and rules and regulations governing the classification of
workers' compensation risks, MwNN. STAT. §§ 79.09, 79.17 (1982), repealed by ch.
290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321; to maintain records covering all aspects of
workers' compensation insurance in Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 79.18 (1982), re-
pealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321; and to participate in the liqui-
dation of the obligations of insolvent insurers, MIn. STAT. §§ 79.28-.31 (1982),
repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321. In addition, the Rating Asso-
ciation was responsible for the operation of the Assigned Risk Plan. MINN.
STAT. §§ 79.24-.26 (1982). As was the case with its member insurers, the Rating
Association had to be licensed, file annual reports, and risk license revocation if
it failed to perform its obligations in a lawful manner. MINN. STAT. §§ 79.15, .16,
.23, .32 (1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321.
515. The statutes provided:
The association shall adopt articles of association and bylaws for
its government and for the government of its members. These articles
and bylaws and all amendments thereto shall be ified with and ap-
proved by the commissioner [of insurance] and shall not be effective
until so filed and approved. The Association shall admit to member-
ship any insurer authorized to transact workers' compensation insur-
ance in this state. The charges and services of the association shall be
fixed in the articles or bylaws and shall be equitable and non-discrimi-
natory as between members.
MINN. STAT. § 79.12 (1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1321.
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tect the interests of its members. Its members directed the
Rating Association to institute the lawsuit.
The Rating Association was authorized to "assist the com-
missioner and insurers in approving rates, determining hazards
and other material facts in connection with compensation risks,
and to assist in promoting safety in the industries."516 Since
1921, the Rating Association has represented its member insur-
ers before the state administrative agencies empowered to fix
workers' compensation insurance rates and in the courts. The
Rating Association also had statutory standing as an "inter-
ested party" in administrative rate proceedings.5 1 7 It was au-
thorized to petition for an administrative hearing to change the
schedule of workers' compensation rates and to seek judicial
review of any final rate order issued by the insurance commis-
sioner. 18 Thus the Rating Association was an "interested
party" authorized to seek judicial review of a final order en-
tered under section 79.071, subdivision la, because section
79.073 authorized judicial review of all final orders of the insur-
ance commissioner "pursuant to Sections 79.071 and 79.072."519
Section 142, subdivision 1, of chapter 346 directed the com-
missioner to issue an order implementing the mandated 15%
rate reduction "pursuant to the authority" granted in section
11, codified as section 79.071, subdivision la. The commissioner
issued the implementing order on June 5, 1981, the same day he
issued the order under section 79.071, subdivision 1, approving
a rate increase of 11.8%. There was no statutory basis for con-
cluding that the Rating Association was an interested party au-
thorized by section 79.073 to seek judicial review of the latter
order under section 79.071, subdivision 1, but not of the order
implementing the mandated 15% rate reduction under section
79.071, subdivision la.
Finally, it could not reasonably have been maintained that
in the course of judicial review of an order issued under section
79.071, subdivision 1, the Rating Association could not attack
the constitutionality of any statutory provision on which the or-
der was based. The situation was no different when the Rating
Association sought, through its declaratory judgment action, to
attack the order issued under section 79.071, subdivision la,
which rested entirely on the legislatively-mandated 15% rate
516. MINN. STAT. § 79.11 (1982), repealed by ch. 290, § 15, 1983 Minn. Laws at
1321.
517. MmN. STAT. § 79.071 (1980).
518. M Nq. STAT. § 79.073 (1980). See also MwiN. STAT. §§ 79.075, 79.32 (1980).
519. MAiNN. STAT. § 79.073 (1980).
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reduction. A party declared by statute to be an interested
party and given standing by statute to seek judicial review of
an administrative order may raise any issue, including a consti-
tutional issue, that is necessary to a just resolution of the case
or controversy.
The Rating Association was not deprived of standing be-
cause only its members wrote workers' compensation insur-
ance in Minnesota and would suffer losses because of the
challenged legislative action and implementing administrative
order. The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently ac-
corded standing to associations representing members who
clearly had standing in their individual capacities.5 20 The fed-
eral law of standing is in accord. As the United States
Supreme Court remarked in Sierra Club v. Morton,21 "it is
clear that an organization whose members are injured may rep-
resent those members in a proceeding for judicial review."5 22
Professor Kenneth C. Davis has concluded that the "law sup-
porting that remark is abundant."5 23
In National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v.
Schultz,524 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit authorized the Council, a national trade association for
the coin-operated laundry and dry cleaning industry, to bring a
suit to challenge a ruling of the administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor. The circuit court
held that an "organization that is a sufficiently effective spokes-
man for the interests of its members to assure an adversarial
presentation of the issues has standing to present their views
even though the action is not brought under Rule 23 [class
actions]."525
It would have been a foolish and wasteful use of judicial
time and effort for the Rating Association, or any insurer, to
have instituted a class action to challenge the mandated reduc-
tion when the Minnesota law recognized the Rating Association
as an interested party that properly represented all workers'
compensation insurance companies in the state in rate matters.
Indeed, the Rating Association was uniquely qualified to repre-
520. See, e.g., Minnesota Educ. Ass'n v. Independent School Dist. No. 404,
287 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 1980); No Power Line, Inc. v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality
Council, 311 Minn. 330, 250 N.W.2d 158 (1976); Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Min-
nesota Bd. of Pharmacy, 301 Minn. 28, 221 N.W.2d 162 (1974).
521. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
522. Id. at 739.
523. 4 K.C. DAviS, supra note 212, § 24.15, at 268 (2d ed. 1983).
524. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
525. Id. at 704.
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sent the interest of all workers' compensation insurers in the
case because the constitutional issue turned on the impact of
chapter 346 on the entire workers' compensation insurance in-
dustry in Minnesota. No single named plaintiff insurer was as
qualified as the Rating Association to assure an adversarial
presentation of this constitutional issue.
VII. CONCLUSION-THE MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT'S SUMMARY OPINION
The Minnesota Supreme Court entered a summary opinion
adopting the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law and affirming its judgment "declaring that Section 142 of
Minn. Laws 1981, ch. 346 is valid and constitutional in all re-
spects" 26 and dismissing the Rating Association as a party
from the action.5 27 The court's summary disposition of the case
is astounding.
The court, of course, did not state why it decided the case
without opinion, but certainly it could not be said that a de-
tailed opinion would have no precedential value. We can only
assume that the court concluded that the cost savings to the in-
surers resulting from the aggregate of all the benefit, adminis-
526. See Appendix 11, infra, at 676.
527. The summary opinion was entered pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Appellate Procedure which then provided:
In any case decided under Rule 133.01 or in any other case where
the Supreme Court determines that a detailed opinion would have no
precedential value, the Supreme Court in its discretion may enter the
following summary opinion:
"Affirmed (or reversed or other appropriate direction for ac-
tion), pursuant to Rule 136.01(2)."
MiNN. R. Civ. APP. P. 136.01 (1982). Rule 133.01 then provided:
(1) The Supreme Court, on its own motion or on motion of any
party, may summarily affirm, may summarily reverse with directions,
may remand or dismiss an appeal or other request for relief upon
grounds proper for remand or dismissal, or may limit the issues to be
considered on appeal. Summary dispositions have no precedential
value and shall not be cited.
(2) Motions for such relief may be made at any time but shall be
filed promptly when the occasion appears and shall comply with the re-
quirements of Rule 127.
MINN. R. Crv. APp. P. 133.01 (1982). These rules have been revised. Rule 136.01
now provides that the Supreme Court, and the new court of appeals, must is-
sue "a statement of the decision" in every case. MINN. R. Crv. APP. P. 136.01
Each statement of the decision must be accompanied by a written opinion
"containing a summary of the case and the reasons for the decision" unless the
appellate court "determines that the contents of the statement of the decision
sufficiently explain the disposition made." Id. The rule also provides that a
"statement of the decision without a written opinion shall not be officially pub-
lished and shall not be cited as precedent, except as law of the case, res judi-
cata or collateral estoppel." Id.
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trative, and operational changes made by chapter 346 justified
the legislatively-mandated 15% reduction in rates. This conclu-
sion of legislative fact, like any other conclusion of fact, would
itself have no precedential value. But an explication of the
court's approach to the many issues concerning the determina-
tion of legislative facts raised by the Rating Association case
would have had precedential value. The case gave the court an
excellent opportunity to indicate what effect it was going to
give to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Clover
Leaf. The court could have decided whether legislative facts
not before the legislature at the time it acted may be consid-
ered by the reviewing courts when the constitutionality of the
legislative action is challenged. It could have decided whether
the rules of evidence apply in the trial of legislative facts and
whether the clearly erroneous test applies on appeal from a
trial court's findings of legislative facts. It could have decided
whether it would more carefully scrutinize legislative action
claimed to violate economic due process under the Minnesota
Constitution than under the United States Constitution. It
could have decided whether it regarded the Rating Association
case as a run-of-the-mill or an unusual economic due process
case and, if unusual, whether that made any difference with re-
spect to the applicable standards of review.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion on all these issues
would obviously have had precedential value. So would its
opinion on why the insurers were not entitled to claim that the
existing rates violated their due process rights because they
did not enable them to cover their expenses and earn a reason-
able rate of return for the risks they incurred in writing work-
ers' compensation insurance in Minnesota. Finally, an opinion
explaining why the Rating Association did not have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the mandated 15% rate reduc-
tion would also have had precedential value. Indeed, the
court's resolution of most of these issues would have had prec-
edential value in constitutional cases that did not involve eco-
nomic regulation.
Even more was involved than the deplorable fact that the
Minnesota Supreme Court missed an opportunity to express its
opinion on significant issues of state and federal constitutional
law. Its summary disposition of the Rating Association case
left the insurance industry, on which Minnesota workers and
employers depend for the implementation of the state's work-
ers' compensation system, without any explanation of why the
Minnesota courts concluded that its constitutional contentions
1984]
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were without merit. Even if the court's explanations would
have had no precedential value, the insurers were also entitled
to know, in a case as important as this one, why the Minnesota
courts rejected the legislative facts they adduced to demon-
strate that the mandated 15% rate reduction bore no fair or rea-
sonable relation to the actual cost savings to the insurers
resulting from the changes made by chapter 346.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
APPENDIX I
MEMORANDUM OF JUDGE JOSEPH P.
SUMMERS528
The 1981 Legislature adopted L. 1981, Ch. 346. Chapter 346
is a comprehensive reform of our workers' compensation code.
Section 142 mandates a reduction of 15% in the maximum rate
which may be charged by workers' compensation insurers.
The 15% reduction is premised upon a legislative finding
that it is justified by the "impact of changes in the benefits pay-
able pursuant to [the workers' compensation law] and in the
administration and operation of the Minnesota workers com-
pensation system".
Defendant Commissioner issued an order June 5, 1981, im-
posing the legislatively mandated 15% rate reduction.
The evidence in the file supports a finding that the actuari-
ally predictable impact of the changes in benefits payable and
in administration would result in a savings in the neighborhood
of 8% rather than 15%.
This case is not, however, a review of an administrative
proceeding establishing a rate; it is in fact a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute. This being so, the test to be ap-
plied by the court is not whether the challenged order is based
upon erroneous premises or an inadequate record, but whether
enforcement will deprive plaintiffs of their property without
due process of law.
Plaintiff association is merely a rating bureau composed of
insurers. The association cannot suffer harm whether the order
goes into effect or not.
The 30 individual plaintiffs are representative of the ap-
proximately 300 companies which write workers' compensation
insurance in Minnesota.
In the nature of things, the bureau maximum rate will have
been set high enough so that most, if not all, the insurers will
make money at the maximum rate. This is the way things
work.
Because of differences in efficiency of management, and
quality of risk, the loss ratios, and hence the operating profit, of
individual insurers cannot be determined by reference to the
maximum rate set by the challenged order. The overall profit-
528. Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Ass'n v. State, No. 452706
(Dist. Ct. Minn. Sept. 24, 1981).
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ability of each insurer will also be affected by the return on its
investment.
Assuming for the purposes of argument that the Legisla-
ture acted in error in requiring a 15% rate cut, there is no evi-
dence that any individual insurer will now be forced to do
business in Minnesota at a loss ratio which would amount to a
confiscation.
The court is not persuaded that an insurer would be in a
position to claim a violation of the Constitution even if it could
not profitably do business here at the legislatively mandated
rate. Unlike railroads, trucking companies, and utilities, which
have extensive capital investments, geographically limited op-
erating rights, and mandates to provide services in Minnesota,
plaintiffs are free to do business or not to do business here as
they choose. This being so, it is arguable that the Legislature
has as much right to fix the maximum compensation insurance
rate as it does to set the usury rate, leaving market forces to de-
termine who will do business and who will not.
The court is aware of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
v. Commissioner, 263 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1970).
Aetna is distinguishable on two points:
(1) In Aetna, there was evidence to support a finding that
imposition of the legislatively mandated rate reduction would
result in an aggregated underwriting loss; there is no such evi-
dence here.
(2) Aetna does not address the issue of whether a due pro-
cess violation has occurred if the legislatively established rate
is such that some, but not all, insurers can still do business at a
profit. The Constitution surely cannot be stretched to guaran-





FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER FOR JUDGMENT529
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF RAMSEY SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT
Workers' Compensation Court File No. 452706
Insurers Rating
Association of Minnesota, et
al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs. FINDINGS OF FACT,
State of Minnesota and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Michael D. Markman, AND ORDER FOR
Commissioner of Insurance, JUDGMENT
Defendants.
The above-entitled action for declartory judgment came on
for trial before the undersigned Judge of the District Court in
the Ramsey County Courthouse, St. Paul, Minnesota on Janu-
ary 11, 1982. Hessian, McKasy and Soderberg by Thomas E.
Harms and James A. Stein appeared as attorneys for plaintiffs.
Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, by
Thomas R. Muck, Deputy Attorney General and Reynaud
Harp, Special Assistant Attorney General, appeared as attor-
neys for defendants.
The Court having considered the evidence and the stipula-
tions between the parties, having heard the arguments of coun-
sel, and having been advised in the premises, and having
considered all of the files and proceedings herein, makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff, Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Asso-
ciation of Minnesota (hereinafter "Association"), is an unincor-
porated association established under the laws of the State of
Minnesota (Minn. Stat. § 79.01 et seq. (1980)) with its principal
offices in Minneapolis, Minnesota. By law, every insurer trans-
acting the business of workers' compensation insurance in the
state is required to be a member of the Association.
2. Plaintiffs, other than the Association, are insurance
529. Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Ass'n v. State, No. 452706
(Dist. Ct. Minn. March 2, 1982).
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companies duly authorized to insure workers' compensation
risks within the state of Minnesota who have at all times rele-
vant to this action engaged in the issuance and renewal of poli-
cies of workers' compensation within the state.
3. Defendant State of Minnesota through the Department
of Commerce, Insurance Division is engaged inter alia in the
regulation of workers' compensation insurers doing business in
this state. Defendant, Michael D. Markman, is the duly ap-
pointed Commissioner of Insurance (hereinafter "Commis-
sioner") for the state of Minnesota and is charged by statute
with implementing the statutes which are the subject matter of
this litigation.
4. In 1977 a Workers' Compensation Study Commission
was established by the Minnesota Legislature to improve the
system of providing workers' compensation insurance at fair
and reasonable rates to employers within the state.
5. The Study Commission held 40 meetings between Sep-
tember 1, 1977 and February 16, 1979. On February 16, 1979, it
approved its 320-page final "Report to the Minnesota Legisla-
ture and Governor" dated February 1979.
6. A second Study Commission was created in 1979 and it
held 12 additional hearings between March 24, 1980, and De-
cember 9, 1980. It issued an additional 325 page "Report to the
Minnesota Legislature and Governor" dated December 1980.
7. In the 1981 Session of the Legislature, beginning Janu-
ary, 1981, various changes in the Workers' Compensation law
were introduced in the Minnesota Legislature. Certain of these
changes were considered for the first time in this legislative
session while others were the result of studies by the two
above-mentioned study commissions.
8. One of the workers' compensation reform bills consid-
ered in the 1981 Session, commencing in January, 1981, was
Senate File 359, ultimately enacted as Minn. Laws 1981 ch. 346,
the law which is challenged in this litigation.
9. During the period January to May 16, 1981, when SF 359
and other workers' compensation reform bills were under con-
sideration, a number of written materials containing estimates
of the cost savings which would result from the benefit and ad-
ministrative changes under consideration were made available
to the Legislature. Some changes were estimable numerically
while others were "unpriceable" in the sense that, although it
was known that they would generate cost savings, the precise
amount of the savings could not be predicted using standard
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actuarial techniques. Actuarial techniques are not suited to
predicting human behavior factors associated with some types
of changes. The estimates, whether or not numerical, included:
a. A memorandum dated December 19, 1980 prepared by Jordan
Lorence, an aide to Senator Olhoft. In this memorandum numerical es-
timates were given as follows: a 3% savings for a 2 year delay in the
escalator payment required by Minn. Stat. § 176.645 (1980), a 4% sav-
ings for a $75,000 cap on death benefits, and a 1.4% saving [sic] for re-
moving the minimum benefit floor. Other changes were identified as
having the effect of reducing rates but in an amount which could not be
quantified. These include: a delay in permanent partial payments until
return to work, a $275 cap on the permanent partial formula, an offset
for prior injury awards, removal of the heart attack presumption, estab-
lishment of an 8 year statute of limitation, an upgraded computerized
filing system for the Department of Labor and Industry, prohibiting
state lawyers from representing workers in claims cases, establishing a
degree of disability schedule, and allowing insurance companies to
round off amounts to the nearest dollar.
b. An undated memorandum prepared by Jordan Lorence entitled
"Priceable Provisions of the Compromise Workers Compensation Bill."
In this memorandum numerical cost saving estimates were given as
follows: 1.5% savings for a 10 year cap on death benefits, 1.2% for a 1
year delay in the escalator, a 5.3-9% increase for Reinsurance Associa-
tion full funding, an 8-10% savings from a medical fee schedule. Other
changes were identified as reducing costs over time but were not able
to be estimated numerically such as the new preponderance of the evi-
dence standard.
c. A March 25, 1981 memo re: Cost Implications of SF 359 from Paul
Hyduke (an aide to Senators Nichols and Peterson) to Senator Nichols.
In this memorandum numerical cost savings estimates were given as
follows: 5-6% savings for permanent partial benefits upon return to
work, 2.4% for a delay in the escalation of benefits for 104 weeks, 2.5%
for a 5 year cap on death benefits. The memorandum also stated that
other amendments with cost implications existed (e.g. reserve dis-
counts, statute of limitations, medical fee schedule, settlements in dis-
trict court) but that their cost impact could not be estimated
prospectively.
d. A January 8, 1981, memorandum prepared by Jordan Lorence enti-
tled "Summary of Workers' Compensation Modification Bill SF 21."
The memorandum states that workers' compensation amendments pro-
posed in SF 21 would reduce rates by 10%. The major provisions of SF
21 were described as a delay in the payment of permanent partial ben-
efits until return to work, a change in the permanent partial formula by
substituting a flat rate of $250 for the state average weekly wage, a 104-
week delay in the escalator, an offset of benefits by previous awards in
cases where a work related injury is aggravated by a compensated sec-
ond injury, a $75,000 cap on death benefits, an 8-year statute of limita-
tions on claims, and removal of the floor under temporary total
benefits.
e. An undated document prepared by Jordan Lorence and labeled as
from Senator Olhoft, entitled "Potential Areas To Cut Costs In W.C."
This document described establishing a schedule of disabilities, estab-
lishing an internal organ compensability schedule, and establishing a
medical panel and/or a medical fee schedule as involving a moderate
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potential for cost savings. This document described litigation related
matters such as adding workers compensation judges to reduce case
backlogs, making small claims informal like conciliation court, elimi-
nating the "liberal construction" standard, changing the mindset of the
judges and adding certainty to the system as involving significant cost
saving potential. This document described benefit-related changes
which may speed return to work as involving significant cost savings
potential. This document identified computerizing state records and
administrative clean-up bills as involving limited potential for savings.
f. A statement by Insurance Commissioner Markman to the House
Committee on Governmental Operations dated April 24, 1981. In this
statement the Commissioner identified 8% in savings for benefit re-
lated changes and 2% per year for 5 years for administrative changes.
g. An April 20, 1981, memo to Senator Collin Peterson from Commis-
sioner Markman. In this memorandum numerical estimates for the fol-
lowing were given: 2% for medical fee cbnstraints, 1.9% for a 52 week
escalator delay, 1.5% for a 10 year death benefit cap, 1.0% for the social
security offset, 2.3% for a delay in permanent partial payments, a .7%
increase for Reinsurance Association changes and 2% for each of the
next 5 years for administrative changes, principally the 14-day payment
change and the computerization of the Department of Labor and
Industry.
h. An April 17, 1981, memo to Senator Collin Peterson from Commis-
sioner Markman. In this memorandum it was stated that an increase
of the delay in the escalator from 52 to 104 weeks would yield an addi-
tional .7% to 1% in savings, a change in the death benefit cap from 10 to
5 years would yield additional savings of 1.5 to 2%. The Commissioner
further expressed that he was unable to estimate an amendment re-
quiring apportionment of disabilities based on non-job related events
and that the impact of a statute of limitations on open claims would be
so small as to preclude measurement.
i. An April 20, 1981, memo to Senator Wayne Olhoft from Commis-
sioner Markman. In this memorandum the effect of a higher retention
limit for the Workers' Compensation Reinsurance Association was said
to be less than 1%.
j. An April 17, 1981, letter from Craig Andersen to Jordan Lorence in
which estimates of 1.5% for a 10-year death cap and 1.2% for an escala-
tor delay of 1 year were given.
10. Changes in the workers' compensation laws were the
subject of legislative hearings during the period January 1,
1981, to May 16, 1981. Excerpts from nine hearings at which the
cost savings of various proposed changes in the workers' com-
pensation system proposals were explicitly discussed were
stipulated to by the parties as follows:
a. March 11, 1981 Senator Labor Subcommittee.
b. March 30, 1981 Senator Labor Subcommittee.
c. April 2, 1981 Senate Employment Committee.
d. April 24, 1981 House Governmental Operations Committee.
e. May 4, 1981 House Appropriations Committee.
f. May 6, 1981 House Floor.
g. May 14, 1981 House-Senate Conference Committee.
h. May 15, 1981 House-Senate Conference Committee.
i. May 16, 1981 House Floor.
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11. At the May 15, 1981, meeting of the House-Senate Con-
ference Committee Commissioner Markman testified that the
cost saving effect of the sections of the bill which he was able
to estimate was 11% in the first year and an additional 2% per
year for 4 more years but that the cost savings could be as high
as 14% in the first year. Commissioner Markman's figures did
not include estimates on unpriceable amendments such as the
liberal construction change (§§ 56, 136) or the burden and stan-
dard of proof changes (§§ 55, 56).
12. The legislative history of SF 359 includes all of the
materials referred to in paragraph 9 hereof; the committee and
floor testimony and debates referred to in paragraph 10 hereof;
the testimony and submissions of information to the study
commissions referred to above and more fully discussed here-
after; and the reports of the study commissions. All of the leg-
islative history must be considered in determining whether the
Legislature had a rational basis for enacting the law challenged
in this action. Included in the legislative history which must be
considered are estimates of cost savings of amendments con-
sidered but never enacted, or enacted in some amended form.
Such estimates cannot be excluded from the Legislature's ra-
tional basis since they could well form the basis for estimates
and opinions of the cost savings effects of changes finally
enacted.
13. Many changes in benefits and administration which
were contained in SF 359, some in modified form, were either
recommended or referred to in the final report of the 1977-1979
Study Commission, including payment of permanent partial
awards on return to work, a delay in the escalator, a medical
fee schedule, computerization of the Department of Labor and
Industry, separating the Workers' Compensation Court of Ap-
peals from the Department of Labor and Industry, a limitation
on death benefits, rates to be set by competition rather than ad-
ministrative determination, and rounding payments to the
nearest dollar.
14. The first Study Commission staff found that litigation
is a major factor in increased workers compensation costs.
15. The first Study Commission staff found that litigation
results in many species of costs for a workers compensation
system, as described at pp. 200-01 of the first Study Commis-
sion report. These included attorney fee costs for the defend-
ants' attorneys and costs resulting from delays in rehabilitation
and return to work.
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16. The first Study Commission compared the administra-
tion of the Minnesota Worker's Compensation system with that
in Wisconsin, whose system was believed to function better.
Minnesota's loss development factors are bigger than Wiscon-
sin [sic] primarily because of delays in settling and litigatin
claims. Wisconsin's system results in a much lower litigation
rate. Senator Nichols, one of the Senate authors of SF 359 al-
luded to the Minnesota-Wisconsin comparison in committee
testimony.
17. Many administrative changes in ch. 346 were designed
to reduce litigation and thus lower costs although the amount
by which they would be successful in doing so might not be ac-
tuarially calculable. Examples include speeding up the
processing and improving administrative aspects of the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry operations by computerizing it
(§ 144), requiring first payment to be made within 14 days
(§ 96), changing procedures on the service of petitions (§ 106,
134-135, 72), transferring the workers' compensation judges to
the Hearing Examiner's Office (§ 105-108), and restricting the
workers' compensation court of appeals to an appellate func-
tion only and not a de novo trial court (§§ 113-120, 123-126, 133).
18. The first Study Commission received testimony from
many persons, including employers and insurers, to the effect
that the workers compensation law was being interpreted too
liberally in favor of injured workers in unjustified factual situa-
tions. An American Insurance Association study gathered by
the staff of the 1977-1979 Study Commission found that liberal
interpretation of the law was the number one ranked problem
in Minnesota.
19. The first Study Commission heard evidence that the
traditional standard of evidence in civil cases (preponderance
of the evidence) was not being applied in workers' compensa-
tion cases. In this connection it was said that not just the law
but also the "facts" in workers compensation cases are liberally
construed, that the preponderance of the evidence standard is
being ignored and that findings awarding compensation are in-
stead being based on a "scintilla of evidence".
20. Certain administrative changes in ch. 346 were
designed to address problems referred to in paragraphs 18 and
19, including amendments deleting certain liberal construction
language from the law (§ 136), prescribing that the law should
be construed as in other civil cases (§ 56), expressly placing the
burden of proof on the employee (§ 55) and expressly defining
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the standard of proof to be "preponderance of the evidence"
(§ 56).
21. The first Study Commission heard evidence to the ef-
fect that the workers' compensation court system was partial to
injured workers, and that it was plaintiff-biased. The testimony
was that many of the workers' compensation judges were for-
merly civil service attorneys whose function is to represent
plaintiffs, that workers' compensation court of appeals judges
are often former workers' compensation judges, that all have
come up through the system together at the Department of La-
bor and Industry, and all office together at the State Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry.
22. Certain administrative changes in ch. 346 were
designed to improve the impartiality of the workers compensa-
tion court system including designating the workers' compen-
sation court of appeals as a separate entity organizationally
from the Department of Labor and Industry, redefining the
function of that court to that of an appellate body, and moving
the workers' compensation judges (physically and organiza-
tionally) to the Office of Administrative Hearings.
23. In April, 1981, the Minnesota Legislature passed differ-
ent versions of SF 359. The bills went to a Conference Commit-
tee and a final bill was passed out of the Conference
Committee on May 16, 1981. The Conference Committee Re-
port passed the Senate by 55 to 7 and the House by 91 to 39. On
June 1, 1981, the Governor signed the Act, which became law
as Minn. Laws 1981, ch. 346.
24. The Act made a number of changes in the benefits
payable under the Workers' Compensation Law and in the ad-
ministration and operation of the law.
25. Section 142 of the Act directed the Commissioner of
Insurance to within 15 days reduce by 15% the schedule of
maximum rates. Under Minn. Stat. § 79.21 (1980) the schedule
of maximum rates establishes the maximum rate insurers may
charge, although insurers may charge less than this rate.
26. Plaintiffs' claims that the Legislature lacked a rational
basis for mandating this reduction are unsubstantiated.
27. The legislative history of SF 359 shows that the Legis-
lature had before it sufficient information and data, including
numerical estimates of many amendments which were subject
to actuarial or numerical evaluation and also including non-nu-
merical opinions that other amendments would lead to cost
savings, albeit in amounts which were not actuarially determi-
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nable, as to clearly preclude a finding that the Legislature acted
arbitrarily, capriciously or irrationally in mandating a 15% rate
reduction.
28. Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the cost savings re-
sulting from the aggregate of all of the benefit, administrative
and operational changes in ch. 346 are less than 15%.
29. The cost savings in the Act are greater than 15% and
indeed are at least 20%.
30. The plaintiff Association has insufficient standing to
act as a party herein.
31. Any conclusions of law herein which should be termed
findings of fact are hereby adopted as such.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Section 142 of Minn. Laws 1981, ch. 346 does not deprive
Plaintiffs or any of them of due process of law in contravention
of Minn. Const. Art. I, § 7 or U.S. Constit. Amend. 14.
2. The plaintiff Association has insuifucient statutory au-
thority to act as a party in a declaratory judgment action seek-
ing a declaration that a law is unconstitutional.
3. Any findings of fact herein which should be termed con-
clusions of law are hereby adopted as such.
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. That Plaintiffs action be dismissed with prejudice and
that Defendants be awarded judgment declaring that Section
142 of Minn. Laws 1981, ch. 346 is valid and constitutional in all
respects;
2. That the plaintiff Association is dismissed as a party
from this action; and
3. That Defendants be awarded their costs and disburse-
ments herein.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: March 2, 1982 JAMES M. LYNCH
Judge of District Court
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